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This thesis consists of three studies on corporate governance issues of 
Chinese listed companies. In the first study, I investigate the role of board 
secretaries in management earnings forecasts. Individuals in this senior 
executive position are responsible for coordinating information disclosure. I 
find that their legal and accounting expertise and foreign experience help 
improve management earnings forecast quality. The quality of forecasts, as 
indicated by forecast occurrence, frequency, precision and accuracy, is 
positively associated with board secretaries’ duality role and equity holdings, 
whereas it is negatively associated with their political connections. The quality 
of forecasts is found to increase the compensation of board secretaries. Finally, 
I show that the equity holdings of board secretaries reduce litigation risks and 
increase corporate philanthropic giving. 
Based on the notion that women cooperate more with women than with 
men, my second study examines the gender interaction effect between female 
top managers and female board directors in Chinese firms. I show that this 
gender interaction is positively associated with the firm’s accounting return but 
negatively associated with its stock price return. Earnings management, which 
can lead to overstated accounting numbers but unfavourable stock market 
reactions, partly explains the opposite results. Furthermore, I find that only the 
newly appointed female top managers engage in this earnings management. 
Overall, the findings suggest that the pressure on women to perform leads to 
‘women helping women’, which is detrimental to shareholders’ value. 
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Women are underrepresented on corporate boards. By employing the 
large variation in socioeconomic development across provinces of China, the 
third study shows that the barriers to board gender diversity are deeply rooted 
in societal gender role attitudes. I find that corporate boards tend to be more 
gender diverse in a province where there is a smaller gender difference in 
educational achievement in STEM disciplines, where there is a stronger belief 
that women and men possess equal intrinsic abilities, or where female political 
leaders are present in the provincial government or communist party. However, 
I find little evidence that female labour force participation or childcare provision 
would affect board gender diversity. Collectively, the findings suggest that it is 
the gender equality attitudes rather than the supply of average female labour 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Focusing on the research area of corporate governance, this thesis studies 
how managerial characteristics affect firm outcomes by shaping corporate 
governance. By definition, corporate governance is the system of mechanisms, 
processes and practices that are used to control and govern companies. The 
function of corporate governance system is largely dependent on the 
effectiveness of management, which is linked to the managers’ personal 
characteristics. Most of previous literature in this field has employed a variety 
of financial data from advanced economies to establish empirical findings. 
More recently, a growing number of studies in top finance journals have turned 
to use Chinese data  (e.g., Ayyagari et al. 2010; Giannetti et al. 2015; Qian et 
al. 2015; Ru 2017). The increasing attention in China is not surprising because 
the Chinese economy is influential and interesting. Despite being the second 
largest economy in the world, China is governed by weak formal legal and 
regulatory systems relative to developed countries (Allen et al. 2005). When 
the external governance is inadequate to protect investors and shareholders, 
an effective internal corporate governance system is crucial. Thus, it is 
worthwhile to study what managerial characteristics can improve corporate 
governance and consequently firm performance. This thesis deals with this 
research question by using two unique features of Chinese listed firms. 
First, board secretary is a unique managerial post in Chinese firms, who 
oversees corporate information disclosure to outside investors and regulators. 
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The first study of the thesis examines what characteristics of board secretaries 
are related to the quality of corporation information disclosure. In western 
countries, corporate information is usually disclosed by CEOs or CFOs. 
However, CEOs and CFOs have many other duties and have great influence 
on comprehensive corporate tasks. It is difficult to link their specific 
characteristics directly to individual tasks such as information disclosure. The 
unique post of board secretary in China and their defined role in information 
disclosure afford me an opportunity to circumvent this problem. 
Second, Chinese firms have significantly higher female representation 
among CEO, CFO and executive director posts than U.S. firms. This unique 
feature of Chinese firms is necessary for studying gender issues in 
corporations. Simply speaking, if there are no women in these posts, it is 
impossible to study how gender-related factors can influence managers’ 
performance. Using this unique setting, the second and third studies of this 
thesis examine the effect of managerial gender in Chinese firms.  
Chapters 2–4 of this thesis contains three separate empirical studies. In 
each chapter, I first formulate the hypotheses based on existing literature and 
then build empirical models using data collected from well-established 
databases for Chinese listed firms, such as CSMAR, RESSET and China 
Statistical Yearbook. I analyse the data by employing standard econometrics 
techniques, including ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) regressions, probit regressions, margin analysis and 
event study.  
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Chapter 2 shows that board secretaries who have more expertise in legal 
and accounting areas, dual senior roles in the firms, and more equity incentives 
are more likely to issue management forecasts of higher quality. Politically 
connected board secretaries are found to be associated with lower forecast 
quality. Board secretaries with accounting expertise, dual senior roles and 
more equity incentives are more likely to issue bad news forecasts and 
downward guidance forecasts. Moreover, board secretaries who issue high-
quality forecasts have higher compensation and are less likely to be replaced. 
Overall, the results suggest that board secretaries play an important role in 
management earnings forecast disclosure. Finally, board secretaries have 
pervasive influences on corporate issues such as litigations and corporate 
social responsibility practices. 
Chapter 3 examines the gender interaction between female top managers 
and female board directors. The literature in sociology has shown that women 
are different from men in their core values (Sapienza et al. 2009; Adams & 
Funk 2012). In the corporate governance field, the prior literature has either 
assessed the gender composition of the top management team or of the board 
of directors (Adams & Ferreira 2009; Huang & Kisgen 2013; Faccio et al. 2016). 
Given the evidence that women cooperate more with women than with men 
(Weber & Zulehner 2010; Matsa & Miller 2011; Price 2012; Tate & Yang 2015), 
I argue that the gender interaction between female top managers and female 
board directors can take place and exert an impact at the firm level. I show that 
this gender interaction increases ROA but depresses stock prices. Further 
analysis shows that the increased ROA is due to earnings management. 
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Finally, I find that the gender interaction effects disappear when women 
managers hold their leadership roles for more than one year. The results 
suggest that when women leaders face stronger performance pressure during 
their initial year in leadership, they tend to liaise with women directors to sugar-
coat their performance through earnings manipulation, which hurts 
shareholders’ value. 
Chapter 4 explores the sources of gender diversity on corporate boards. 
Historically, women have been severely underrepresented on the board of 
directors (Adams & Kirchmaier 2015). Previous regulatory policies that aim to 
increase board gender diversity, such as mandatory gender quota, have all 
targeted firms. If barriers to women’s participation on the board are rooted in 
local communities – for example, if there exist negative gender stereotypes – 
then it is necessary to take actions at a societal level. My results support this 
argument by showing that board gender diversity is positively associated with 
three provincial-level gender equality proxies, including (1) the gender 
composition of the student enrolment from each province into Tsinghua 
University, the top-ranked STEM-oriented university in China; (2) the beliefs 
about gender differences in intrinsic abilities, career development and 
housework division from the Chinese General Social Survey; and (3) the 
existence of female political role models in the provincial government and 
communist party. Finally, I find that female labour force participation rates and 
childcare provision, which have potential effects on women’s supply, do not 
affect board gender diversity. Collectively, the results suggest that board 
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gender diversity is associated with local gender equality environments, not the 
supply of women at grass-root levels. 
This thesis makes three major contributions to the corporate governance 
literature. The first study on board secretaries opens a new research avenue 
for the top management team (TMT) literature by studying a unique top 
managerial post in Chinese firms. This study suggests that board secretaries’ 
characteristics affect corporate information disclosure, which has implications 
for regulators and policymakers to increase corporate financial transparency. 
The second study bridges two strands of literature on the gender composition 
of the TMT and the gender diversity of the board of directors. It further extends 
the work of Amore et al. (2014) by showing that the gender interaction between 
female top managers and female board directors leads to a short-lived 
increment in ROA, which is a result of earnings management. The third study 
provides the first evidence that improved provincial-level gender equality 
beliefs can promote corporate board gender diversity. This study contributes 
to board gender diversity literature by suggesting that the sources of the 
diversity are deeply rooted in gender role ideology in local communities.  
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 introduces the whole thesis. 
Chapter 2 presents the article entitled ‘Do Board Secretaries Influence 
Management Earnings Forecasts?’ published in the Journal of Business Ethics 
in 2017. Chapter 3 presents my working paper entitled ‘Does Gender 
Interaction Enhance or Impede Firm Performance?’ Chapter 4 presents my 
recent work exploring the sources of corporate board gender diversity, entitled 
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‘Do Local Gender Equality Attitudes Affect Women’s Representation on 







Chapter 2  
Do Board Secretaries Influence Management Earnings 
Forecasts? 
2.1. Introduction 
Managers often release earnings forecasts prior to the actual earnings 
announcement to show their ability to anticipate economic environment 
changes and adjust production plans (Trueman 1986; Marini 1989). Various 
characteristics of a top management team (TMT) affect the style of 
management earnings forecasts (Bamber et al. 2010). The literature has 
largely examined the roles of Chief Financial Officer (Geiger & North 2006; 
Jiang et al. 2010), Chief Counsel1 (Kwak et al. 2012; Hopkins et al. 2014; Bird 
et al. 2015), Chief Risk Officer (Aabo et al. 2005), Chief Knowledge Officer 
(Earl & Scott 1999) and Chief Marketing Officer (Nath & Mahajan 2008). From 
2006, Chinese listed companies are required to have a board secretary to 
coordinate information disclosure and board meetings. According to the 
Chinese Company Law, board secretaries are a top manager role, not a non-
executive role. This article studies how board secretaries influence 
management earnings forecasts. 
Although board secretaries in China and company secretaries in other 
countries share similar responsibilities for coordinating board meetings, 
                                            
 
1 The Chief Counsel is the head of the legal department, and is also known as General Counsel 




managing internal information flow and ensuring regulatory compliance, 2 
board secretaries have additional responsibilities for firms’ information 
disclosure to and relationship management with outside investors. Since board 
secretaries are top managers and managers’ personal characteristics are 
found to influence management earnings forecasts (Bamber et al. 2010), we 
expect that professional expertise could influence the professional ability of 
board secretaries in fulfilling their earnings forecasts duties. Board secretaries 
with legal expertise are better aware of litigation risks and, hence, are more 
likely to make fair forecasts to reduce information asymmetry (Kwak et al. 
2012). Board secretaries with an accounting background have sound 
knowledge of firms’ financial situation and can make more accurate forecasts. 
Board secretaries with international experience usually possess advanced 
knowledge about legal institutions and corporate governance (Giannetti et al. 
2015; Duan & Hou 2017) and, therefore, tend to improve the quality of 
management earnings forecasts. 
Political connection is another important managerial characteristic in the 
Chinese setting. Politically connected managers are often entrenched in firms 
and are less likely to be replaced, reducing their incentive to improve firm 
performance (Cao et al. 2011; You & Du 2012). In addition, politically 
connected managers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may pursue social 
objectives rather than the maximisation of shareholder wealth (Fan et al. 2007). 
                                            
 
2 McNulty and Stewart (2015) point out that company secretaries are responsible for statutory 





Politically connected board secretaries may be former bureaucrats who are 
lack of business knowledge or experience. We expect that politically 
connected board secretaries – those who are members of the Chinese 
communist party – are likely to issue low-quality forecasts. 
Role duality for board secretaries is common. Many board secretaries also 
sit on the board or serve as a senior executive (e.g., CFO). Role duality can 
bring information advantage, expand managerial power (Finkelstein 1992) and 
strengthen managerial entrenchment (Finkelstein & D'aveni 1994). We expect 
that board secretaries holding duality roles have better access to corporate 
internal information and resources and thus generate high-quality 
management earnings forecasts.  
Finally, managerial ownership can align the interests of managers and 
shareholders and mitigate agency problems (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Datta 
et al. 2005). Nagar et al. (2003) show that the alignment of CEO and 
shareholders’ interests increases the frequency of management earnings 
forecasts. We predict that board secretaries with more equity holdings are 
more willing to serve the interests of shareholders by issuing management 
forecasts of higher quality.   
To test our four predictions, we hand collect the characteristics of board 
secretaries for the period 2002–2012. We examine the impact of board 
secretaries on five proxies for the quality of management earnings forecasts – 
forecast occurrence, frequency, precision, accuracy and optimism. The 




positively related to the expertise, role duality and equity holdings of board 
secretaries, but is negatively related to their political connections. Further, 
board secretaries with accounting expertise, role duality and equity holdings 
are more likely to issue bad news and downward guidance forecasts, which 
help reduce legal and reputational risks. In addition, we study the influence of 
management earnings forecasts on corporate decisions regarding board 
secretaries’ compensation and turnover. We find that board secretaries 
engaging in high-quality forecast disclosure receive higher compensation and 
have more stable job retention. Finally, we perform additional analyses to 
examine the board secretaries’ impact on corporate policy and show that 
equity holdings of board secretaries reduce firms’ litigation risks and improve 
corporate social responsibility. Overall, the results suggest an important role 
of board secretaries in management earnings forecasts. 
Our study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, to the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first study on board secretaries, opening a new 
research avenue for TMT studies. It also complements the existing literature 
on the roles of Chief Financial Officer (Geiger & North 2006; Jiang et al. 2010), 
Chief Counsel (Kwak et al. 2012; Hopkins et al. 2014; Bird et al. 2015), Chief 
Risk Officer (Aabo et al. 2005), Chief Knowledge Officer (Earl & Scott 1999) 
and Chief Marketing Officer (Nath & Mahajan 2008). 
Second, this study adds to the management forecast literature by finding 
a new managerial determinant of the forecast quality. The existing literature 
has documented the impact of demographic characteristics of top managers, 




(Bamber et al. 2010; Baik et al. 2011; Brochet et al. 2011; Kwak et al. 2012; 
Cassell et al. 2013). We provide original evidence that the quality of 
management earnings forecasts is also related to board secretaries’ 
professional expertise, political connections, role duality and equity holdings.  
Third, this study contributes to studies of managerial effects on business 
ethics (Rogers & Stocken 2005; Slater & Dixon-Fowler 2009; Chen et al. 2016; 
Lee 2017). As the accurate and timely disclosure of corporate information is a 
fundamental element of ethical communication (Holley 1998; Ruppel & 
Harrington 2000), management earnings forecasts play a key role in investor 
protection. Ethical managers are expected to provide high-quality forecast 
information to stakeholders. Furthermore, our findings suggest that board 
secretaries also impact the firms’ litigation risks and corporate social 
responsibility.   
This study has important policy implications for regulators and policy 
makers who aim to establish an effective governance mechanism within the 
context of China. Our results suggest that certain requirements regarding the 
expertise and equity holdings of board secretaries will help improve 
management earnings forecast quality. Appointing a board member or senior 
executive of the firm as its board secretary will also be beneficial.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 
introduces the institutional background. Section 2.3 reviews the related 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 2.4 describes the sample and 









2.2. Institutional background 
The top management team (TMT) is a group of individuals who manage 
the operations of the firms at the highest corporate level. The TMT typically 
consists of Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Technology 
Officer, Chief Operations Officer, Chief Marketing Officer, Chief Counsel and 
Chief Risk Officer.  
As a unique post in Chinese firms, the board secretary is a part of the TMT. 
As prescribed in the Guidance for the Articles of Listed Company (1997) and 
the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005), it is the 
responsibility of board secretaries to deliver corporate information to 
stakeholders. The Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (2008) and the Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks on Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange (2008) further strengthen board secretaries’ information 
disclosure roles by stating that ‘a listed company must establish an information 
disclosure department and put the board secretary to manage this department’; 
‘the board secretary is responsible for disclosing material information to the 
public, coordinating information disclosure matters, establishing standardised 
information disclosure systems and urging other managers to observe relevant 
disclosure regulations’; and ‘the board secretary is responsible for disclosing 
corporate information in a timely manner, ensuring confidentiality with regard 




non-published material information is leaked.’3 
Board secretaries have other obligations. First, board secretaries are 
responsible for ensuring corporate decisions in compliance with laws and 
regulations by providing professional legal advice to the TMT. Second, they 
educate other top managers about the latest rules and regulations on 
information disclosure. Third, they act as a liaison between firms and different 
regulatory agencies, such as the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CRSC), the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges and local securities 
authorities. Fourth, they answer the consulting calls of investors, communicate 
with media reporters and assist financial analysts’ investigation in the firms. 
Overall, board secretaries perform multiple duties in corporate operations and 
aim to improve information disclosure and corporate governance. 
The post of Chinese board secretaries is originated from company 
secretaries in western countries. Although individuals in both roles serve as 
senior executives in charge of issues such as provision of legal assistance, 
safekeeping of business documents and maintaining contact with investors, 
Chinese board secretaries differ greatly from company secretaries in certain 
aspects. Since the Model Business Corporation Act of 1984 granted U.S. firms 
the discretion to specify titles and duties for their management team members, 
the original role of company secretaries in U.S. firms has been blurred. For 
instance, instead of company secretaries, in the U.S. CEOs and CFOs often 
                                            
 





release corporate information to the public, General Counsels often liaise with 
regulators, and Chief Compliance Officers ensure the firms’ legal compliance. 
In China board secretaries report directly to boards of directors, whereas in the 
U.S. company secretaries report to General Counsels or CEOs.  
As Chinese board secretaries undertake legal and regulatory duties and 
expose themselves to high litigation risks of irresponsible forecast disclosure, 
Chinese board secretaries could have a more active and positive role in 
corporate information disclosure than company secretaries of western 
countries. Further, Chinese board secretaries report directly to boards of 
directors and are expected to safeguard the interests of shareholders by 
making accurate information disclosure.  
The financial forecasting of Chinese firms is different from that of U.S. 
firms in two ways. First, Chinese firms generate their forecast based on the 
deviation of their own prediction about future earnings from the actual earnings 
of the firms in the corresponding period of the previous year, while U.S. firms 
make a forecast by comparing the consensus market expectation about future 
earnings with their own prediction of the earnings. Second, Chinese listed firms 
usually issue management forecasts of future net profits, whereas U.S. firms 





2.3. Literature and hypotheses development  
2.3.1. The literature 
Previous literature has shown that top managers have an influence on 
management earnings forecasts. Baik et al. (2011) document a positive 
relation between CEO ability and the likelihood, frequency and accuracy of 
management earnings forecasts. Stock markets respond more strongly to 
earnings forecasts issued by more capable CEOs, which suggests that 
management earnings forecasts communicate information regarding CEOs’ 
ability to the market. Cassell et al. (2013) show that retiring CEOs are more 
likely to issue earnings forecasts in the final year of their tenure, and that those 
final-year forecasts are more likely to convey good news. This result is more 
significant when CEOs have more equity holdings or when CEOs cut final-year 
spending in R&D and capital expenditure. These findings suggest that retiring 
CEOs tend to manage final-year earnings forecasts for self-serving benefits. 
Kwak et al. (2012) find that firms with a General Counsel in the TMT are more 
likely to issue earnings forecasts, and that their forecasts are less optimistic 
and more accurate. They further show that the influence of General Counsels 
on forecast disclosure is more salient when the General Counsel holds an 
additional role of company secretary or has higher compensation. 
The literature also documents a link between management styles and the 
voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts. Bamber et al. (2010) show that 
managers’ styles regarding earnings forecast disclosure are associated with 




background. Brochet et al. (2011) find that firms that appoint new CEOs with 
previous forecasting experience are more likely to issue earnings forecasts. 
Regarding CFOs, they further document that, in firms that have historically 
issued earnings forecasts, there is a temporary break in the forecast issuance 
following CFO turnover. The subsequent forecasts by the new CFO are less 
precise due to the CFO’s little experience in the firm or the industry.   
The literature suggests that managers tend to strategically manage 
earnings forecasts to serve their own benefits. Cheng and Lo (2006) report 
that managers who plan to buy their firm’s stocks are more likely to issue bad 
news forecasts in order to reduce the purchase price, while managers who 
plan to sell their firm’s stocks tend to maintain their forecasting style in view of 
the high litigation risks associated with insider sales. Cheng et al. (2013) find 
that before insider sales, the more positive news forecasts issued by the 
managers are more precise. They further show that managers are less inclined 
to strategically manage forecast precision when large institutional investors are 
present or when this forecasting behaviour poses high litigation risks. 
Management earnings forecast outcomes also have implications for 
individual managers. Trueman (1986) reports that investors use management 
forecast quality to evaluate managers’ ability to adjust production plans in 
response to foreseeable changes in business environments. Lee et al. (2012) 
find that inaccurate management earnings forecasts result in quick 
replacement of CEOs in underperforming firms. This suggests that when 
making decisions on CEO replacement, the board of directors evaluates CEOs’ 




accuracy of management earnings forecasts. The relation between forecast 
accuracy and CEO turnover is more pronounced when the CEOs are less 
entrenched in the firms.  
2.3.2. Hypothesis 1: Expertise 
Research in the area of corporate governance has long focused on the 
effects of top managers’ demographic characteristics on firm performance 
(Nelson 2005; Kaplan et al. 2012). Bamber et al. (2010) show that top 
managers’ personal characteristics, including age, education and functional 
experience, affect management earnings forecasts. Since board secretaries 
are members of the TMT and are legally responsible for information disclosure, 
we argue that their demographic characteristics, such as legal expertise, 
accounting expertise and international experience, are associated with their 
competence in improving management forecasts. 
Board secretaries with legal expertise are more sensitive to litigation risks 
induced by information asymmetry and hence more likely to improve forecast 
quality. Further, since these board secretaries are more capable of advising 
the TMT on issues related to legislative and regulatory compliance, this can 
form a competent TMT which can better manage the firm’s overall risk and 
information disclosure practice. In addition, the forecasts of the firms’ earnings 
demand board secretaries’ accounting knowledge. Board secretaries with 
accounting expertise have a better understanding of the firms’ financial 
conditions and thus can have a more accurate prediction of the future earnings.  




characteristic. Chinese returnee managers have opportunities to learn about 
advanced legal institutions and superior management practices in foreign 
countries (Duan & Hou 2017). Giannetti et al. (2015) provide evidence that 
board directors with international experience can transfer advanced 
governance and management knowledge they acquired from overseas to 
Chinese firms, which leads to improved corporate governance and earnings 
performance of the local firms. In addition, managers’ international experience 
has been found to improve the firms’ social performance in local communities 
(Slater & Dixon-Fowler 2009). We expect that Chinese board secretaries with 
international work or study experience are more likely to enhance the quality 
of management earnings forecasts. We propose hypothesis H1 as follows.  
H1: The expertise of board secretaries (H1a: legal expertise, H1b: 
accounting expertise, H1c: international experience) is positively related to 
management forecast quality. 
2.3.3. Hypothesis 2: Political connection 
It has been shown that in Chinese firms, managers’ political connections 
can undermine the firms’ financial performance because these managers lack 
business experience and often pursue private gains rather than shareholder 
wealth maximisation (Fan et al. 2007). In addition, political connections 
aggravate managerial entrenchment and impede managerial accountability 
(Cao et al. 2011; You & Du 2012). We therefore expect that politically 
connected board secretaries are less capable of issuing high-quality earnings 




H2: The political connection of board secretaries is negatively related to 
management forecast quality. 
2.3.4. Hypothesis 3: Role duality  
In Finkelstein’s (1992) framework, the structural power of individual 
managers is assessed by the number of official titles they hold. He points out 
that top managers’ ability to influence corporate decisions is contingent on their 
power. In China, board secretaries often have a duality role and serve as the 
firm’s board director, CFO or another senior executive post (e.g. president or 
vice-president). We argue that board secretaries holding additional senior titles 
can access and employ more resources to provide management earnings 
forecasts of higher quality.  
The organisation theory suggests that the consolidation of management 
and board roles promotes unity of command and increases organisation 
effectiveness (Boyd 1990; Donaldson & Davis 1991; Boyd 1995; Pfeffer & 
Salancik 2003). Board secretaries who are also board members have their 
own interests better aligned with shareholders, which could enhance forecast 
quality. Board secretaries who are CFOs have better insights into the firms’ 
financial information and can take this advantage to issue accurate forecasts. 
Board secretaries who hold another senior executive post in the firms are more 
involved in the firms’ business operations, which potentially results in higher 
forecast quality. We thus propose hypothesis H3 as follows. 
H3: The role duality of board secretaries (H3a: board member, H3b: CFO, 





2.3.5. Hypothesis 4: Equity holding 
Producing high-quality forecasts is sometimes costly and board 
secretaries may have incentives (e.g., insider trading) to withhold corporate 
information. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Datta et al. (2005) point out that 
managerial equity holdings can alleviate agency problems and facilitate 
managers’ incentive alignment with investors. Nagar et al. (2003) find that 
CEOs whose interests are better aligned with those of shareholders issue 
earnings forecasts more frequently. We expect that equity holdings can 
incentivise board secretaries to issue high-quality forecasts. We propose 
hypothesis H4 as follows. 
H4: The equity holding of board secretaries is positively related to 







2.4. Data and research design 
2.4.1. Sample construction 
We hand collect board secretaries’ characteristics from their biography 
files in the China Securities Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
database for all listed firms on the main board of the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange between 2002 and 2012. 4  We obtain management earnings 
forecast data from the RESSET database. Both quarterly and annual 
management earnings forecasts are retained. Following Anilowski et al. (2007), 
we require that a quarterly management forecast is issued before the earnings 
announcement for the forecast fiscal quarter and no more than 90 days prior 
to the end of that fiscal quarter. For annual forecasts, we require that the 
forecast is issued prior to the earnings announcement for the forecast fiscal 
year and no more than 730 days prior to the end of that fiscal year.  
Table 2.1 summarises the definition and data sources of the variables. 
We merge the management forecast data with data on board secretary 
characteristics, corporate governance and firm characteristics. The final 
sample to conduct management forecast occurrence and frequency analyses 
contains 6,840 firm-year observations. Out of them, 5,362 firm-years have at 
least one management forecast issuance, which will be used to analyse   
                                            
 
4  Due to the high workload in data hand-collection, we only include firms listed on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. There is no evidence that the role of board secretaries in the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange would be any different. The sample starts from 2002 because 




Table 2.1 Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Data 
Source 
Occurrence A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm issues at least one 
management forecast in a given year, and 0 otherwise. 
RESSET 
Frequency The total number of management forecasts issued by a 
firm in a given year. 
RESSET 
Precision Coded as 3 if a firm issues a point forecast, 2 if it issues a 
range forecast, 1 if it issues an open-interval forecast, and 
0 if it issues a qualitative forecast. 
RESSET 
Accuracy The absolute difference between the management 
forecast of net profits and the actual net profits, scaled by 
the market value of tradable shares on the day prior to the 
forecast release date, and then multiplied by –1. 
RESSET 
Optimism Coded as 1 if the forecasted net profit is higher than the 
actual net profits, 0 if it is equal to the actual net profits, 
and –1 if it is lower than the actual net profits. 
RESSET 
Ln(Horizon) The natural logarithm of the number of days between the 
forecast release date and the actual earnings 
announcement date. 
RESSET 
Pr(BadNews) A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm issues at least one 
bad news management forecast in a given year, and 0 
otherwise. 
RESSET 
#BadNews The total number of bad news management forecasts 
issued by a firm in a given year. 
RESSET 
%BadNews The fraction of management forecasts that convey bad 
news. 
RESSET 
Law A dummy variable equal to 1 if a board secretary holds a 
lawyer license, and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR 
Accounting A dummy variable equal to 1 if a board secretary holds a 
professional accounting certificate, and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR 
ForeignExp Coded as 1 if a board secretary has work or study 
experience in a foreign country, 0.5 if s/he has work or 
study experience in Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan, and 0 
otherwise. 
CSMAR 
PartyMeb A dummy variable equal to 1 if a board secretary is a 
member of the Chinese communist party, and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR 
Board_Duality A dummy variable equal to 1 if a board secretary sits on 
the board of the firm, and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR 
CFO_Duality A dummy variable equal to 1 if a board secretary serves 
as the firm’s CFO, and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR 
Mag_Duality A dummy variable equal to 1 if a board secretary holds an 
additional non-accounting senior executive position in the 
firm, and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR 
EquityHold The natural logarithm of 1 plus the equity holding, where 
equity holding is defined as the change in the value of the 
board secretary’s stockholding of the firm given a 1% 





Female A dummy variable equal to 1 if a board secretary is female, 
and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR 
Age The age of a board secretary. CSMAR 
Ln(Tenure) The natural logarithm of the number of days that a board 
secretary has held this post. 
CSMAR 
Ln(Pay) The natural logarithm of the sum of a board secretary’s 
salary and bonus. 
CSMAR 
Turnover A dummy variable equal to 1 if a board secretary steps 
down from this post in a given year, and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR 
BIndep The proportion of independent directors on the board. CSMAR 
InstHold The proportion of shares held by institutional investors. RESSET 
GovHold The proportion of shares held by the Chinese government. RESSET 
CR The proportion of stocks held by a firm’s ten largest 
blockholders. 
RESSET 
Duality A dummy variable equal to 1 if a CEO works as the chair 
of the board, and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR 
BMeet The number of board meetings. CSMAR 
P/B The ratio of market value to book value of equity. CSMAR 
Ln(Assets) The natural logarithm of total assets. CSMAR 
MBE A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm’s actual earnings 
meet or beat the most recent consensus analyst forecast, 
and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR 
CMBE A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm’s actual earnings 
meet or beat the most recent consensus analyst forecast 
for the past two consecutive years, and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR 
Crisis A dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation year is in 
the crisis period of 2007-2008, and 0 otherwise. 
N/A 
Industry The first two digits of the Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS) code. 
CCER 
MAO A dummy variable equal to 1 if a modified auditor opinion 
is issued to a firm, and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR 
SUE A dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a lawsuit against a 
firm, and 0 otherwise.  
CCER 
Donation The natural logarithm of social donations (in Chinese 
RMB).  
CSMAR 
CSR_Disclose A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm discloses its 
corporate social responsibility practice in its annual report, 
and 0 otherwise.  
CSMAR 
CapExp The ratio of capital expenditure to cash flow  CSMAR 
Opacity The absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated 
based on the Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model. 
CSMAR 
ROA Return on assets. CSMAR 




management forecast precision. For analysis of forecast accuracy and 
optimism, the sample size is further reduced to 4,818 firm-years due to missing 
data of firms’ earnings or stock price. 
2.4.2. Empirical model 
Forecasting quality can be evaluated through five forecasting properties: 
occurrence, frequency, precision, accuracy and optimism. Occurrence is a 
dummy indicator equal to 1 if there is at least one management forecast 
issuance in a given firm-year, and 0 otherwise. Frequency is the total number 
of forecasts issued by a firm in a given year. Precision is coded as 3 if the 
forecast is a point forecast, 2 if it is a range forecast, 1 if it is an open-interval 
forecast, and 0 if it is a qualitative forecast. Accuracy is the absolute difference 
between the management forecast of net profits and the actual net profits, 
scaled by the market value of tradable shares one day prior to the forecast 
release date, and then multiplied by –1. A lower value of Accuracy indicates 
lower management forecast accuracy. 5  Optimism is coded as 1 if the 
management earnings forecast is higher than the actual net profits (i.e., 
optimistic bias), 0 if it is equal to the actual net profits, and –1 if it is less than 
the actual net profits (i.e., pessimistic bias).  
To examine the impact of board secretary characteristics on the properties 
of management earnings forecasts, we use the following regression model: 
                                            
 
5 Forecast accuracy can be measured only when there is a forecast release. Hence, forecast 
















      
(Equation 2.1) 
where i indexes firm, and t indexes year. The dependent variable measures 
one of the following forecast properties: Occurrence, Frequency, Precision, 
Accuracy and Optimism.  
When firms issue multiple forecasts in a year, we take their average 
values to construct Precision, Accuracy and Optimism. We use point, range 
and open-interval forecasts to construct Accuracy and Optimism. For range 
forecasts, the midpoint of the range is used as the management forecast 
estimate (Kross et al. 2011). For open-interval forecasts, the value provided in 
the open interval forecast is taken as the management forecast estimate (Yang 
2012; Cassell et al. 2013).  
We examine how these forecast properties are associated with board 
secretary characteristics, including expertise, political connection, role duality 
and equity holding. We construct three variables as proxies for the expertise. 
Law is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a board secretary holds a lawyer license, 
and 0 otherwise. Accounting is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a board 
secretary holds a professional accounting certificate, and 0 otherwise. 
ForeignExp is coded as 1 if a board secretary has work or study experience in 
foreign countries, 0.5 if s/he has work experience in Hong Kong, Macau or 
Taiwan, and 0 otherwise. Following Li et al. (2008), we use the membership in 




secretaries. PartyMeb equals 1 if the secretary is a member of the Chinese 
communist party, and 0 otherwise.  
We also examine three forms of board secretary duality as indicated by 
Board_Duality, CFO_Duality and Mag_Duality. Board_Duality is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the board secretary is the firm’s board member, and 0 
otherwise. CFO_Duality is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the board secretary 
serves as the firm’s CFO, and 0 otherwise. Mag_Duality is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the board secretary holds an additional non-accounting senior 
executive post in the firm, and 0 otherwise.  
Finally, we examine the effect of board secretaries’ equity holdings on 
management forecast properties. The equity holding is measured as the 
change in the value of the secretary’s stockholding of the firm given a 1% 
increase in the firm’s stock price (Bergstresser & Philippon 2006; Burns & 
Kedia 2006). The natural logarithm of 1 plus the equity holding calculated 
above constitutes the variable EquityHold. 
The regressions control for a number of demographic characteristics of 
board secretaries. Female is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a board secretary 
is female, and 0 otherwise. Age is the age of the board secretary. Ln(Tenure) 
is the natural logarithm of the number of days that a board secretary has held 
this post. If there is a board secretary replacement within a firm-year, we use 
the characteristics of the board secretary holding the post at the year-end to 
construct these variables. 




management forecast quality (Ajinkya et al. 2005; Karamanou & Vafeas 2005). 
We thus control for corporate governance characteristics. BIndep is the 
proportion of independent directors on the board. BMeet is the number of 
board meetings. Duality is a binary variable equal to 1 if a CEO serves as the 
board chair, and 0 otherwise. InstHold is the proportion of shares held by 
institutional investors. GovHold is the proportion of shares held by the Chinese 
government.  
The regressions control for a variety of firm-level characteristics.6 Since 
Ajinkya et al. (2005) find a negative relation between ownership concentration 
and management forecast properties, we control for the concentration ratio 
(CR), measured as the proportion of stocks held by the firm’s ten largest 
blockholders. The price-to-book ratio (P/B) is included to account for the firms’ 
growth opportunities. Bamber and Cheon (1998) find that growth opportunities 
serving as an indicator of proprietary costs can affect firms’ forecasting choices. 
Ln(Assets) is calculated as the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets, and is 
included in our model because firm size has been found to affect forecast 
disclosures (Kasznik & Lev 1995; Baginski & Hassell 1997). We also control 
for Crisis, which is a dummy indicator of the crisis period of 2007–2008. 
Moreover, the literature on voluntary information disclosure suggests that firms 
                                            
 
6 The literature has shown that managers are likely to issue management forecasts to meet or 
beat the market’s expectations (Matsumoto 2002; Kross et al. 2011). As a robustness test, we 
further control for meeting or beating earnings expectations (MBE) and consistency in meeting 
or beating earnings expectations (CMBE). MBE equals 1 if a firm’s actual earnings meet or 
beat the most recent consensus analyst forecast, and 0 otherwise. CMBE equals 1 if a firm’s 
actual earnings meet or beat the most recent consensus analyst forecast for the past two 
consecutive years, and 0 otherwise. The results of the regressions including these two 





in different industries are exposed to different litigation costs, proprietary costs 
and information asymmetry severity, and thus manage their forecasting 
policies with different strategies (Kasznik & Lev 1995; Bamber & Cheon 1998). 
Therefore, we include Industry dummies, defined as the first two digits of the 
firm’s Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) code. 
We estimate Equation 2.1 using a Probit model if the dependent variable 
is Occurrence, a Poisson model if the dependent variable is Frequency, and 
an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression if the dependent variable is 
Precision, Accuracy or Optimism. For the regressions of Precision, Accuracy 
and Optimism, we add an additional control variable, Ln(Horizon), which is the 
natural logarithm of the number of days between the forecast release date and 
the actual earnings announcement date. Ln(Horizon) is included because the 
literature has found a negative relation between forecast horizon and forecast 
precision and accuracy  (Pownall et al. 1993; Baginski & Hassell 1997; Xu 
2010). If multiple forecasts are issued within a firm-year, we take the average 
horizon to generate the data. The independent variables of Equation 2.1, 
except Ln(Horizon), are lagged by one year relative to the dependent variable 
in order to mitigate reverse causality. We winsorise all continuous variables at 
the 1% and 99% levels. 
2.4.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics of management earnings 




Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics of Management Earnings Forecasts 
This table presents descriptive statistics of management earnings forecasts that have been issued between 2002–2012. The t-statistics 
for difference in mean and Wilcoxon z-statistics for difference in median are presented in brackets. *** denotes statistical significance at 
the 1% level. Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. 
  Annual Forecasts   Quarterly Forecasts   All Forecasts   Difference in Mean 
Difference in 
Median 
  Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 













(Annual - Quarterly) 
Precision 2.115 2.000 0.491  2.122 2.000 0.484  2.119 2.000 0.486  -0.007 -0.000 
             [-0.85] [-0.79] 
Accuracy -30.208 -6.286 194.423  -8.409 -2.204 33.356  
-
15.820 
-3.151 117.000  -21.799*** -4.081*** 
             [-10.78] [-35.22] 
Optimis
m 
0.093 1.000 0.996  -0.049 -1.000 0.999  -0.001 -1.000 1.000  0.142*** 2.000*** 









60.000 39.384  83.010 73.000 58.700  68.978*** 82.000*** 
             [81.65] [65.58] 






mean and median tests show that there is no significant difference in forecast 
precision between the two types of forecasts. However, the annual forecasts 
have lower accuracy, higher optimism and longer horizon than quarterly 
forecasts. 
Table 2.3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our 
regressions. The mean Occurrence is 0.654, 0.720 and 0.787 for annual 
forecasts, quarterly forecasts and all forecasts, respectively, suggesting that 
65.4%, 72% and 78.7% of firm-year observations contain at least one 
respective forecast issuance. The mean forecast frequency is 0.850, 1.680 
and 2.533 for annual forecasts, quarterly forecasts and all forecasts, 
respectively, suggestive of the prevalent forecast disclosure of Chinese firms. 
The 25th percentile of forecast precision is 2.00, 2.00 and 1.75 for annual 
forecasts, quarterly forecasts and all forecasts, respectively, which suggests 
the high propensity of Chinese firms to issue quantitative forecasts. The 
median forecast accuracy is –4.818 while the mean accuracy is –13.340, 
which suggests that the forecasts issued by certain firms or in certain years 
are extremely inaccurate. The mean Optimism is negative (–0.026) for all 
forecasts, indicating that management forecasts, on average, are 
pessimistically biased.  
In addition, we observe that 16.3% of board secretaries have an 
accounting certificate and 32.3% of board secretaries are communist party 
members. Only 2.0% of board secretaries have a lawyer license, and 3.5% 




Table 2.3 Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables 
This table presents descriptive statistics of management earnings forecast variables, 
board secretary characteristics, firm characteristics and firm outcome variables in the 
firm-year panel. Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. 
Variable #Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
Annual Management Forecasts 
Occurrence 6,840 0.654 0.476 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Frequency 6,840 0.850 0.750 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 3.000 
Precision 4,471 1.827 0.804 0.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 3.000 
Accuracy 3,839 -21.150 45.070 -311.700 -18.360 -6.511 -2.387 -0.054 
Optimism 3,839 0.077 0.946 -1.000 -1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Ln(Horizon) 4,462 4.759 0.530 2.398 4.549 4.916 5.112 5.609 
Pr(BadNews) 6,492 0.222 0.416 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
#BadNews 6,492 0.247 0.489 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.000 
%BadNews 6,492 0.214 0.405 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Quarterly Management Forecasts 
Occurrence 6,840 0.720 0.449 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Frequency 6,840 1.680 1.298 0.000 0.000 2.000 3.000 5.000 
Precision 4,922 1.837 0.776 0.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 3.000 
Accuracy 4,267 -7.259 14.040 -105.800 -7.264 -2.863 -1.070 -0.018 
Optimism 4,267 -0.053 0.846 -1.000 -1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Ln(Horizon) 4,906 3.984 0.649 1.792 3.738 4.190 4.511 4.736 
All Management Forecasts 
Occurrence 6,840 0.787 0.410 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Frequency 6,840 2.533 1.800 0.000 1.000 3.000 4.000 7.000 
Precision 5,380 1.817 0.771 0.000 1.750 2.000 2.000 3.000 
Accuracy 4,829 -13.340 27.530 -192.900 -12.270 -4.818 -1.846 -0.048 
Optimism 4,829 -0.026 0.787 -1.000 -1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 





(Table 2.3 continued) 
Variable #Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
Board Secretary Characteristics 
Law 6,840 0.020 0.139 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Accounting 6,840 0.163 0.369 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ForeignExp 6,840 0.035 0.169 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
PartyMeb 6,840 0.323 0.468 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Board_Duality 6,840 0.269 0.443 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
CFO_Duality 6,840 0.082 0.274 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Mag_Duality 6,840 0.408 0.492 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
EquityHold 6,834 2.086 3.942 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 13.800 
Female 6,840 0.177 0.382 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Age 6,840 40.550 7.010 23.000 35.000 40.000 45.000 71.000 
Ln(Tenure) 6,840 6.939 1.059 3.091 6.433 7.170 7.687 8.490 
Ln(Pay) 4,439 12.090 0.846 9.879 11.520 12.120 12.660 14.130 
Turnover 5,398 0.142 0.349 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Firm Characteristics 
BIndep 6,840 0.335 0.091 0.000 0.333 0.333 0.375 0.556 
InstHold 6,840 0.170 0.189 0.000 0.021 0.096 0.265 0.742 
GovHold 6,840 0.188 0.239 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.383 0.750 
CR 6,840 0.584 0.150 0.229 0.477 0.603 0.704 0.868 
Duality 6,840 0.203 0.402 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
BMeet 6,840 8.525 3.249 3.000 6.000 8.000 10.000 20.000 
P/B 6,840 4.060 3.769 -5.750 1.970 3.125 5.000 24.340 
Ln(Assets) 6,840 21.280 1.061 18.820 20.570 21.170 21.890 24.540 
MBE 3,328 0.401 0.490 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
CMBE 2,512 0.195 0.396 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Firm Outcomes 
MAO 5,773 0.081 0.273 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SUE 4,829 0.060 0.237 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Donation 4,084 1.496 4.394 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 19.600 
CSR_Disclose 4,084 0.219 0.414 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
CapExp 5,730 0.390 0.616 -0.939 0.065 0.215 0.509 3.900 
Opacity 6,172 0.118 0.189 0.001 0.024 0.057 0.122 1.205 
ROA 6,830 0.036 0.065 -0.168 0.010 0.034 0.067 0.177 




secretaries are board members, 8.2% are CFOs, and 40.8% hold another 
senior post in the firm. More than 75% of board secretaries do not hold any 





2.5.1. Board secretary characteristics and management forecast 
occurrence 
In Table 2.4, we examine the effects of board secretaries’ expertise, 
political connection, role duality and equity holding on management forecast 
occurrence by using annual forecasts, quarterly forecasts and all forecasts in 
Panels A, B and C, respectively.  
The coefficients of Law are significantly positive in models 6, 10, 11 and 
15, indicating that board secretaries with legal expertise are more likely to 
issue quarterly earnings forecasts. The coefficients of Accounting are 
significantly positive in models 1, 5, 6, 10, 11 and 15, indicating that board 
secretaries with accounting expertise are more likely to issue annual and 
quarterly earnings forecasts. The coefficients of ForeignExp are significantly 
positive in models 6 and 10, indicating that board secretaries with international 
experience are more likely to issue quarterly earnings forecasts. The results 
generally support the prediction that board secretaries with more expertise are 
more likely to issue forecasts, supporting the hypothesis H1.  
The coefficients of PartyMeb are significantly negative in models 2, 5, 7 
and 10 at the 5% level, suggesting an adverse effect of political connection on 





Table 2.4 Board Secretary Characteristics and Management Forecast 
Occurrence 
This table presents Probit regression results for the impact of board secretary 
characteristics on management forecast occurrence. The dependent variable is 
Occurrence, and all independent variables are lagged by one year relative to the 
dependent variable. Control variables and industry dummies are included but 
suppressed for brevity. Robust z-statistics are provided in brackets below each 
coefficient. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. 
Panel A: Annual Forecasts 
DV=Forecast occurrence (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Law 0.1795    0.1848 
 [1.43]    [1.46] 
Accounting 0.2106***    0.1573*** 
 [4.62]    [3.09] 
ForeignExp 0.0614    0.0399 
 [0.62]    [0.40] 
PartyMeb  -0.0920**   -0.0851** 
  [-2.52]   [-2.29] 
Board_Duality   0.1182***  0.0992*** 
   [3.11]  [2.58] 
CFO_Duality   0.2475***  0.1258* 
   [3.82]  [1.74] 
Mag_Duality   0.2229***  0.2082*** 
   [6.47]  [5.98] 
EquityHold    0.0330*** 0.0291*** 
    [7.77] [6.69] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
pseudo R2 0.098 0.096 0.104 0.101 0.11 
N 6840 6840 6853 6847 6834 
Panel B: Quarterly Forecasts 
DV=Forecast occurrence (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Law 0.2955**    0.2845** 
 [2.18]    [2.09] 
Accounting 0.1979***    0.1520*** 
 [4.10]    [2.84] 
ForeignExp 0.2315**    0.1947* 
 [2.15]    [1.77] 
PartyMeb  -0.0927**   -0.0787** 
  [-2.46]   [-2.06] 
Board_Duality   0.0431  0.0291 
   [1.09]  [0.73] 
CFO_Duality   0.2466***  0.1374* 
   [3.55]  [1.78] 
Mag_Duality   0.2580***  0.2413*** 
   [7.17]  [6.66] 
EquityHold    0.0229*** 0.0199*** 
    [5.25] [4.44] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
pseudo R2 0.106 0.104 0.112 0.106 0.116 




(Table 2.4 continued) 
Panel C: All Forecasts 
DV=Forecast occurrence  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Law 0.3532**    0.3326** 
 [2.32]    [2.17] 
Accounting 0.1612***    0.1294** 
 [3.16]    [2.28] 
ForeignExp 0.124    0.0971 
 [1.09]    [0.84] 
PartyMeb  -0.0547   -0.0456 
  [-1.37]   [-1.13] 
Board_Duality   0.0461  0.0326 
   [1.10]  [0.77] 
CFO_Duality   0.1906**  0.0976 
   [2.57]  [1.19] 
Mag_Duality   0.2089***  0.1950*** 
   [5.46]  [5.06] 
EquityHold    0.0194*** 0.0168*** 
    [4.19] [3.55] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
pseudo R2 0.108 0.106 0.111 0.108 0.114 





The coefficients of Board_Duality, CFO_Duality and Mag_Duality are 
significantly positive in models 3, 5, 8, 10, 13 and 15. These results suggest 
that board secretaries who are board members are more likely to issue annual 
earnings forecasts, and that board secretaries with an additional CFO or 
another senior executive title are more likely to issue both annual and quarterly 
earnings forecasts. These findings support the hypothesis H3.  
Finally, the coefficients of EquityHold are significantly positive in models 
4, 5, 9, 10, 14 and 15 at the 1% level, which indicates that board secretaries 
who hold shares of their firms are more likely to release annual and quarterly 
earnings forecasts to outside investors. This result supports the hypothesis H4. 
2.5.2. Board secretary characteristics and management forecast 
frequency 
In Table 2.5, we report the results for the effects of board secretary 
characteristics on management forecast frequency. We show that Law, 
Accounting and ForeignExp are positively associated with forecast frequency, 
indicating that the professional expertise of board secretaries improves 
earnings forecast frequency, supporting the hypothesis H1. PartyMeb is 
negatively related to forecast frequency, consistent with the hypothesis H2. 
Board_Duality, CFO_Duality and Mag_Duality are positively related to forecast 
frequency, lending support to the hypothesis H3. The coefficients of 
EquityHold are significantly positive in all models, which supports the 
hypothesis H4 that equity holdings provide incentives for board secretaries to 




Table 2.5 Board Secretary Characteristics and Management Forecast 
Frequency 
This table presents Poisson regression results for the impact of board secretary 
characteristics on management forecast frequency. The dependent variable is 
Frequency, and all independent variables are lagged by one year relative to the 
dependent variable. Control variables and industry dummies are included but 
suppressed for brevity. Robust z-statistics are provided in brackets below each 
coefficient. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. 
Panel A: Annual Forecasts 
DV=Forecast frequency (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Law 0.1501**    0.1514** 
 [2.12]    [2.13] 
Accounting 0.1054***    0.0769** 
 [4.07]    [2.55] 
ForeignExp 0.0731    0.0547 
 [1.31]    [0.98] 
PartyMeb  -0.0713***   -0.0632** 
  [-2.81]   [-2.49] 
Board_Duality   0.0629***  0.0615*** 
   [2.81]  [2.72] 
CFO_Duality   0.1282***  0.0756** 
   [4.06]  [2.04] 
Mag_Duality   0.1219***  0.1190*** 
   [5.81]  [5.63] 
EquityHold    0.0061*** 0.0038* 
    [2.80] [1.74] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
pseudo R2 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.024 0.026 
N 6840 6840 6853 6847 6834 
Panel B: Quarterly Forecasts 
DV=Forecast frequency (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Law 0.1207**    0.1185** 
 [2.37]    [2.28] 
Accounting 0.0952***    0.0733*** 
 [4.32]    [2.90] 
ForeignExp 0.1400***    0.1169*** 
 [3.30]    [2.76] 
PartyMeb  -0.0484**   -0.0375* 
  [-2.26]   [-1.75] 
Board_Duality   0.0363*  0.0338* 
   [1.89]  [1.75] 
CFO_Duality   0.1247***  0.0766** 
   [4.50]  [2.39] 
Mag_Duality   0.1576***  0.1545*** 
   [8.84]  [8.64] 
EquityHold    0.0052*** 0.0031 
    [2.70] [1.59] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
pseudo R2 0.045 0.044 0.048 0.045 0.049 




(Table 2.5 continued) 
Panel C: All Forecasts 
DV=Forecast frequency (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Law 0.1303***    0.1295*** 
 [2.86]    [2.78] 
Accounting 0.0999***    0.0749*** 
 [4.88]    [3.19] 
ForeignExp 0.1156***    0.0941** 
 [2.86]    [2.33] 
PartyMeb  -0.0574***   -0.0473** 
  [-2.90]   [-2.40] 
Board_Duality   0.0459***  0.0438** 
   [2.61]  [2.48] 
CFO_Duality   0.1277***  0.0778*** 
   [4.99]  [2.62] 
Mag_Duality   0.1454***  0.1425*** 
   [8.93]  [8.71] 
EquityHold    0.0055*** 0.0033* 
    [3.16] [1.88] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
pseudo R2 0.048 0.047 0.052 0.048 0.052 





2.5.3. Board secretary characteristics and management forecast 
precision 
In Table 2.6, we report the results for the effects of board secretary 
characteristics on management forecast precision. We show that 
Board_Duality, CFO_Duality and Mag_Duality are significantly and positively 
associated with quarterly and annual forecast precision. The results suggest 
that board secretaries with role duality tend to employ their expanded power 
and superior resources to generate precise forecasts, which corroborates the 
hypothesis H3. In addition, EquityHold significantly increases the precision of 
quarterly earnings forecasts, lending some support to the hypothesis H4. 
2.5.4. Board secretary characteristics and management forecast 
accuracy 
We examine how board secretary characteristics impact the accuracy and 
optimism of management earnings forecasts.  
Table 2.7 reports the results for forecast accuracy. We find that 
Accounting is significantly positively related to forecast accuracy in model 11. 
CFO_Duality and Mag_Duality are significantly positively associated with 
forecast accuracy in models 3, 5, 13 and 15, which supports the hypothesis 
H3. The role duality leads to board secretaries’ concentrated power and 
information advantage. These board secretaries thus issue more accurate 
forecasts. Furthermore, we report a significantly positive relation between 




Table 2.6 Board Secretary Characteristics and Management Forecast 
Precision 
This table presents OLS regression results for the impact of board secretary 
characteristics on management forecast precision. The dependent variable is 
Precision, and all independent variables except Ln(Horizon) are lagged by one year 
relative to the dependent variable. Control variables and industry dummies are 
included but suppressed for brevity. Robust t-statistics are provided in brackets below 
each coefficient. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. 
Panel A: Annual Forecasts 
DV=Forecast precision (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Law 0.0503    0.0484 
 [0.60]    [0.58] 
Accounting 0.0231    0.0127 
 [0.90]    [0.42] 
ForeignExp 0.0238    0.0127 
 [0.40]    [0.21] 
PartyMeb  0.0287   0.0294 
  [1.08]   [1.09] 
Board_Duality   0.0463**  0.0449* 
   [2.02]  [1.94] 
CFO_Duality   0.0653**  0.0603* 
   [2.30]  [1.78] 
Mag_Duality   0.1172***  0.1178*** 
   [5.50]  [5.51] 
EquityHold    0.0013 -0.0003 
    [0.70] [-0.15] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R2 0.234 0.234 0.241 0.235 0.239 
N 4462 4462 4468 4466 4460 
Panel B: Quarterly Forecasts 
DV=Forecast precision (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Law 0.0569    0.0583 
 [0.83]    [0.85] 
Accounting 0.0063    -0.0087 
 [0.26]    [-0.30] 
ForeignExp 0.0325    0.0201 
 [0.58]    [0.36] 
PartyMeb  0.0036   0.0024 
  [0.15]   [0.10] 
Board_Duality   0.0374*  0.0360* 
   [1.81]  [1.73] 
CFO_Duality   0.0539**  0.0605* 
   [2.03]  [1.88] 
Mag_Duality   0.1186***  0.1180*** 
   [6.13]  [6.08] 
EquityHold    0.0031* 0.0014 
    [1.83] [0.81] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R2 0.257 0.257 0.262 0.256 0.263 




(Table 2.6 continued) 
Panel C: All Forecasts 
DV=Forecast precision (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Law 0.0277    0.0288 
 [0.41]    [0.43] 
Accounting 0.0165    0.0083 
 [0.73]    [0.31] 
ForeignExp 0.0376    0.0229 
 [0.72]    [0.44] 
PartyMeb  0.0038   0.0034 
  [0.17]   [0.15] 
Board_Duality   0.0353*  0.0341* 
   [1.77]  [1.70] 
CFO_Duality   0.0465*  0.0418 
   [1.80]  [1.35] 
Mag_Duality   0.1175***  0.1169*** 
   [6.41]  [6.34] 
EquityHold    0.0025 0.0009 
    [1.51] [0.53] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R2 0.267 0.267 0.273 0.267 0.272 





Table 2.7 Board Secretary Characteristics and Management Forecast 
Accuracy 
This table presents OLS regression results for the impact of board secretary 
characteristics on management forecast accuracy. The dependent variable is 
Accuracy, and all independent variables except Ln(Horizon) are lagged by one year 
relative to the dependent variable. Control variables and industry dummies are 
included but suppressed for brevity. Robust t-statistics are provided in brackets below 
each coefficient. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. 
Panel A: Annual Forecasts 
DV=Forecast accuracy (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Law -4.8705    -4.6833 
 [-0.87]    [-0.84] 
Accounting 2.6248    1.1254 
 [1.53]    [0.54] 
ForeignExp 2.5047    3.065 
 [0.82]    [0.98] 
PartyMeb  0.9734   1.3449 
  [0.54]   [0.76] 
Board_Duality   -0.6074  -1.2196 
   [-0.38]  [-0.75] 
CFO_Duality   6.7386***  5.7522*** 
   [4.25]  [2.90] 
Mag_Duality   4.1326***  3.8852*** 
   [2.92]  [2.71] 
EquityHold    0.5682*** 0.5393*** 
    [5.15] [4.82] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R2 0.048 0.048 0.051 0.05 0.053 
N 3834 3834 3838 3836 3832 
Panel B: Quarterly Forecasts 
DV=Forecast accuracy (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Law -2.4163    -2.3045 
 [-1.57]    [-1.62] 
Accounting 0.2316    -0.0363 
 [0.37]    [-0.06] 
ForeignExp -0.628    -0.452 
 [-0.46]    [-0.40] 
PartyMeb  0.2589   0.2829 
  [0.50]   [0.55] 
Board_Duality   -0.0345  -0.1904 
   [-0.07]  [-0.39] 
CFO_Duality   1.0924*  0.9751 
   [1.80]  [1.40] 
Mag_Duality   0.4815  0.4285 
   [1.11]  [0.98] 
EquityHold    0.1559*** 0.1470*** 
    [4.27] [3.92] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R2 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.077 0.077 




(Table 2.7 continued) 
Panel C: All Forecasts 
DV=Forecast accuracy (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Law -4.0768    -3.8391 
 [-1.35]    [-1.28] 
Accounting 1.7979**    1.0766 
 [1.97]    [1.03] 
ForeignExp 1.7494    2.0087 
 [1.27]    [1.44] 
PartyMeb  0.2997   0.5548 
  [0.32]   [0.59] 
Board_Duality   -0.5849  -0.9649 
   [-0.65]  [-1.07] 
CFO_Duality   3.6355***  2.6697** 
   [3.51]  [2.27] 
Mag_Duality   2.1150***  1.9009** 
   [2.75]  [2.44] 
EquityHold    0.3834*** 0.3672*** 
    [6.05] [5.67] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R2 0.061 0.06 0.062 0.063 0.065 




Table 2.8 reports the results for forecast optimism. Board_Duality and 
Mag_Duality are significantly positively related to forecast optimism in models 
9, 13 and 15. The results reveal that board secretaries who serve as board 
members or non-accounting senior executives issue more optimistically biased 
quarterly earnings forecasts – that is, the forecast earnings released by board 
secretaries tend to exceed actual earnings. The results also suggest that board 
secretaries with higher hierarchical status within firms, as evidenced by their 
role duality, tend to overestimate firm profitability and issue more optimistic 
future earnings estimates. In addition, we document significantly positive 
coefficients on EquityHold, suggesting that board secretaries with more equity 
holdings issue more optimistically biased forecasts. This could result from the 





Table 2.8 Board Secretary Characteristics and Management Forecast 
Optimism 
This table presents OLS regression results for the impact of board secretary 
characteristics on management forecast optimism. The dependent variable is 
Optimism, and all independent variables except Ln(Horizon) are lagged by one year 
relative to the dependent variable. Control variables and industry dummies are 
included but suppressed for brevity. Robust t-statistics are provided in brackets below 
each coefficient. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. 
Panel A: Annual Forecasts 
DV=Forecast optimism (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Law 0.0018    0.0076 
 [0.02]    [0.07] 
Accounting 0.0418    0.0408 
 [1.07]    [0.92] 
ForeignExp 0.1016    0.1134 
 [1.20]    [1.34] 
PartyMeb  0.0032   0.0084 
  [0.09]   [0.23] 
Board_Duality   0.0528  0.0486 
   [1.56]  [1.42] 
CFO_Duality   0.0286  0.0045 
   [0.59]  [0.08] 
Mag_Duality   0.0101  0.0083 
   [0.32]  [0.27] 
EquityHold    0.0064* 0.0059* 
    [1.84] [1.67] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R2 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.026 
N 3834 3834 3838 3836 3832 
Panel B: Quarterly Forecasts 
DV=Forecast optimism (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Law -0.037    -0.0319 
 [-0.43]    [-0.37] 
Accounting 0.0197    -0.0025 
 [0.58]    [-0.06] 
ForeignExp 0.0192    0.0273 
 [0.27]    [0.38] 
PartyMeb  -0.0129   -0.0134 
  [-0.42]   [-0.44] 
Board_Duality   0.0705**  0.0642** 
   [2.44]  [2.21] 
CFO_Duality   0.0571  0.0529 
   [1.36]  [1.10] 
Mag_Duality   0.0448*  0.0413 
   [1.69]  [1.56] 
EquityHold    0.0082*** 0.0068** 
    [2.69] [2.21] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R2 0.028 0.028 0.03 0.03 0.03 




(Table 2.8 continued) 
Panel C: All Forecasts 
DV=Forecast optimism (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Law -0.0227    -0.0161 
 [-0.31]    [-0.22] 
Accounting 0.0441    0.0318 
 [1.49]    [0.94] 
ForeignExp 0.0683    0.0757 
 [1.08]    [1.20] 
PartyMeb  -0.0092   -0.0076 
  [-0.35]   [-0.29] 
Board_Duality   0.0707***  0.0645** 
   [2.81]  [2.55] 
CFO_Duality   0.0524  0.0283 
   [1.42]  [0.67] 
Mag_Duality   0.0412*  0.0382* 
   [1.79]  [1.65] 
EquityHold    0.0087*** 0.0075*** 
    [3.29] [2.80] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R2 0.037 0.037 0.039 0.039 0.04 





2.6. Additional analyses 
2.6.1. Board secretary characteristics and bad news versus good news 
management forecasts 
Compared to good news forecasts, managers have more incentives to 
issue bad news forecasts because this can reduce their legal and reputation 
costs (Skinner 1994; Heflin et al. 2016). Since board secretaries have 
important legal and regulatory duties, they could face great litigation risks if 
they made irresponsible forecast disclosures. Thus, the characteristics of 
board secretaries should have an impact on bad news issuance.  
Following Heflin et al. (2016), we classify a management forecast as a 
bad (good) news forecast, if the management forecast is lower (higher) than 
the most recent consensus analyst forecast, where the consensus forecast is 
identified as the median analyst forecast issued within 180 days prior to the 
management forecast disclosure date. We collect analyst forecast data from 
the CSMAR database. Since only annual analyst earnings forecasts are 
available in CSMAR, our analysis on bad news versus good news 
management forecasts uses the annual forecasts only.  
We study three different properties of bad news management forecasts. 
Pr(Bad news) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm issues at least one bad 
news management forecast in a given year, and 0 otherwise. #Bad news is 
the number of bad news management forecasts issued by a firm in a given 




convey bad news. If there is no management forecast issuance in a firm-year, 
then Pr(Bad news), #Bad news and %Bad news are set to 0. 
Table 2.9 presents the regression results for the impact of board secretary 
characteristics on bad news management forecasts. We estimate Probit 
regressions for the dependent variable of Pr(Bad news), Poisson regressions 
for #Bad news, and OLS regressions for %Bad news. The coefficients of 
Accounting are significantly positive in models 1 and 11, which suggests that 
board secretaries with accounting expertise are more likely to issue bad news 
forecasts. The coefficients of PartyMeb are negatively significant, which 
indicates that political connection reduces board secretaries’ willingness to 
release bad news forecasts. The coefficients of Board_Duality, CFO_Duality, 
Mag_Duality and EquityHold are significantly positive, suggesting that board 
secretaries who have dual roles and equity holdings make more frequent bad 
news forecast disclosures.  
2.6.2. Management earnings forecasts and board secretary pay 
Management earnings forecast quality reflects managers’ ability to adapt 
future production plans in response to foreseeable changes in business 
environments (Trueman 1986; Baik et al. 2011; Yang 2012). Lee et al. (2012) 
further show that underperforming CEOs are more likely to be replaced when 
their firms produce less accurate earnings forecasts. These studies suggest 
that management earnings forecast quality signifies managerial ability. 
Board secretaries have duties to reduce information asymmetry between 




Table 2.9 Board Secretary Characteristics and Bad News Management 
Forecasts 
This table presents regression results for the impact of board secretary characteristics 
on bad news management forecast disclosure. Panel A reports Probit regression 
results on the occurrence of bad news management forecasts (Pr(BadNews)), Panel 
B reports Poisson regression results on the frequency of bad news management 
forecasts (#BadNews), and Panel C reports OLS regression results on the fraction of 
management forecasts that convey bad news (%BadNews). All independent variables 
are lagged by one year relative to the dependent variable. Control variables and 
industry dummies are included but suppressed for brevity. Robust t(z)-statistics are 
provided in brackets below each coefficient. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are 
provided in Table 2.1. 
Panel A: Dependent variable = Pr(BadNews) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Law -0.0494    -0.0434 
 [-0.40]    [-0.35] 
Accounting 0.1190**    0.0679 
 [2.53]    [1.25] 
ForeignExp 0.033    0.0264 
 [0.32]    [0.26] 
PartyMeb  -0.1182***   -0.1094*** 
  [-2.94]   [-2.68] 
Board_Duality   0.0732*  0.0383 
   [1.85]  [0.95] 
CFO_Duality   0.2224***  0.1472** 
   [3.59]  [2.05] 
Mag_Duality   0.2763***  0.2563*** 
   [7.72]  [7.06] 
EquityHold    0.0393*** 0.0359*** 
    [8.90] [7.97] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.144 0.145 0.153 0.154 0.163 
N 6840 6840 6853 6847 6834 
Panel B: Dependent variable = #BadNews 
  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Law -0.053    -0.0764 
 [-0.37]    [-0.51] 
Accounting 0.079    0.0376 
 [1.57]    [0.64] 
ForeignExp 0.0153    0.0207 
 [0.15]    [0.20] 
PartyMeb  -0.1328***   -0.1253** 
  [-2.67]   [-2.52] 
Board_Duality   0.0923**  0.055 
   [2.16]  [1.28] 
CFO_Duality   0.1966***  0.1333* 
   [3.25]  [1.88] 
Mag_Duality   0.3058***  0.2820*** 
   [7.52]  [6.86] 
EquityHold    0.0328*** 0.0285*** 
    [8.04] [6.76] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.096 0.096 0.102 0.101 0.106 





(Table 2.9 continued) 
Panel C: Dependent variable = %BadNews 
  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Law -0.0282    -0.0247 
 [-0.84]    [-0.74] 
Accounting 0.0355**    0.0211 
 [2.50]    [1.33] 
ForeignExp 0.0077    0.0067 
 [0.24]    [0.21] 
PartyMeb  -0.0288***   -0.0267** 
  [-2.71]   [-2.53] 
Board_Duality   0.0243**  0.014 
   [2.11]  [1.22] 
CFO_Duality   0.0623***  0.0361 
   [3.03]  [1.58] 
Mag_Duality   0.0755***  0.0679*** 
   [7.15]  [6.41] 
EquityHold    0.0140*** 0.0129*** 
    [9.66] [8.76] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.148 0.148 0.156 0.162 0.168 





forecast disclosure. Since investors may favourably evaluate firms that have 
frequent forecast issuance and high forecast precision and accuracy, these 
firms that benefit from improved forecast disclosure are likely to reward their 
board secretaries. Thus, we predict that board secretaries’ pay is positively 
related to the occurrence, frequency, precision and accuracy of management 
forecasts. We construct the variable Ln(Pay) as the natural logarithm of the 
sum of the board secretary’s salary and bonus. 
Table 2.10 presents the regressions of board secretary pay on 
management earnings forecast properties. 7  In Panel A, we use the OLS 
estimator. We observe in model 1 that the coefficient of Occurrence is 
significantly positive at the 1% level, which reveals that board secretaries 
involved in forecast disclosure receive higher pay. In models 2–6, where at 
least one forecast issuance occurs in the firm-year, the coefficients of 
Frequency, Precision, Accuracy and %BadNews are significantly positive, 
consistent with the notion that board secretaries who issue high-quality 
forecasts are better remunerated. The coefficient of Optimism is significantly 
negative, which suggests that board secretaries who issue less optimistically 
biased forecasts earn more. Furthermore, board secretaries with foreign 
experience, role duality and equity holdings tend to receive higher pay, while 
board secretaries with party membership have lower pay. 
                                            
 
7 Since board secretary pay and replacement should be more related to the overall forecast 




Table 2.10 Management Earnings Forecasts and Board Secretary Pay 
This table presents regression results for the impact of management earnings 
forecast properties on board secretary pay. The dependent variable is Ln(Pay), and 
all independent variables are lagged by one year relative to the dependent variable. 
Control variables and industry dummies are included but suppressed for brevity. In 
the dynamic OLS regressions, the one-year lagged Ln(Pay) is included as an 
additional control variable, and robust t-statistics are provided in brackets. In the 
dynamic panel system GMM estimation, all independent variables are treated as 
endogenous except for crisis and industry dummies, and these endogenous variables 
are then instrumented by three of their past values; the t-statistics based on finite-
sample corrected robust standard errors (Windmeijer 2005) are provided in brackets. 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. 
Panel A: OLS 
DV = Pay (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Occurrence 0.0792***       
 [3.04]       
Frequency  0.0180***     0.0156 
  [2.82]     [1.49] 
Precision   0.1830***    0.1691*** 
   [10.09]    [7.06] 
Accuracy    0.0023***   0.0017*** 
    [4.77]   [3.58] 
Optimism     -0.0744***  -0.0632*** 
     [-4.24]  [-3.64] 
%BadNews      0.1623*** 0.1297*** 
      [6.16] [4.36] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R2 0.300 0.300 0.328 0.305 0.304 0.304 0.328 
N 4405 4405 3341 2823 2823 4405 2823 
Panel B: Dynamic OLS 
DV = Pay (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Occurrence 0.0175       
 [0.96]       
Frequency  0.0015     -0.001 
  [0.33]     [-0.15] 
Precision   0.0364***    0.0312* 
   [2.60]    [1.93] 
Accuracy    0.0008**   0.0006* 
    [2.03]   [1.66] 
Optimism     -0.0341***  -0.0303*** 
     [-2.92]  [-2.62] 
%BadNews      0.0127 0.0157 
      [0.69] [0.82] 
Ln(Pay)_Lag1 0.7858*** 0.7861*** 0.7749*** 0.7818*** 0.7825*** 0.7856*** 0.7766*** 
 [57.06] [57.14] [48.14] [45.97] [46.06] [56.85] [40.57] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R2 0.702 0.702 0.694 0.702 0.702 0.702 0.703 




(Table 2.10 continued) 
Panel C: Dynamic Panel GMM 
DV = Pay (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
Occurrence 0.2392**       
 [2.46]       
Frequency  0.0206     0.0192 
  [1.13]     [1.38] 
Precision   0.1293**    0.0911*** 
   [2.51]    [2.82] 
Accuracy    0.0017**   0.0014** 
    [2.42]   [2.11] 
Optimism     -0.0739**  -0.0601** 
     [-2.51]  [-2.20] 
%BadNews      0.018 0.0141 
      [0.46] [0.34] 
Ln(Pay)_Lag1 0.4587*** 0.4847*** 0.4049*** 0.5886*** 0.5998*** 0.6818*** 0.5612*** 
 [8.86] [9.39] [7.15] [11.69] [13.54] [17.39] [11.41] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 





The issues of reverse causality and omitted variables may plague our 
results. Following Wintoki et al. (2012), we control for the link between current 
management forecast properties and past board secretary pay by using a 
dynamic model with lagged board secretary pay as a regressor. The dynamic 
model can at least partially control for such reverse causality and capture the 
potential dynamic pattern in board secretary compensation arrangements.  
In Panel B of Table 2.10, we include the one-year lagged board secretary 
pay as a regressor, and this dynamic model is estimated in OLS regressions. 
We find that board secretaries’ current pay is positively and significantly related 
to their past pay. The dynamic model complements our static model 
statistically as well as economically. The adjusted R2 rises from 30% in the 
static model to 70% in the dynamic model, which suggests that past pay 
explains a large portion of variation of the current pay. 
Despite controlling for this dynamic relation, our results may still suffer 
from firm-level omitted variable bias. Wintoki et al. (2012) argue that in the 
presence of a dynamic relation, simply using firm-level fixed effects to alleviate 
this endogeneity concern may produce biased results, as fixed effects 
estimation is powerful under an assumption that past values of the dependent 
variable have no impact on current values of independent variables. Wintoki et 
al. (2012) further suggest that the dynamic panel system generalised method 
of moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) can 
account for the dynamic nature of the model as well as control for time-
invariant unobserved firm-level heterogeneity. Thus, following Dezsö and Ross 




GMM estimator to reduce reverse causality and time-invariant omitted variable 
biases. The results in Panel C of Table 2.10 show that board secretaries 
receive higher pay by providing management earnings forecasts of higher 
precision, higher accuracy and lower optimism.8  
2.6.3. Management earnings forecasts and board secretary turnover 
Firms could employ management earnings forecast quality to evaluate 
board secretaries’ ability and performance when making replacement 
decisions. We examine the effect of management forecast quality on board 
secretary turnover. We construct the dummy variable, Turnover, which is equal 
to 1 if there is a board secretary turnover in a given firm-year, and 0 otherwise.  
In Table 2.11, we regress board secretary turnover on management 
forecast properties. In Panel A, we estimate Probit regressions. The 
coefficients of Accuracy are significantly negative, indicating that board 
secretaries who issue more accurate forecasts are less likely to be replaced. 
The results corroborate the finding of Lee et al. (2012) that management 
forecast errors increase managerial turnover. The results based on the 
dynamic linear probability model in Panel B of Table 2.11 show that there is a  
                                            
 
8 The GMM instruments tests can be further added to validate the model specification. The 
AR(1) and AR(2) tests are used to examine whether sufficient lags of the dependent variable 
have been included to make the model dynamically complete, and the Hansen J test of over-




Table 2.11 Management Earnings Forecasts and Board Secretary 
Turnover 
This table presents regression results for the impact of management earnings 
forecast properties on board secretary turnover. The dependent variable is Turnover, 
and all independent variables are lagged by one year relative to the dependent 
variable. Control variables and industry dummies are included but suppressed for 
brevity. In the dynamic linear probability model, the one-year and two-year lagged 
Turnover variables are included as additional control variables, and robust z-statistics 
are provided in brackets. In the dynamic panel system GMM estimation, all 
independent variables are treated as endogenous except for crisis and industry 
dummies, and these endogenous variables are then instrumented by two of their past 
values; the t-statistics based on finite-sample corrected robust standard errors 
(Windmeijer 2005) are provided in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are 
provided in Table 2.1. 
Panel A: Probit 
DV = Turnover (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Occurrence 0.1436***       
 [2.73]       
Frequency  0.0238*     0.002 
  [1.86]     [0.09] 
Precision   -0.0843***    0.0256 
   [-2.64]    [0.56] 
Accuracy    -0.0019**   -0.0019** 
    [-2.24]   [-2.15] 
Optimism     0.0257  0.018 
     [0.72]  [0.51] 
%BadNews      -0.0641 -0.0363 
      [-1.06] [-0.54] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.015 0.013 0.019 0.015 
N 5398 5398 3928 3130 3130 5398 3130 
Panel B: Dynamic Linear Probability Model 
DV = Turnover (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Occurrence 0.0248**       
 [2.21]       
Frequency  0.0041     -0.0002 
  [1.35]     [-0.03] 
Precision   -0.0230***    0.0027 
   [-2.90]    [0.26] 
Accuracy    -0.0005**   -0.0005* 
    [-2.03]   [-1.96] 
Optimism     0.0054  0.0036 
     [0.66]  [0.44] 
%BadNews      -0.0182 -0.0063 
      [-1.31] [-0.42] 
Turnover_Lag1 -0.0068 -0.0066 0.0025 0.0084 0.0109 -0.0058 0.0076 
 [-0.30] [-0.30] [0.09] [0.28] [0.36] [-0.26] [0.25] 
Turnover_Lag2 0.03 0.0301 0.0448** 0.0510** 0.0534** 0.0313* 0.0506** 
 [1.59] [1.60] [2.04] [2.17] [2.26] [1.66] [2.15] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.006 0.004 0.012 0.004 





(Table 2.11 continued) 
Panel C: Dynamic Panel GMM 
DV = Turnover (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
Occurrence 0.0368       
 [1.11]       
Frequency  -0.0084     0.0011 
  [-1.05]     [0.09] 
Precision   -0.0223    0.0261 
   [-1.49]    [1.40] 
Accuracy    -0.0012**   -0.0009* 
    [-2.22]   [-1.70] 
Optimism     0.0319  0.0265 
     [1.59]  [1.40] 
%BadNews      -0.0752** -0.0533 
      [-2.19] [-1.47] 
Turnover_Lag1 -0.0094 -0.0002 -0.1033 -0.1480* -0.1373* -0.0142 -0.1674** 
 [-0.16] [-0.00] [-1.56] [-1.95] [-1.75] [-0.23] [-2.07] 
Turnover_Lag2 0.0236 0.0218 0.0062 0.0128 0.018 0.0247 0.0162 
 [1.00] [0.95] [0.22] [0.45] [0.61] [1.04] [0.54] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 





dynamic relation in board secretary turnover.9 The dynamic panel system 
GMM estimation results in Panel C provide further support for the argument 
that higher forecast accuracy leads to a lower likelihood of board secretary 
turnover. 
Since board secretaries are appointed by the board of directors and report 
directly to the board, they are likely to be replaced during the routine board 
turnover. As a robustness test, we create a new sample that includes only the 
firm-years during which the boards are routinely replaced. Using this restricted 
sample, the untabulated results show that the newly appointed boards of 
directors are likely to retain former board secretaries if these secretaries issue 
accurate forecasts.  
2.6.4. Board secretary characteristics and firm outcomes 
Board secretaries are members of the TMT. They could have an impact 
on other corporate issues, such as auditing quality, lawsuits, corporate social 
responsibility, financial policy, earnings quality and firm performance. To test 
for this prediction, we construct the following variables. Modified auditor 
opinion (MAO) is equal to 1 if a modified auditor opinion is issued to a firm, and 
0 otherwise. Lawsuit (SUE) is equal to 1 if there is a lawsuit issued against a 
firm, and 0 otherwise. Corporate social responsibility is measured by the 
                                            
 
9 A limitation of dynamic linear probability model is that a predicted probability from this model 
can be either less than zero or greater than one. However, a probability should be bounded 
within this range. Another limitation is that the residual is not normally distributed. The 
commonly used t test, which is based on normal distributions, can cause biases with respect 




following two variables. Donation is the natural logarithm of social donations 
(in Chinese RMB). CSR is equal to 1 if a firm releases its corporate social 
responsibility strategy in its annual report, and 0 otherwise. As a proxy for 
corporate financial policies, capital expenditure (CapExp) is the ratio of capital 
expenditure to cash flow. Earnings quality is measured by Opacity, which 
equals the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated using Dechow 
and Dichev’s (2002) model. Firm performance is measured by return on assets 
(ROA) and return on sales (ROS).  
Table 2.12 presents the regression results for the impact of board 
secretary characteristics on firm-level outcomes. In model 1, the result shows 
that the issuance of modified auditor opinions is positively associated with the 
duality director role of board secretaries, and negatively associated with their 
duality CFO role and equity holdings. In model 2, the result shows that firms 
whose board secretaries hold the firms’ stock have lower litigation risks. In 
model 3, board secretaries with accounting expertise and equity holdings are 
associated with more corporate donations. Model 4 shows that firms whose 
board secretaries are politically connected are less engaged in socially 
responsible corporate activities. In model 5, the result indicates that the foreign 
experience and the party membership of board secretaries reduce firms’ 
capital expenditure, while their equity holdings increase it. In model 6, the 
result suggests that firms are more likely to manipulate earnings when board 
secretaries have role duality. Models 7 and 8 suggest that board secretaries’ 





Table 2.12 Board Secretary Characteristics and Firm Outcomes 
This table presents regression results for the impact of board secretary characteristics on firm outcomes, including the release of modified 
auditor opinions (MAO), lawsuits against firms (SUE), social donations (Donation), corporate social responsibility (CSR), capital 
expenditure (CapExp), earnings opacity (Opacity) and firm performance (ROA and ROS). All independent variables are lagged by one 
year relative to the dependent variable. Models 1, 2 and 4 are Probit regressions, while the other models are OLS regressions. Control 
variables and industry dummies are included but suppressed for brevity. Robust t(z)-statistics are provided in brackets below each 
coefficient. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in 
Table 2.1. 
DV= MAO SUE Donation CSR CapExp Opacity ROA ROS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Law -0.0197 -0.322 0.823 -0.0278 0.0691 -0.0187 -0.002 -0.0025 
 [-0.10] [-1.26] [1.27] [-0.12] [0.81] [-1.00] [-0.28] [-0.12] 
Accounting 0.1651 -0.0625 0.5246* 0.0783 0.0207 0.0117 -0.0027 -0.0073 
 [1.49] [-0.59] [1.78] [0.68] [0.64] [1.40] [-0.76] [-0.74] 
ForeignExp -0.0043 0.2215 -0.3514 0.0396 -0.1114** 0.0111 0.0018 -0.0037 
 [-0.02] [1.00] [-0.67] [0.18] [-2.46] [0.73] [0.28] [-0.22] 
PartyMeb -0.0522 0.0235 -0.2243 -0.2026** -0.0497** -0.003 -0.0026 -0.0067 
 [-0.60] [0.32] [-1.08] [-2.17] [-2.09] [-0.61] [-0.98] [-0.93] 
Board_Duality 0.1583** 0.0008 -0.0748 -0.048 -0.0279 0.0119** -0.0004 -0.0046 
 [2.08] [0.01] [-0.39] [-0.52] [-1.21] [2.06] [-0.15] [-0.72] 
CFO_Duality -0.2539* -0.1027 -0.4154 -0.1261 0.039 -0.0057 0.0049 0.014 
 [-1.75] [-0.54] [-1.18] [-0.83] [0.79] [-0.52] [1.04] [1.23] 
Mag_Duality -0.1032 0.0601 0.2655 0.1233 0.0265 0.0105** 0.0024 0.0064 
 [-1.48] [0.83] [1.63] [1.52] [1.16] [2.07] [1.07] [1.14] 
EquityHold -0.0403*** -0.0236* 0.0484** 0.0135 0.0081*** -0.0014** 0.0018*** 0.0037*** 
 [-3.66] [-1.89] [2.11] [1.52] [2.83] [-2.21] [6.61] [6.23] 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.13 0.097 0.157 0.219 0.048 0.105 0.117 0.072 





Considerable research has studied the influence of CEOs, CFOs and 
General Counsels on management forecast disclosure, but that of board 
secretary, an important senior position responsible for information disclosure 
to regulators, investors and financial analysts, has been largely ignored. Board 
secretaries’ performance in forecast disclosure could have significant 
implications for the information transmission between inside managers and 
outside investors. This study investigates the effects of board secretaries’ 
expertise, political connections, role duality and equity holdings on 
management earnings forecasts. Our results suggest that the quality of 
management earnings forecasts is positively associated with the legal 
expertise, accounting expertise, foreign experience, role duality and equity 
holdings of board secretaries, and negatively related to their communist party 
membership.  
In addition, board secretaries with accounting expertise, role duality and 
equity holdings tend to issue bad news forecasts. Firms may make 
compensation and replacement decisions for board secretaries based on their 
performance in forecast disclosure. Specifically, board secretaries receive 
higher pay and are less likely to be replaced when they deliver higher quality 
forecasts to the public. Our further results provide evidence that board 
secretaries play an important role in corporate governance, business ethics, 




Chapter 3  
Does Gender Interaction Enhance or Impede Firm 
Performance? 
3.1. Introduction 
The issue of gender diversity in corporate leadership has received mounting 
attention from regulators worldwide. In 2003, Norway mandated a mandatory 
quota requiring female representation on boards of public firms to reach 40% 
by 2008. Since then, a growing number of developed countries, such as Spain, 
Iceland, Finland and France, have proposed such policies or introduced similar 
gender-related governance codes to promote gender diversity within firms. 
Among developing countries, China has witnessed a steadily rising number of 
women taking up director or senior executive positions. In 2000, only 9% of 
directors, 4% of CEOs and 18% of CFOs were women, while the ratios 
ascended to 14%, 6% and 33%, respectively, in 2014. 
Prior research on the relation between gender diversity and firm outcomes 
has assessed either board gender diversity or the gender of senior executives 
(e.g., Adams & Ferreira 2009; Huang & Kisgen 2013; Cumming et al. 2015; 
Francis et al. 2015). There is rather limited evidence on whether the gender 
interaction between the board of directors and the top management team has 
an effect on firm outcomes. Given the influential roles of CEOs and CFOs in 
management, I define them as top managers and then examine the gender 




argue that, due to the minority status of women in the top corporate hierarchy 
and their higher pressure to perform well, gender interaction among women 
could take place, leading to measurable effects at the firm level.  
The seminal work of Matsa and Miller (2011) shows that firms with more 
women on board tend to add more women to its top management team. They 
argue that this finding ‘presents evidence of women helping women in 
corporate America’ (p. 635). This is also consistent with anecdotal evidence. 
Sheri McCoy, a businesswoman, worked as the CEO of Avon Products Inc. 
during 2012–2017.  It was striking to notice that during this period out of eleven 
directors on the board, seven were women.10 
In this chapter, I posit that the gender interaction between female top 
managers and female board directors can influence firm performance in two 
competing ways. On the one hand, it could impair firm performance. According 
to agency theory (Fama & Jensen 1983), the board of directors functions to 
reduce the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. Board 
independence is crucial to this monitoring mechanism (Rosenstein & Wyatt 
1990). The gender interaction, in a sense, connects the board to the 
management, which could undermine the effectiveness of board oversight and 
hurt firm performance. On the other hand, it could improve firm performance. 
Due to the gender interaction, female top managers are likely to receive extra 
expert advice and support from female board directors, which ultimately 
improves firms’ operational efficiency. In addition, the high female 
                                            
 




representation on the board can cultivate a female-friendly corporate culture 
(Matsa & Miller 2011; Tate & Yang 2015) and thus may motivate female top 
managers to perform. 
China offers me a unique opportunity to study the gender interaction effect 
for at least two reasons. First, in China, a large number of female professionals 
have broken the glass ceiling rising to the top corporate positions. The 
representation of women is considerably higher than that in U.S. and European 
firms, which allows for a larger variation in gender-related variables that can 
be employed to identify, if present, a gender interaction effect.11 Simply put, it 
is impossible to study gender-related issues if there are no women in these 
roles. Second, because of the one-child policy in China, women are likely to 
have as many opportunities as men in terms of education and upbringing (Tsui 
& Rich 2002), which could reduce social prejudice against women. It is less 
likely that women in corporate China are mere tokens, which enables me to 
circumvent the challenge of dealing with the tokenism issue in current studies 
that use U.S. or European data (e.g., Lee & James 2007; Ahern & Dittmar 
2012; Matsa & Miller 2013). 
Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, I find evidence that the gender 
interaction between the presence of female top managers and the fraction of 
women on board is positively associated with return on assets (ROA). If the 
                                            
 
11 The differences between China and the U.S. in women’s occupancy in senior positions are 
striking. Between 2000 and 2014, women occupied 11% of board seats, 25.6% of CFO roles, 
and 4.9% of CEO roles in listed firms of China. By contrast, in U.S. listed firms, women 




higher ROA accompanying women’s interaction represented enhanced 
operating efficiency, then an intuitive expectation would be that the stock 
market responded positively to the appointment of female top managers to 
firms that have female directors on board. Surprisingly, contrary to my intuition, 
the empirical results show that the appointment of female CEOs leads to more 
negative short-term cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in firms with a higher 
ratio of female board representation. This suggests that the gender interaction 
could be unfavourable to stock investors.  
I decompose female directors into female executive directors and female 
independent directors. I find that the opposite effects of female interaction on 
accounting profitability and stock prices pertain to female executive directors 
only, while the effects are statistically insignificant when examining female 
independent directors. The results indicate that the gender interaction requires 
women’s managerial power in order to exert an impact at the firm level. 
Collectively, my results reveal that stock investors tend to interpret female 
interaction as an unfavourable practice and react negatively as a result, 
although the firm’s accounting returns improve. It is noteworthy that ROA is a 
backward-looking measure and can be distorted by adoption of various 
financial policies and, more critically, by earnings manipulation practices 
(Burgstahler & Dichev 1997). I show that in my data, earnings management 
increases ROA, in line with the argument of Dechow et al. (1995) that use of 
discretionary accruals is a major way for managers to manipulate earnings. 
Further, I show that the gender interaction between female top managers and 




possible explanation for my results: the gender interaction could induce 
earnings manipulation, which inflates accounting returns but in fact hurts 
shareholders’ interests, leading to declining stock prices.  
Finally, I find that the gender interaction has significant effects on ROA 
and earnings management only when the female top managers start their top 
managerial role. The effects disappear when the female top managers hold 
their role for more than one year. The results provide some evidence that 
women holding the posts for longer periods are likely to be entrenched in the 
firms and experience lower performance pressure; as a result, they would have 
less need to disguise their performance though earnings manipulation. To 
further justify this contention, I examine the long-run stock market reactions to 
female CEO appointments. I find that only the one-year post-appointment buy-
and-hold (B&H) returns are negative and significant, while the two- and three-
year post-appointment B&H returns are statistically insignificant. Jointly, the 
results indicate that because female top managers are likely to face strong 
performance pressure during their initial year in leadership, they collaborate 
with female directors to sugar-coat their performance via earnings 
manipulation, which induces unfavourable stock price movements. 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in three major ways. First, 
it bridges two strands of literature on the gender diversity of corporate board 
and the gender issue of top management team. My results reveal that women’s 
representation in the firm should go beyond the board level in order for gender 
diversity to make an impact on firm outcomes. My study is closely related to 




positive effect of the gender interaction between top managers and board 
directors on ROA. Since a market-based performance measure is unavailable 
for these private firms, my study for Chinese public firms unveils a key 
undocumented feature: gender interaction leads to a short-lived increment in 
ROA, but this is a result of earnings management, which ultimately makes a 
detrimental impact on stock prices. 
Second, this chapter complements the literature on gender diversity within 
firms. It has been shown that gender diversity influences a variety of firm 
policies and outcomes, including profitability (Ahern & Dittmar 2012; Dezsö & 
Ross 2012; Matsa & Miller 2013; Liu et al. 2014), corporate governance 
(Adams & Ferreira 2009; Beck et al. 2013), risk avoidance (Faccio et al. 2016), 
acquisitions (Levi et al. 2014), earnings quality (Srinidhi et al. 2011; Francis et 
al. 2015) and stock price informativeness (Gul et al. 2011). I also contribute to 
the general literature on diversity. This body of literature has documented that 
firm performance is related to different forms of diversity, including racial 
diversity (Richard 2000; Richard et al. 2004), cognitive diversity (Kilduff et al. 
2000) and top management team heterogeneity (Pegels et al. 2000; Carpenter 
2002).  
Third, this chapter adds to gender-related studies by showing that the 
interaction among women affects firm performance only when women have 
managerial power. Only the gender interaction between female top managers 
and female executive directors has a significant effect on firm performance, 
whereas the gender interaction as regards female independent directors has 




regulatory quotas on female board membership. My evidence suggests that 
including more women as independent directors could curb the gender 
interaction’s increasing impact on earnings manipulation. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the 
institutional background. Section 3.3 discusses the conceptual background 
and develops the hypotheses. Section 3.4 describes the data and the research 
methodology. Section 3.5 presents the empirical results. Section 3.6 





3.2. Institutional background 
In Chinese firms, the top executive officer in charge of business was 
entitled Chief Manager (CM) in the early 2000s. In more recent years, after 
China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation, some firms have begun to 
entitle this person Chief Executive Officer (CEO) as it is in U.S. firms. CMs or 
CEOs are appointed by the board of directors as the head manager and they 
report directly to the board. They implement corporate policies set by the board, 
run day-to-day business, disclose corporate information to outside investors 
and government agencies and so forth. In addition, they can nominate qualified 
candidates to make up the management team. In some firms, the CMs or 
CEOs may sit on the board; in these cases, they have much higher status 
within the firm, which strengthens their managerial power in decision making.  
CFOs in Chinese firms have similar responsibilities to those in U.S. firms. 
The Company Law of China prescribes that CFOs are responsible for the firms’ 
financial planning, reporting and risk management. CFOs take part in 
corporate decision-making process along with CEOs. The accountability of 
CFOs has a direct impact on the quality of reported earnings. In light of the 
influential roles of CEOs and CFOs, I define both of them as top managers.   
The board of directors in China has similar functions to that in the U.S. 
According to the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in 
China, published by China Securities Regulatory Commission in 2002, the 
board of directors is required to represent the best interests of shareholders to 




during shareholder meetings, and the decisions regarding their appointment 
and dismissal need to be approved by shareholders. Directors are expected to 
have adequate knowledge of corporation laws and regulations regarding 
business operations and management.  
The board of directors can be divided into two groups. Executive directors 
who hold managerial positions in the firm take part in daily operations on behalf 
of shareholders. Independent directors who are selected from outside the firm 
are not allowed to have any affiliation with majority shareholders. They typically 
have professional expertise, such as being certified public accountants or 
lawyers, in order to fulfil their monitoring duties. The Company Law of China 
requires that the board of directors consists of five to nineteen members and 
that at least one-third of the directors should be independent directors.  
There are two separate boards in China and some European countries. 
One is the board of directors, which is identical to that in the U.S., responsible 
for monitoring and disciplining the management. The other one is the 
supervisory board, which is elected by shareholders and employees to 
supervise both the board of directors and the top management team. The 
board of directors and the supervisory board are established in parallel to serve 
shareholders’ best interests but are organised in different ways. The 
supervisory board cannot include any members of the board or the 
management; it must be a separate, independent agency inside the firm. In 
contrast, the board of directors is more directly and frequently involved in 
corporate governance and business operations. The board of directors is 




duties to their U.S. counterparts. To make my findings comparable to those of 
other countries, I follow Giannetti et al. (2015) and focus my analysis on the 




3.3. Literature and hypotheses development 
The previous literature has shown that CEOs and CFOs have pervasive 
interactions with the board of directors. The board serves two primary functions 
in these interactions. First, the board acts as a monitoring mechanism to 
address the agency conflicts between managers and investors. Boyd (1994) 
and Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) find that effective board monitoring 
compromises CEOs’ ability to pursue excess compensation. Hoitash et al. 
(2012) show that CFOs in firms with stronger board governance experience a 
larger compensation decline following disclosures of material weakness in the 
firms’ internal control. Borokhovich et al. (1996) show that in firms with more 
independent boards, CEOs are more likely to be appointed from outside the 
firms, and that the stock market responds more favourably to the appointment 
of outside CEOs than that of inside CEOs. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) 
find that firms tend to appoint fewer independent directors when CEOs are 
involved in director selection. The second function of the board is to provide 
professional expertise and advice to aid corporate decision-making. Westphal 
(1999) find that CEOs who have social ties (e.g., friendships) with board 
directors are more likely to seek expert advice from these directors, and that 
the directors are more willing to offer such advice.  
In view of these dynamic relationships between CEO/CFO and the board 
of directors, I expect that gender similarity could be a factor that facilitates the 
interactions. The existing evidence indicates that women cooperate more with 




segregated when they are very young and continually exposed to different 
gender groups for much of their childhood. Girls’ same-sex relationships are 
characterised by cooperation and interpersonal harmony, while boys’ same-
sex relationships exhibit an inclination to compete and dominate (Maccoby 
1990). Such gender differences in attitudes and behaviours continue to 
manifest in adulthood. The experiment by Eckel and Grossman (2001) further 
shows that the agreement among women is more easily attainable and that 
women are more likely to accept the offer of other women. Chatman and 
O'Reilly (2004) find that women perform better in all-female work groups. Greig 
and Bohnet (2009) find that in Kenya, women contribute more to the provision 
of public goods in all-female groups than in mixed-sex groups, reflective of the 
greater cooperation among women in daily life.  
Within firms, women tend to help each other. Matsa and Miller (2011) 
show that firms with higher female representation on the board tend to appoint 
more women to the top management team. Weber and Zulehner (2010) find 
that start-up firms with women among the first hires appoint more women in 
the future and have a higher likelihood of survival in the markets. Price (2012) 
and Tate and Yang (2015) both find that the presence of female leadership in 
top management reduces the wage disparity between women and men 
employees. Therefore, it is plausible to expect that, at the top of corporate 
hierarchy, female CEOs and CFOs tend to collaborate more with female 
directors than with male directors. 
The collaboration between female CEOs/CFOs and female directors can 




an empirical issue. On the one hand, the collaboration could dampen the 
monitoring ability of the board of directors. Serving as a monitoring facility that 
is essential to addressing agency problems, the board of directors should 
maintain a certain degree of independence from the management team in 
order to detect and discipline managerial misconduct (Hermalin & Weisbach 
1998; Shivdasani & Yermack 1999). As the close interaction connects 
directors to managers to some extent (Coles et al. 2014; Lee et al. 2014; 
Khanna et al. 2015), it could undermine the effectiveness of board monitoring, 
which would result in inferior firm performance (Rosenstein & Wyatt 1990).  
One the other hand, the collaboration between female CEOs/CFOs and 
female directors encourages directors’ provision of professional expertise to 
managers. Due to a closer interaction, female CEOs/CFOs are likely to have 
more efficient information exchange with female directors. Female directors 
could offer extra expert advice and knowledge for female CEOs/CFOs in 
problem solving. The improved operational efficiency leads to higher firm 
profitability. In addition, with more women rising to the top of the firms, a 
female-friendly corporate culture would arise (Matsa & Miller 2011; Tate & 
Yang 2015) and produce an equal, vibrant environment for women to perform, 
thereby enhancing firm performance.  
Therefore, I formulate the two competing hypotheses as follows: 
H1a (Board Independence Hypothesis): The gender interaction between 




H1b (Operational Efficiency Hypothesis): The gender interaction between 






3.4. Data and research design 
3.4.1. Sample construction 
My sample comprises all public firms listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges of China. I collect board composition data, top 
management team information and firm-level accounting data from the China 
Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. In firms that have 
a CM but no CEO, I take the person entitled the CM to be the CEO. In firms 
that have both CM and CEO, I retain only the CEO. After excluding financial 
and utility firms, I am left with a sample of 19,022 firm-year observations from 
2,328 firms for the period 2000 ̶ 2014. 
3.4.2. Empirical model 
I examine the gender interaction’s impact on firm performance by 




= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (Female top manager𝑖,𝑡 × %Female directors𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝛼2Female top manager𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3%Female directors𝑖,𝑡
+ ∑ 𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝑹𝑶𝑳𝑺𝑖,𝑡−1 + εi,t 
 
(Equation 3.1) 
where firm performance is measured by ROA. Female top manager is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if either the CEO or the CFO is female, and 0 if both 




The interaction term, Female top manager × %Female directors, is the key 
variable of interest.  
Consistent with the convention in the gender diversity literature (Adams & 
Ferreira 2009; Dezsö & Ross 2012; Liu et al. 2014), the regression model 
controls for a number of board and management characteristics that have 
been identified as explanatory factors for firm performance. As shown by 
Yermack (1996), firms with smaller boards tend to underperform. Core et al. 
(1999) and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find that board independence 
influences corporate governance and, hence, firm performance. Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1993) show that firms with larger management teams have better 
performance. Therefore, I control for the natural logarithm of the number of 
directors on the board (Ln(Board size)), the proportion of independent directors 
on the board (%Independent directors) and the natural logarithm of the number 
of executives in top management team (Ln(Management size)).12  
A variety of firm characteristics are also included as control variables. 
Fama and French (1998) document an inverse relation between leverage and 
firm value. Brush et al. (2000) show that sales growth is positively related to 
firm performance. Yermack (1996) finds a positive association between firm 
size and firm performance. Peng (2004) shows that younger firms have better 
performance. I thus control for leverage ratio (Leverage), sales growth 
(Ln(1+Sales growth)), firm size (Ln(Assets)) and firm age (Ln(Firm age)). 
                                            
 
12  Following Dezsö and Ross (2012), I define the top management team as the senior 




Following Amore et al. (2014), the control variables are lagged by one year 
relative to the dependent variable in order to mitigate simultaneity issue.  
Industry dummies and year dummies are incorporated to account for 
industry-wide and yearly economic fluctuations, respectively. I estimate 
Equation 3.1 using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with robust 
standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. Table 3.1 summarises the 
variable definitions. 
3.4.3. Descriptive statistics 
In Panel A of Table 3.2, I compare gender diversity in top corporate 
positions between Chinese firms and U.S. firms. The mean value of the 
variable female top manager in Chinese firms is 0.289, which is significantly 
higher than the corresponding ratio of 0.042 in U.S. firms. The proportion of 
Chinese firms having female CEOs (0.049) is more than twice that of U.S. firms 
(0.022). The fraction of female CFOs in Chinese firms (0.256) is nearly thrice 
that in U.S. firms (0.088). On average, 11% of board directors in Chinese firms 
are women, being of similar level to the female board representation of 10% in 
U.S. firms. In addition, in China the female directors are more likely to be 
executive directors, whereas in the U.S. women are more likely to be 
independent directors. In general, women tend to have more managerial 
power in Chinese firms. Panel B of Table 3.2 presents the summary statistics 
of ROA and control variables for all listed firms in China. The average ROA of 





Table 3.1 Variable Definitions 
Variable Description   
Firm performance: 
 
ROA EBIT divided by total assets   
Female top manager: 
 
Female top manager 
1 if a firm has a female CEO or a female CFO, and 0 
otherwise   
Board gender diversity: 
 
%Female directors the proportion of female directors on the board 
%Female executive 
directors 
the proportion of female executive directors on the board 
%Female independent 
directors 
the proportion of female independent directors on the 




the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the 
board 
%Independent directors the proportion of independent directors on the board 
Ln(Management size) 
the natural logarithm of the number of top executives 
reported in CSMAR 
Leverage total debt divided by total assets 
Ln(1+Sales growth) 
the natural logarithm of one plus annual growth in total 
sales 
Ln(Assets) the natural logarithm of total assets 
Ln(Firm age) the natural logarithm of the number of years of stock listing 
Cash holding total cash divided by total assets 
R&D 
research and development expenses divided by total 
assets 
Capital expenditure capital expenditures divided by total assets 
Government ownership the proportion of shares held by government 
Institutional ownership 
the proportion of shares held by bank trusts, insurance 
companies, investment companies, independent 
investment advisors, pension funds, and other institutions 
Managerial ownership the proportion of shares held by top executives 
Regional development the provincial marketisation index 
Industry dummy 






Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics of gender diversity and control variables. 
Panel A compares the gender composition of top managers and the female board 
representation between Chinese firms and U.S. firms. For U.S. firms, the data on CEO 
and CFO gender comes from Execucomp; the data on board gender diversity comes 
from RiskMetrics. Panel B describes the distribution of control variables. Variable 
definitions are provided in Table 3.1. 
Panel A: Female top managers and female board directors 
  Mean SD Min p25 Median p75 Max 
China        
Female top manager 0.289 0.453 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Female CEO 0.049 0.216 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Female CFO 0.256 0.437 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
%Female directors 0.110 0.110 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.167 0.833 
%Female executive directors 0.064 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.636 
%Female independent directors 0.047 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.571 
US        
Female top manager 0.042 0.201 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Female CEO 0.022 0.147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Female CFO 0.088 0.283 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
%Female directors 0.100 0.096 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.167 0.429 
%Female executive directors 0.006 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.167 
%Female independent directors 0.088 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.143 0.375 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of firm performance and controls (China) 
  Mean SD Min p25 Median p75 Max 
ROA 0.048 0.087 -0.562 0.026 0.050 0.080 0.355 
Ln(Board size)  2.255 0.232 1.386 2.197 2.197 2.398 3.219 
%Independent directors 0.320 0.133 0.000 0.316 0.333 0.375 1.000 
Ln(Management size)  1.796 0.383 0.000 1.609 1.792 2.079 3.761 
Leverage  0.490 0.314 0.040 0.315 0.472 0.618 3.208 
Ln(1+Sales growth) 0.131 0.468 -9.212 -0.013 0.127 0.270 11.810 
Ln(Assets)  21.430 1.207 10.840 20.660 21.290 22.060 28.480 




To decide upon the best methodology to carry out the hypothesis tests, I 
assess whether there is enough time-series variation in the variables of 
interest. In Table 3.3, I present the proportion of sample firms that experience 
a change in the variables of Female top manager, Female CEO, Female 
CFO, %Female directors, %Female executive directors and %Female 
independent directors over a one-year period, respectively. The results report 
rather limited within-firm variation in these variables. On average, the variable 
Female top manager varies in 6.30 % of sample firms on a yearly basis. 
Specifically, only 1.72% of firms experience a transition between female CEOs 
and male CEOs, while the ratio of a gender transition due to CFO 
replacements is 5.50%. Over the whole sample period, 6.25% of firm-years 
undergo a change in Female top manager. Regarding female board 
representation, the within-firm variation is also small. There is a change 
in %Female directors in 20.68% of firm-years.  
Collectively, the analysis suggests that the use of firm-fixed effects or 
dynamic panel generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator is 
inappropriate. Both techniques remove unobservable between-firm 
heterogeneity and exploit only the within-firm variation for identification, and 
thus would largely undermine the statistical significance of the gender 
variables that have limited time-series variation. In the robustness section, I 




Table 3.3 Change in Female Top Manager and Female Board Directors over Time 
This table presents the fraction of sample firms that experience a change in the variables of Female top manager, Female CEO, Female 
CFO, %Female directors, %Female executive directors, and %Female independent directors, on a yearly basis from 2000 to 2014. The 
results are based on a sample of 19,022 firm-year observations from 2,328 listed firms in China. 
        Change in       




2000 - - - - - - 671 
2001 8.92% 2.36% 7.09% 20.21% 19.29% 3.28% 762 
2002 8.17% 1.90% 7.05% 29.68% 18.70% 16.91% 893 
2003 7.11% 2.12% 5.84% 24.63% 17.41% 13.27% 942 
2004 6.89% 2.10% 6.29% 16.77% 13.27% 5.29% 1,002 
2005 7.89% 1.50% 6.95% 17.48% 13.35% 6.11% 1,064 
2006 7.25% 1.68% 6.54% 17.33% 12.20% 7.34% 1,131 
2007 7.94% 2.29% 6.27% 20.39% 13.06% 11.39% 1,133 
2008 5.81% 1.24% 4.81% 22.24% 10.79% 14.94% 1,205 
2009 6.68% 1.31% 6.30% 20.89% 12.52% 12.90% 1,302 
2010 5.65% 2.01% 4.61% 20.28% 12.26% 11.00% 1,346 
2011 5.30% 1.61% 5.44% 18.59% 11.34% 10.47% 1,490 
2012 5.17% 1.79% 4.40% 17.56% 9.30% 10.98% 1,839 
2013 5.64% 1.45% 5.50% 21.61% 11.77% 13.51% 2,073 
2014 6.09% 2.44% 5.35% 29.55% 14.66% 20.79% 2,169 
Mean 6.30% 1.72% 5.50% 19.81% 12.66% 10.54% 1,268 
2000-2014        
Percent of firms 33.25% 9.66% 30.54% 68.00% 48.93% 52.79% 2,328 






3.5.1. Gender interaction within Chinese firms 
Women helping women is a key assumption behind the rationale for 
proposing a significant impact of gender interaction on firm performance.13 I 
thus need to confirm whether this is the case in Chinese firms. Following Matsa 
and Miller (2011), I explore whether the presence of female directors facilitates 
women’s progression to CEO and CFO positions. Table 3.4 reports the Probit 
regression results. The dependent variable is Female top manager, and the 
key independent variable is lagged %Female directors. Model 1 shows that a 
firm with a more gender-diverse board in the previous year is more likely to 
have a female CEO or a female CFO in the current year. In model 2, I control 
for %Female directors of the current year, and find that the relation between 
female top managers and board gender diversity remains significantly positive. 
Jointly, the results suggest that women at the top corporate hierarchy tend to 
help each other.  
3.5.2. Gender interaction and firm profitability 
In Table 3.5, I present the OLS regression results for the impact of gender 
interaction on ROA. In model 1, I observe that the coefficient of Female top 
manager is positive and significant, which suggests that the presence of 
                                            
 
13  Matsa and Miller (2011) find that firms with more women as board directors tend to add more women to their 
top management team. They further argue that this finding ‘presents evidence of women helping women in 
corporate America’ (p.635). Admittedly, observing female appointments by females does not necessarily indicate 
the presence of female ‘cooperation’, because whether women directors would ‘cooperate’ with the newly 




Table 3.4 Gender Interaction within Chinese Firms 
This table presents regression results to test the interaction effect among women in 
Chinese firms. The dependent variable is Female top manager, which is equal to 1 if 
a firm has a female CEO or CFO, and 0 otherwise. All control variables are lagged by 
one year relative to the dependent variable. The regressions are estimated using a 
Probit model. Cluster-robust z-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variable 
definitions are provided in Table 3.1. 
Dependent variable =  Female top manager 
  [1] [2] 
   
%Female directors:   
Previous year 2.369*** 0.871*** 
 [12.24] [4.74] 
Current year  1.739*** 
  [8.64] 
   
Control variables:   
Ln(Board size)  -0.127 -0.121 
 [-1.42] [-1.35] 
%Independent directors  -0.002 0.026 
 [-0.01] [0.10] 
Ln(Management size)  0.075 0.079 
 [1.27] [1.33] 
Leverage -0.008 -0.01 
 [-0.12] [-0.15] 
Ln(1+Sales growth) 0.050** 0.051** 
 [2.24] [2.34] 
Ln(Assets)  -0.069*** -0.067*** 
 [-3.15] [-3.04] 
Ln(Firm age) -0.048 -0.047 
 [-1.34] [-1.33] 
Constant 0.736 0.660 
 [1.52] [1.36] 
Year fixed effect Y Y 
Firm fixed effect Y Y 
R2 0.0517 0.0561 




Table 3.5 Gender Interaction and Firm Profitability 
This table presents OLS regressions of ROA on the interaction between female top managers and female directors. Cluster-robust t-
statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variable 
definitions are provided in Table 3.1. 
 DV=ROA  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
Female top manager 0.003*  0.004* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 [1.73]  [1.81] [-0.26] [-0.33] [-0.51] [-0.20] [-0.48] [-0.09] 
%Female directors  -0.001 -0.004 -0.017 -0.014 -0.019* -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 
  [-0.14] [-0.51] [-1.58] [-1.37] [-1.69] [-1.39] [-1.24] [-1.21] 
Female top manager × %Female directors    0.033** 0.030* 0.038** 0.035** 0.037** 0.032* 
    [1.99] [1.86] [2.20] [2.04] [2.13] [1.83] 
          
Control variables:          
Ln(Board size)  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 [-0.54] [-0.58] [-0.54] [-0.54] [-0.43] [-0.65] [-0.62] [-0.55] [-0.32] 
%Independent directors -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.005 0.002 0.000 
 [-0.02] [-0.02] [-0.03] [-0.05] [0.24] [0.29] [-0.42] [0.18] [0.04] 
Ln(Management size)  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005** -0.005* -0.003 -0.005* -0.004 
 [-1.59] [-1.58] [-1.61] [-1.62] [-1.97] [-1.90] [-1.28] [-1.73] [-1.63] 
Leverage -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.006 -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.004 -0.004 
 [-3.16] [-3.16] [-3.16] [-3.15] [-1.10] [-2.73] [-3.03] [-0.70] [-0.65] 
Ln(1+Sales growth) 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 [9.11] [9.13] [9.10] [9.11] [8.73] [8.18] [9.04] [7.85] [7.78] 
Ln(Assets)  0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 [6.69] [6.59] [6.64] [6.57] [6.30] [6.47] [5.78] [5.20] [5.65] 
Ln(Firm age) -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.002 -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.001 -0.001 
 [-7.45] [-7.52] [-7.47] [-7.47] [-1.62] [-6.63] [-6.70] [-0.44] [-0.75] 
          
Additional controls:          
Cash holding     0.090***   0.094*** 0.091*** 
     [9.93]   [9.51] [9.25] 
R&D     -0.087   -0.027 -0.099 
     [-0.80]   [-0.24] [-0.89] 
Capital expenditure     0.110***   0.113*** 0.110*** 
     [8.40]   [8.34] [8.26] 




      [1.48]  [2.24] [1.74] 
Institutional ownership       0.026***  0.026*** 0.025*** 
      [5.19]  [5.15] [4.98] 
Managerial ownership       0.039***  0.031*** 0.031*** 
      [3.62]  [2.66] [2.59] 
Regional development       0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
       [6.09] [5.72] [5.74] 
Constant -0.043** -0.040* -0.042* -0.040* -0.061*** -0.068*** -0.050** -0.106*** -0.119*** 
 [-2.02] [-1.85] [-1.95] [-1.84] [-2.85] [-3.00] [-2.21] [-4.49] [-4.69] 
Industry fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry-year fixed effect N N N N N N N N Y 
R2 0.073 0.072 0.073 0.073 0.092 0.074 0.08 0.101 0.117 






female top managers in the top management improves firms’ accounting 
profitability. In model 2, the coefficient of %Female directors is statistically 
insignificant. In model 3, where I include both Female top manager 
and %Female directors, the effect of Female top manager remains positive 
and significant. The effect is also economically relevant. The ROA of women-
led firms is 0.004 higher than that of men-led firms, holding other controls 
constant. Given that the mean ROA is 0.048, an increase of 0.004 in ROA 
corresponds to a percentage increase of 8.3% (=0.004/0.048).  
For the control variables, Leverage is negatively related to ROA, 
consistent with the notion that high leverage may reflect potential problems in 
firms’ profitability (Fama & French 1998). ln(1+Sales growth) has a significantly 
positive association with ROA, consistent with the argument of Brush et al. 
(2000) that growth in sales enables firms to fully employ production capacity, 
which in turn enhances firm profits. ln(Assets) is positively associated with 
ROA, suggesting that larger firms perform better (Yermack 1996). I find a 
negative relation between ln(Firm age) and ROA, consistent with the finding of 
Peng (2004) that younger Chinese firms have more effective governance 
systems and consequently have better accounting performance.  
In model 4, I test the hypothesis H1 by multiplying Female top manager 
by %Female directors.14 The insignificant coefficient on Female top manager 
suggests that when none of the directors are women, the presence of female 
                                            
 
14 To rule out the possibility that multicollinearity would confound my results, I compute the 




top managers in the top management has no significant impact on ROA. The 
coefficient on Female top manager × %Female directors is positive and 
significant at the 5% level, which suggests that higher board gender diversity 
increases the positive effect of female top managers on ROA.  
Figure 3.1 plots the marginal effect of the presence of female top 
managers in firms with different proportions of women on the board. When 
there are no women on board (%Female directors=0), the fitted ROA is roughly 
equal to 0.048, no matter whether there is female leadership or male 
leadership in the top management team. The marginal effect, which is the ROA 
difference between firms with female and with male leadership monotonically 
increases as %Female directors increases. Specifically, at the 50th percentile 
of %Female directors (=0.111), the ROA difference is 0.003, which is 
statistically insignificant. At the 75th percentile of %Female directors (=0.167), 
the ROA difference is 0.005, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. In 
fact, when 14% of board directors are female – approximately one female 
director – the marginal effect of female top managers turns to be statistically 
significant. 
To further reduce omitted variable bias, I include additional firm- and 
market-level control variables. In model 5 of Table 3.2, I control for corporate 
financial policies. Cash holding is positively and significantly related to ROA, 
as firms with large cash reserves can benefit from less costly internal financing 




Figure 3.1 Marginal Effect of Presence of Female Top Managers 
This graph plots the marginal effect of female top managers on ROA in firms with 
different proportions of female directors on board. The blue line is the linear prediction 
plot for firms with female top managers, and the red line is the linear prediction plot 
for firms with male top managers. These two lines plot how ROA varies with %Female 























association with ROA, consistent with the finding of McConnell and Muscarella 
(1985) that firms tend to make capital investments that improve firm profitability. 
In model 6, I control for ownership structure. I find that Institutional ownership 
significantly increases ROA, which supports the idea that institutional investors 
monitor and discipline managerial behaviours to improve firms’ accounting 
performance (McConnell & Servaes 1990). I document a significant impact of 
Managerial ownership on ROA, consistent with the finding of Coles et al. 
(2012). In addition, local market development conditions may also affect firm 
performance. There is a considerable difference in the level of economic 
development across China’s provinces. In model 7, I control for Regional 
development, which is a comprehensive index of regional market development 
level of each province, collected from the NERI INDEX of Marketisation of 
China’s Provinces Report (2011). The index is assigned to each firm based on 
the location of the firm’s headquarters. Firms headquartered in more 
developed provinces show better performance. Model 8 includes all additional 
control variables, and model 9 further includes industry-year fixed effects to 
capture all time-varying industry characteristics. Altogether, the results show 
that the interaction between female top managers and female board directors 
significantly increases ROA. 
3.5.3. Female gender interaction versus male gender interaction 
Is the gender interaction effect specific to women? To clarify this question, 
I test whether male top managers interact with male directors. Male top 
manager is equal to 1 if both CEO and CFO in the firm are men, and 0 




are included in a single model, one will be dropped. I thus use only Female top 
manager as the proxy for gender composition in top management. To make 
sure that female interaction and male interaction can be simultaneously 
examined in one model, I do not use %Female directors or %Male directors as 
the multiplier, because Female top manager × %Female directors and Male 
top manager × %Male directors will be perfectly collinear. I construct new 
variables to represent board gender diversity. High female representation on 
board is equal to 1 if the percentage of female directors on a firm’s board is no 
less than the 75th percentile of the sample, and 0 otherwise. High male 
representation on board is constructed analogously for male directors.  
In mode 1 of Table 3.6, female interaction is positively and significantly 
related to ROA. In model 2, male interaction has no significant impact on ROA. 
When both female interaction and male interaction are included in model 3, 
only the female interaction effect is statistically significant. Thus, I argue that 
the gender interaction effect only takes place among women. I find little 
evidence that there exists a significant interaction effect between male top 
managers and male board directors. 
3.5.4. Gender interaction, firm profitability and managerial power of 
women 
Executive directors have the managerial power to support the execution 
of corporate decisions made by female top managers. In contrast, independent 




Table 3.6 Female Gender Interaction versus Male Gender Interaction 
This table presents OLS regressions of ROA on the gender interaction between 
female top managers and female board directors while controlling for male gender 
interaction. Female top manager is equal to 1 if a firm has a female CEO or CFO, and 
0 otherwise. Male top manager is equal to 1 if both CEO and CFO in the firm are male, 
and 0 otherwise. High female representation on board is equal to 1 if the percentage 
of female directors on the board is no less than the 75th percentile of the sample, and 
0 otherwise. High male representation on board is equal to 1 if the percentage of male 
directors on the board is no less than the 75th percentile of the sample, and 0 
otherwise. Control variables are included but suppressed for brevity. Cluster-robust t-
statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in Table 3.1. 
 DV=ROA [1] [2] [3] 
Female top manager -0.000 0.004 -0.002 
 [-0.06] [1.64] [-0.66] 
High female representation on board -0.005**  -0.007*** 
 [-2.07]  [-2.64] 
Female top manager × High female representation on board 0.011***  0.013*** 
 [2.74]  [2.94] 
High male representation on board  -0.003 0.000 
  [-0.87] [0.01] 
Male top manager × High male representation on board  0.002 -0.004 
  [0.50] [-0.80] 
Controls Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effect Y Y Y 
Year fixed effect Y Y Y 
R2 0.101 0.1 0.101 






providing external monitoring and professional expertise. Independent 
directors add less than executive directors to the managerial power of female 
top managers. I expect that the effect of female top managers on firm 
performancerequires female executive directors’ managerial power to 
enhance women’s status in the top management. To test this prediction, in 
Table 3.7, I examine the gender interactions of Female top manager 
with %Female executive directors and %Female independent directors. 
In model 1, neither %Female executive directors nor %Female 
independent directors reports statistically significant impact on ROA. In model 
2, the coefficient on Female top manager is positive and significant at the 5% 
level. In model 3, the coefficient of Female top manager × %Female executive 
directors is significantly positive, indicating that the more women are added as 
executive directors to a firm led by a female CEO/CFO, the higher the 
profitability (as measured by ROA) of that firm. The coefficient of %Female 
executive directors is significantly negative, which means that in absence of 
female top managers (i.e., both CEO and CFO are men) a higher proportion 
of female executive directors on board will reduce ROA. 
Figure 3.2 plots the marginal effect of the presence of female top 
managers in firms with different proportions of female executive directors on 
board. When none of the executive directors are female (%Female executive 
directors=0), the marginal effect, which is the ROA difference between firms 
with female and with male leadership in top management team is negligible. 




Table 3.7 Gender Interaction, Firm Profitability and Managerial Power of Women 
This table presents OLS regressions of ROA on the interaction between female top managers and female executive/independent 
directors. Cluster-robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Variable definitions are provided in Table 3.1. 
 DV=ROA [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Female top managers  0.004** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
  [2.01] [-0.18] [-0.25] [-0.45] [-0.11] [-0.40] [-0.02] 
%Female executive directors -0.011 -0.016 -0.035*** -0.032** -0.042*** -0.038*** -0.041*** -0.039*** 
 [-1.15] [-1.63] [-2.62] [-2.44] [-2.81] [-2.82] [-2.80] [-2.64] 
%Female independent directors  0.014 0.013 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.015 0.017 0.015 
 [1.15] [1.07] [0.42] [0.57] [0.38] [0.93] [1.06] [0.94] 
Female top managers × %Female executive directors   0.045** 0.039** 0.055** 0.051** 0.054** 0.049** 
   [2.23] [2.00] [2.51] [2.44] [2.43] [2.22] 
Female top managers × %Female independent directors    0.018 0.02 0.02 0.016 0.022 0.015 
   [0.74] [0.84] [0.79] [0.64] [0.89] [0.63] 
         
Control variables:         
Ln(Board size)  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 [-0.50] [-0.45] [-0.44] [-0.32] [-0.53] [-0.49] [-0.40] [-0.18] 
%Independent directors  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.007 -0.000 -0.002 
 [-0.14] [-0.17] [-0.19] [0.08] [0.14] [-0.60] [-0.03] [-0.15] 
Ln(Management size)  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005** -0.005* -0.003 -0.005* -0.004 
 [-1.59] [-1.62] [-1.64] [-2.00] [-1.94] [-1.29] [-1.75] [-1.64] 
Leverage -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.006 -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.004 -0.004 
 [-3.16] [-3.16] [-3.15] [-1.09] [-2.73] [-3.02] [-0.68] [-0.63] 
Ln(1+Sales growth) 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 [9.15] [9.12] [9.13] [8.75] [8.20] [9.07] [7.89] [7.82] 
Ln(Assets)  0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 [6.59] [6.65] [6.57] [6.32] [6.48] [5.77] [5.19] [5.64] 
Ln(Firm age) -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.002* -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.001 -0.001 
 [-7.55] [-7.51] [-7.50] [-1.67] [-6.68] [-6.75] [-0.52] [-0.81] 
         
Additional controls:         
Cash holding    0.090***   0.094*** 0.092*** 
    [9.96]   [9.54] [9.28] 




    [-0.79]   [-0.26] [-0.89] 
Capital expenditure    0.109***   0.111*** 0.109*** 
    [8.30]   [8.23] [8.16] 
Government ownership      0.007  0.010** 0.008* 
     [1.45]  [2.24] [1.75] 
Institutional ownership      0.027***  0.026*** 0.025*** 
     [5.21]  [5.19] [5.01] 
Managerial ownership      0.039***  0.031*** 0.031*** 
     [3.61]  [2.66] [2.59] 
Regional development      0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
      [6.24] [5.88] [5.89] 
Constant -0.039* -0.042* -0.040* -0.061*** -0.068*** -0.050** -0.107*** -0.120*** 
 [-1.83] [-1.95] [-1.83] [-2.85] [-3.02] [-2.20] [-4.53] [-4.73] 
Industry fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry-year fixed effect N N N N N N N Y 
R2 0.073 0.073 0.074 0.092 0.075 0.08 0.102 0.118 





Figure 3.2 Marginal Effect of Presence of Female Top Managers 
This graph plots the marginal effect of female top managers on ROA in firms with 
different proportions of female executive directors on board. The blue line is the linear 
prediction plot for firms with female top managers, and the red line is the linear 
prediction plot for firms with male top managers. These two lines plot how ROA varies 

























increases. Specifically, at the 75th percentile of %Female executive directors 
(=0.111), the ROA difference is 0.005, which is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. In fact, when %Female executive directors exceeds 8% – approximately 
one female executive director on the board – the ROA difference between 
these two groups of firms turns to be statistically significant. 
In models 4–8 of Table 3.7, I control for additional firm characteristics, 
market development levels and industry-year fixed effects. The findings 
continue to hold. In addition, some female CEOs and CFOs may be board 
members and thus count as female executive directors. I remove these 
observations from the count of female executive directors and re-calculate the 
variable %Female executive directors. The untabulated results show that my 
prior findings still hold. Taken together, the empirical results reveal that the 
increasing impact of female top managers on ROA is associated with the 
managerial power provided by female executive directors. 
3.5.5. Endogeneity 
Board characteristics could be endogenously chosen by firms to suit their 
operating or contracting environments (Adams & Ferreira 2009). Farrell and 
Hersch (2005) show that the likelihood of a firm adding a woman to its board 
is associated with the number of women already on the board and the firm’s 
accounting performance. Thus, it is challenging to establish a causal relation 
between gender diversity and firm performance.  
In Table 3.8, I test whether firm performance affects the appointment of 




Table 3.8 Determinants of Gender in Appointments 
This table presents regression results for the determinants of gender in appointments of top managers and directors. The dependent 
variable Female CEO (CFO) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a female CEO (CFO) is appointed in a given year, and 0 otherwise. 
#Female directors (#Female executive/independent directors) is the total number of female directors (female executive/independent 
directors) appointed to the board in a given year. All independent variables are lagged by one year, except the departure variables. 
Female CEO departure (Female CFO departure) is equal to 1 if a female CEO (CFO) is replaced, and 0 otherwise. #Female director 
departures (#Male director departures) is the number of female (male) directors departing the board. Other departure variables are 
constructed analogously. Models 1 and 2 are estimated using a Probit model. Models 3–5 are estimated using a Poisson model. Cluster-
robust z-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variable definitions are provided in Table 3.1. 
 Dependent variable= Female CEO Female CFO # Female directors # Female executive directors # Female independent directors 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
ROA (lag) -0.789*** -0.339 -0.898*** -1.274*** -0.556* 
 [-2.66] [-1.59] [-4.21] [-4.64] [-1.93] 
Ln(Board size)  (lag) -0.218 0.168** -0.897*** -0.720*** -0.869*** 
 [-1.45] [2.12] [-10.01] [-5.45] [-8.08] 
%Female directors (lag) 1.031*** 0.266 0.475*** 0.363 0.503** 
 [4.12] [1.62] [2.64] [1.42] [2.15] 
Ln(Management size)  (lag) 0.051 0.06 -0.08 -0.073 -0.064 
 [0.52] [1.06] [-1.38] [-0.85] [-0.92] 
%Female executives (lag) 0.663*** 0.631*** 0.778*** 1.519*** 0.019 
 [3.69] [5.49] [6.77] [9.65] [0.12] 
Ln(1+Compensation) (lag) 0.021 -0.066*** 0.023 0.052 -0.02 
 [0.42] [-3.39] [0.90] [1.23] [-0.67] 
Institutional ownership (lag) -0.088 -0.065 0.032 0.121 -0.032 
 [-0.54] [-0.64] [0.34] [0.87] [-0.27] 
Stock return volatility (lag) 1.16 0.692* -0.155 0.023 -0.236 
 [1.60] [1.68] [-0.35] [0.04] [-0.43] 
Ln(Assets)  (lag) -0.121*** -0.049*** -0.064*** -0.112*** -0.037* 
 [-3.37] [-2.79] [-3.29] [-3.78] [-1.65] 
Female CEO departure 0.902***     
 [6.62]     
Female CFO departure  1.310***    
  [20.70]    
# Female director departures   0.256***   




# Male director departures   0.201***   
   [19.33]   
# Female executive director departures    0.469***  
    [8.22]  
# Male executive director departures    0.300***  
    [17.86]  
# Female independent director departures     0.380*** 
     [4.74] 
# Male independent director departures     0.378*** 
     [13.72] 
Constant -0.475 -0.51 1.345*** -0.211 1.547*** 
 [-0.52] [-1.25] [2.92] [-0.31] [2.79] 
Industry fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y 





2 is a binary variable equal to 1 if a female CEO (CFO) is appointed in a given 
firm-year, and 0 otherwise. In models 3–5, the number of female 
(executive/independent) directors newly added to the board is used as the 
dependent variable.  
Following Farrell and Hersch (2005), I control for board size (Ln(Board 
size)), board gender diversity (%Female directors), management size 
(Ln(Management size)), female representation in the top management team 
(%Female executives), total compensation paid to senior executives and 
board directors (Ln(1+Compensation)), institutional ownership (Institutional 
ownership), standard deviation of monthly stock returns (Stock return volatility) 
and firm size (Ln(Assets)). These control variables are lagged by one year 
relative to the dependent variable. Models 1–2 additionally control for a dummy 
indicator of whether a female top manager steps down in the current year. 
Models 3–5 control for the number of female directors departing the board in 
the current year. 
In Table 3.8, I show that a firm with higher ROA is less likely to appoint a 
female CEO or a female director. This finding suggests a reverse causality 
issue in my study. In addition, women departures are positively significantly 
related to women appointments, in line with the argument that firms are likely 
to appoint a woman in order to achieve the preferred gender diversity goal 
when a female top manager or a female board director departs. 
In light of these results, not having used fixed effects in my previous 




less costly as strict exogeneity does not hold in my data. I therefore adopt an 
instrumental variables approach. There are three gender-related endogenous 
variables in my regression model: Female top manager, %Female directors 
and Female top manager ×%Female directors. Thus, at the minimum, I need 
three instrumental variables, of which the multiplication of two instruments can 
constitute the third instrument (Wooldridge 2010). 
The gender diversity of the top management team and the board of 
directors could mimic that of their industry peers. Knyazeva et al. (2013) point 
out that firms’ decisions on appointments of senior executives and board 
directors are affected by the local supply of qualified candidates. Women in 
the firms’ nearby industry peers could be suitable candidates for firms to 
choose their top managers or directors. I thus define three instrumental 
variables as (1) %Local female directors – the industry average proportion of 
female directors in the province where the firm is headquartered, (2) %Local 
female executives – the industry average proportion of female executives in 
the province where the firm is headquartered, and (3) the multiplication 
of %Local female directors and %Local female executives.  
In Panel A of Table 3.9, I report results for the two-stage-least-squares 
(2SLS) regressions of ROA on female interaction and control variables.15 The 
first-stage regression results show that Female top manager is significantly  
                                            
 
15 I do not use 2SLS regressions to examine the interaction effect of female leaders and female 
executive/independent directors, because at least two additional endogenous variables need 




Table 3.9 Instrumental Variable Approach 
This table presents 2SLS regressions of ROA on the interaction between female top 
managers and female board directors. The IVs include (1) %Local female directors, 
which is the industry average proportion of female directors in the province where the 
firm is headquartered; (2) %Local female executives, which is the industry average 
proportion of female executives in the province where the firm is headquartered; 
(3) %Local female directors × %Local female executives; and (4) Proportion of male 
directors with board connections to female directors, which is the number of male 
directors who sit on other boards where there are female directors, divided by the total 
number of male directors. Panel A uses (1)  ̶(3) as IVs, and Panel B uses (1)  ̶(4) as 
IVs. Director connectedness, which is defined as the total number of external board 
seats held by all directors in the firm, is controlled for in Panel B. Cluster-robust t-
statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in Table 3.1. 






 2nd stage ROA 
%Local female directors 0.350* 0.989***  Female top manager -0.053*** 
 [1.70] [17.30]   [-3.20] 
%Local female executives 1.694*** -0.016  %Female directors -0.100** 
 [10.01] [-0.41]   [-2.40] 
%Local female directors 
× %Local female executives 
-0.699 0.030  
Female top manager 
× %Female directors 
0.265*** 
 [-0.77] [0.09]   [3.34] 
Ln(Board size) -0.036 -0.006  Ln(Board size) -0.003 
 [-1.22] [-1.00]   [-0.70] 
%Independent directors 0.004 -0.001  %Independent directors 0.002 
 [0.05] [-0.06]   [0.16] 
Ln(Management size) 0.026 -0.006  Ln(Management size) -0.004 
 [1.29] [-1.59]   [-1.51] 
Leverage -0.009 -0.002  Leverage -0.013** 
 [-0.35] [-0.29]   [-2.28] 
Ln(1+Sales growth) 0.001 -0.004**  Ln(1+Sales growth) 0.028*** 
 [0.13] [-2.05]   [9.01] 
Ln(Assets) -0.020*** -0.007***  Ln(Assets) 0.005*** 
 [-2.81] [-4.68]   [4.13] 
Ln(Firm age) -0.024** -0.004*  Ln(Firm age) -0.000 
 [-2.27] [-1.83]   [-0.30] 
Cash holding 0.045 -0.002  Cash holding 0.091*** 
 [0.79] [-0.13]   [9.04] 
R&D -0.985 -0.380*  R&D -0.031 
 [-0.86] [-1.69]   [-0.25] 
Capital expenditure 0.074 0.008  Capital expenditure 0.118*** 
 [0.87] [0.42]   [8.58] 
Government ownership -0.083*** -0.030***  Government ownership 0.008* 
 [-2.72] [-4.60]   [1.89] 
Institutional ownership -0.011 -0.001  Institutional ownership 0.027*** 
 [-0.32] [-0.19]   [5.35] 
Managerial ownership -0.02 0.038  Managerial ownership 0.027** 
 [-0.21] [1.39]   [2.12] 
Regional development -0.002 -0.000  Regional development 0.003*** 
 [-0.34] [-0.28]   [5.49] 
Constant 0.702*** 0.211***  Constant -0.058** 
 [4.22] [6.12]   [-2.01] 
Industry fixed effect Y Y  Industry fixed effect Y 
Year fixed effect Y Y  Year fixed effect Y 
N 16,480 16,480   N 16,480 
F test of excluded instruments 83.22 249.45    




(Table 3.9 continued) 







 2nd stage ROA 
%Local female directors 0.347* 0.987***  Female top manager -0.053*** 
 [1.68] [17.36]   [-3.22] 
%Local female executives 1.696*** -0.014  %Female directors -0.103** 
 [10.00] [-0.35]   [-2.50] 
%Local female directors 
× %Local female executives 
-0.714 0.023  
Female top manager 
× %Female directors 
0.275*** 
 [-0.79] [0.07]   [3.49] 
Proportion of male directors with 
external board connections to 
female directors 
0.157** 0.023    
 [2.33] [1.26]    




 [-2.66] [-4.48]   [4.11] 
Ln(Board size) -0.024 -0.002  Ln(Board size) -0.005 
 [-0.82] [-0.30]   [-1.13] 




 [-0.02] [-0.13]   [0.18] 
Ln(Management size) 0.026 -0.006  Ln(Management size) -0.004 
 [1.28] [-1.59]   [-1.53] 
Leverage -0.009 -0.002  Leverage -0.013** 
 [-0.35] [-0.32]   [-2.26] 
Ln(1+Sales growth) 0.001 -0.004**  Ln(1+Sales growth) 0.027*** 
 [0.15] [-2.02]   [9.03] 
Ln(Assets) -0.019*** -0.006***  Ln(Assets) 0.005*** 
 [-2.58] [-4.09]   [3.75] 
Ln(Firm age) -0.023** -0.003  Ln(Firm age) -0.001 
 [-2.22] [-1.56]   [-0.52] 
Cash holding 0.046 0.000  Cash holding 0.090*** 
 [0.81] [-0.02]   [8.96] 
R&D -0.936 -0.352  R&D -0.042 
 [-0.82] [-1.57]   [-0.34] 
Capital expenditure 0.077 0.01  Capital expenditure 0.117*** 
 [0.91] [0.50]   [8.53] 
Government ownership -0.082*** -0.029***  Government ownership 0.008* 
 [-2.70] [-4.53]   [1.86] 
Institutional ownership -0.011 0.000  Institutional ownership 0.026*** 
 [-0.30] [0.03]   [5.14] 
Managerial ownership -0.025 0.037  Managerial ownership 0.026** 
 [-0.25] [1.37]   [2.07] 
Regional development -0.002 0.000  Regional development 0.003*** 
 [-0.29] [0.00]   [5.20] 
Constant 0.651*** 0.185***  Constant -0.047 
 [3.88] [5.31]   [-1.60] 
Industry fixed effect Y Y  Industry fixed effect Y 
Year fixed effect Y Y  Year fixed effect Y 
N 16,480 16,480  N 16,480 
F test of excluded instruments 64.61 187.93  Hansen J statistic  1.75 





positively related to %Local female directors and %Local female executives 
and that %Female directors is significantly positively related to %Local female 
directors, both consistent with my expectation. In the second-stage regression, 
the interaction term significantly increases ROA. The F-statistics of excluded 
instruments suggest that the instruments are not weak. I then use the Cragg-
Donald statistic to examine the identification of the equation as a whole. The 
Cragg-Donald statistic is 169.17, higher than all the critical values reported in 
Table 5.1 of Stock and Yogo (2005).16 This means that the bias of the 2SLS 
regression relative to the OLS regression does not exceed 5% at the 5% 
significance level. Thus, the weak instrument problem is not a major concern 
in my specification. 
One drawback of having an exactly identified model (three endogenous 
variables and three instruments) is that the exogeneity assumption cannot be 
formally examined using the Sargan over-identification test. Following Adams 
and Ferreira (2009), I include an additional instrument defined as the fraction 
of male directors with external board connections to female directors of other 
firms. The logic is that a firm in which male directors sit on other boards where 
there are female directors is likely to add women to its board – thus, the 
relevance condition is fulfilled. Further, I ensure to control for Director 
connectedness, which is equal to the total number of external board seats held 
by all directors in the firm, as a proxy for the overall connectedness of the 
board. It is important to note that although the first three instruments are likely 
                                            
 




to be correlated, the fourth instrument is not. This is important as tests of 
overidentifying restrictions are particularly suspicious when all the instruments 
share a common vulnerability to being invalid (Murray 2006). 
The over-identified 2SLS regression results are presented in Panel B of 
Table 3.9. The results show that Female top manager is significantly positively 
related to the connection instrument. The F-statistics and the Cragg-Donald 
statistic confirm that the model is not weakly identified. The Hansen J statistic 
for the over-identification test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the 
excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals in the model.17 In the 
second-stage 2SLS regression, the coefficient of the interaction term is 0.275, 
being of higher magnitude than the coefficient of 0.032 in the OLS regression 
reported in model 9 of Table 3.5. This implies that the gender interaction’s 
impact on ROA is understated in the OLS regressions. 
3.5.6. Short-run stock market reactions to appointments of female CEOs 
So far, the results have shown that the interaction between female top 
managers and female directors exerts a positive impact on firms’ accounting 
returns. If the higher accounting returns are a manifestation of improved 
operating efficiency of the firms, then stock markets should reward the gender 
interaction by responding positively to the appointments of female top 
managers to firms with female directors on the board. However, is this the case 
                                            
 
17 The Hansen J statistic of 1.75 is marginally significant with a p-value of 0.19. This result 
suggests that the instruments, especially the industry averages in nearby firms, would be not 




in Chinese stock market? To answer this question, I exploit an event study 
methodology to assess the stock market reactions to the appointments of 
female CEOs to firms with different proportions of female directors on board.  
I focus my analysis on CEO appointments with gender transition – namely, 
a female CEO is appointed to replace a male CEO, or a male CEO is appointed 
to replace a female CEO, because only these events relate to variation in the 
gender interaction. I create a binary variable, Female CEO appointment, which 
is equal to 1 if the newly appointed CEO is female, and 0 otherwise. Female 
CEO appointment is then multiplied by %Female directors to capture the 
gender interaction effect. I estimate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over 
two different event windows from day 0 to 1 and from –1 to 1, where day 0 is 
the CEO appointment announcement date. The expected return used to 
compute CAR comes from a market model with an equal-weighted index return 
as the market return for an estimation window (–149,–23) (in trading days) 
prior to the appointment announcement date. The mean CAR(0,1) around the 
CEO appointments in my sample is –0.20%, while the mean CAR (–1,1) is –
0.18%.  
In Panel A of Table 3.10, the coefficients on the interaction between 
Female CEO appointment and %Female directors are significantly negative, 
suggesting that the appointment of a female CEO leads to a more negative 
CAR in a firm with a higher proportion of female directors on its board. In Panel 




Table 3.10 Stock Market Reactions to Appointments of Female CEOs 
This table presents stock market reactions to the announcements of female CEO 
appointments, conditional upon the proportion of female directors on the board. The 
sample includes all appointments with gender transition. The dependent variable is 
CAR over a two- or three-day event window (day 0 is the appointment announcement 
date). Female CEO appointment is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the newly appointed 
CEO is female, and 0 otherwise. Cluster-robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Variable definitions are provided in Table 3.1. 
Panel A: Female directors  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
  CAR(0,1) CAR(0,1) CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) 
Female CEO appointment 0.027* 0.027 0.009 0.011 
 [1.69] [1.59] [1.19] [1.30] 
%Female directors 0.125** 0.135** 0.051** 0.052* 
 [2.37] [2.29] [1.99] [1.93] 
Female CEO appointment × %Female directors -0.173** -0.167** -0.062* -0.066* 
 [-2.22] [-1.99] [-1.72] [-1.66] 
Ln(Board size)  -0.023* -0.025 -0.014** -0.011 
 [-1.82] [-1.62] [-2.05] [-1.26] 
%Independent directors  -0.068 -0.087* -0.039 -0.056* 
 [-1.64] [-1.77] [-1.47] [-1.80] 
Ln(Management size)  0.018** 0.019** 0.006 0.004 
 [2.51] [2.09] [1.40] [0.66] 
Leverage 0.015 0.018 -0.004 -0.003 
 [1.24] [1.30] [-0.64] [-0.42] 
Ln(1+Sales growth) -0.003 0.007 -0.002 0.003 
 [-0.55] [0.61] [-0.70] [0.37] 
Ln(Assets)  0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 
 [0.64] [0.38] [1.38] [1.25] 
Ln(Firm age) -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.000 
 [-1.08] [-0.86] [-0.72] [-0.17] 
Cash holding  0.003  0.011 
  [0.12]  [0.71] 
R&D  0.107  -1.223 
  [0.03]  [-0.99] 
Capital expenditure  0.041  0.013 
  [0.59]  [0.41] 
Government ownership   0.027  0.005 
  [1.35]  [0.46] 
Institutional ownership   -0.013  -0.006 
  [-0.53]  [-0.42] 
Managerial ownership   0.016  0.028 
  [0.35]  [1.18] 
Regional development  -0.000  -0.000 
  [-0.06]  [-0.06] 
Constant -0.055 -0.049 -0.038 -0.052 
 [-0.82] [-0.68] [-0.92] [-1.21] 
Industry fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.141 0.178 0.127 0.163 




(Table 3.10 continued) 
Panel B: Female executive/independent 
directors  
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
  CAR(0,1) CAR(0,1) CAR(-1,1) CAR(-1,1) 
Female CEO appointment 0.027* 0.030* 0.01 0.013 
 [1.74] [1.77] [1.24] [1.52] 
%Female executive directors 0.125** 0.139** 0.053* 0.057* 
 [2.48] [2.48] [1.84] [1.86] 
%Female independent directors  0.125 0.119 0.046 0.036 
 [1.26] [1.04] [1.09] [0.80] 
Female CEO appointment × %Female 
executive directors 
-0.175** -0.206** -0.071* -0.097** 
 [-2.31] [-2.37] [-1.73] [-2.13] 
Female CEO appointment × %Female 
independent directors  
-0.171 -0.11 -0.047 -0.019 
 [-1.24] [-0.71] [-0.76] [-0.27] 
Ln(Board size)  -0.023* -0.026 -0.014** -0.012 
 [-1.81] [-1.65] [-2.06] [-1.34] 
%Independent directors  -0.068 -0.084 -0.038 -0.054* 
 [-1.56] [-1.65] [-1.40] [-1.72] 
Ln(Management size)  0.018** 0.019** 0.006 0.004 
 [2.51] [2.10] [1.39] [0.70] 
Leverage 0.015 0.018 -0.004 -0.003 
 [1.20] [1.33] [-0.60] [-0.35] 
Ln(1+Sales growth) -0.003 0.008 -0.002 0.003 
 [-0.55] [0.70] [-0.68] [0.48] 
Ln(Assets)  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 [0.64] [0.48] [1.40] [1.35] 
Ln(Firm age) -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.000 
 [-1.10] [-0.85] [-0.70] [-0.14] 
Cash holding  0.001  0.009 
  [0.05]  [0.60] 
R&D  0.262  -1.133 
  [0.06]  [-0.89] 
Capital expenditure  0.038  0.011 
  [0.56]  [0.35] 
Government ownership   0.027  0.005 
  [1.33]  [0.44] 
Institutional ownership   -0.011  -0.005 
  [-0.46]  [-0.33] 
Managerial ownership   0.02  0.031 
  [0.42]  [1.30] 
Regional development  0.000  0.000 
  [0.09]  [0.12] 
Constant -0.056 -0.055 -0.04 -0.057 
 [-0.82] [-0.78] [-0.97] [-1.31] 
Industry fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.141 0.182 0.128 0.17 





related to women’s board membership as executive directors but not as 
independent directors. That is, only the interaction between female CEOs and 
female executive directors is interpreted by the market as a significant event 
that materially shapes investors’ expectation about firms’ future performance. 
The result is consistent with my argument that the significant female interaction 
effect is present only when female directors have managerial power.  
Surprisingly, different from my previous results that show that gender 
interaction increases ROA, the market-based analysis conveys a different 
picture – investors respond negatively to the intensified interaction among 
women. 
3.5.7. Gender interaction, firm profitability and earnings management 
I have shown that the gender interaction has a positive impact on firms’ 
accounting returns but a negative impact on stock price performance. Since 
stock price is the present value of firms’ future cash flows, the negative effect 
of the gender interaction on stock prices reflects investors’ negative 
expectations about firms’ future performance. However, why do investors 
interpret the gender interaction as an unfavourable practice when there is a 
noticeable improvement in the accounting returns? This result could be 
explained if the accounting rates of returns had been distorted by managers 
through earnings management. As the gender interaction connects the board 
to the top managers to some extent, the effectiveness of board monitoring 
would be undermined, yielding a negative effect on accounting quality 




firms. Furthermore, the interaction with female directors, especially with female 
executive directors, strengthens the managerial power of female top managers; 
therefore, they are more able to manipulate accounting numbers. Since the 
female top managers in my sample are mainly female CFOs (see Table 3.2), 
the earnings management argument is plausible.  
In Table 3.11, I include earnings management as an additional control 
variable in the baseline model. Earnings management is the value of 
discretionary accruals calculated based on the modified Jones model (Dechow 
et al. 1995). The results show that Earnings management significantly 
increases ROA, which suggests that accounting profits can be inflated due to 
manipulation of discretionary accruals. 
In Table 3.12, I turn to study the effect of gender interaction on earnings 
management. In Panel A, the coefficient on %Female directors represents the 
effect of board gender diversity on earnings management when the firm is led 
by men. The significantly negative coefficient suggests that board gender 
diversity curbs earnings manipulation in male-led firms. In addition, the 
coefficient on Female top manager × %Female directors is significantly 
positive, consistent with the argument that female top managers are more 
likely to manipulate earnings when they have close interactions with the board 
because there are more women on it. This finding possibly explains why the 
stock market reacts negatively to the addition of women top managers to firms 




Table 3.11 Earnings Management and Firm Profitability 
This table presents OLS regressions of ROA on the interaction between female top managers and female board directors while controlling 
for earnings management. Earnings management is the value of discretionary accruals calculated based on the modified Jones model 
(Dechow et al. 1995). Cluster-robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in Table 3.1. 
 Panel A: Female directors [1]    Panel B: Female executive/independent directors [2] 
  ROA     ROA 
Earnings management 0.018***  Earnings management 0.018*** 
 [6.96]   [6.95] 
Female top manager 0.000  Female top manager 0.000 
 [0.08]   [0.15] 
%Female directors -0.007  %Female executive directors -0.031** 
 [-0.65]   [-2.13] 
Female top manager × %Female directors 0.022  %Female independent directors  0.02 
 [1.35]   [1.27] 
Ln(Board size)  -0.002  Female top manager × %Female executive directors 0.038* 
 [-0.47]   [1.75] 
%Independent directors  0.001  Female top manager × %Female independent directors  0.007 
 [0.05]   [0.30] 
Ln(Management size)  -0.005*  Ln(Board size)  -0.001 
 [-1.81]   [-0.34] 
Leverage -0.007  %Independent directors -0.002 
 [-1.16]   [-0.13] 
Ln(1+Sales growth) 0.023***  Ln(Management size)  -0.005* 
 [7.42]   [-1.82] 
Ln(Assets)  0.006***  Leverage -0.007 
 [5.03]   [-1.14] 
Ln(Firm age) -0.001  Ln(1+Sales growth) 0.023*** 
 [-0.37]   [7.45] 
Cash holding 0.088***  Ln(Assets)  0.006*** 
 [8.81]   [5.02] 
R&D 0.005  Ln(Firm age) -0.001 
 [0.05]   [-0.44] 
Capital expenditure 0.104***  Cash holding 0.088*** 
 [7.69]   [8.84] 




 [2.22]   [0.02] 
Institutional ownership  0.030***  Capital expenditure 0.103*** 
 [6.09]   [7.60] 
Managerial ownership  0.032***  Government ownership  0.010** 
 [2.71]   [2.23] 
Regional development 0.003***  Institutional ownership  0.030*** 
 [5.61]   [6.12] 
Constant -0.101***  Managerial ownership  0.032*** 
 [-4.18]   [2.70] 
Industry fixed effect Y  Regional development 0.003*** 
Year fixed effect Y   [5.76] 
R2 0.112  Constant -0.102*** 
N 15,691   [-4.22] 
   Industry fixed effect Y 
   Year fixed effect Y 
   R2 0.113 





Table 3.12 Gender Interaction and Earnings Management 
This table presents OLS regressions of earnings management on the interaction between female top manager and female board directors. 
Earnings management is the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated based on the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 
1995). Cluster-robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Variable definitions are provided in Table 3.1. 
Panel A: Female directors [1]  Panel B: Female executive/independent directors [2] 
  Earnings management    Earnings management 
Female top manager -0.017  Female top manager -0.017 
 [-1.05]   [-1.05] 
%Female directors -0.095**  %Female executive directors -0.112* 
 [-2.27]   [-1.78] 
Female top manager × %Female directors 0.206*  %Female independent directors  -0.075* 
 [1.73]   [-1.85] 
Ln(Board size)  0.001  Female top manager × %Female executive directors 0.212* 
 [0.07]   [1.75] 
%Independent directors  0.051  Female top manager × %Female independent directors  0.205 
 [0.94]   [1.36] 
Ln(Management size)  -0.031  Ln(Board size)  0.002 
 [-1.48]   [0.10] 
Leverage 0.360***  %Independent directors  0.049 
 [2.99]   [0.92] 
Ln(1+Sales growth) -0.022  Ln(Management size)  -0.031 
 [-1.40]   [-1.48] 
Ln(Assets)  -0.060***  Leverage 0.360*** 
 [-5.10]   [2.99] 
Ln(Firm age) 0.005  Ln(1+Sales growth) -0.022 
 [0.88]   [-1.40] 
Cash holding 0.099**  Ln(Assets)  -0.060*** 
 [2.21]   [-5.10] 
R&D -0.297  Ln(Firm age) 0.005 
 [-0.40]   [0.85] 
Capital expenditure 0.251***  Cash holding 0.099** 
 [2.95]   [2.22] 
Government ownership  0.036***  R&D -0.300 
 [2.88]   [-0.41] 




 [-0.23]   [2.96] 
Managerial ownership  -0.066**  Government ownership  0.036*** 
 [-2.08]   [2.88] 
Regional development 0.000  Institutional ownership  -0.005 
 [0.14]   [-0.23] 
Constant 1.217***  Managerial ownership  -0.066** 
 [5.10]   [-2.07] 
Industry fixed effect Y  Regional development 0.000 
Year fixed effect Y   [0.18] 
R2 0.094  Constant 1.216*** 
N 15,691   [5.11] 
   Industry fixed effect Y 
   Year fixed effect Y 
   R2 0.094 





In Panel B of Table 3.12, I find that the interaction between female top 
managers and female executive directors positively impacts earnings 
management, whereas the interaction between female top managers and 
female independent directors has no such effect. This is consistent with my 
previous finding that, only when female directors have managerial power, their 
interaction with female top managers can lead to measurable effects at the 
firm level.  
3.5.8. Gender interaction and the pressure on women to perform 
I test whether the pressure on women to perform causes the gender 
interaction effect. In the survey carried out by Ragins et al. (1998), the female 
senior executives in Fortune 1000 companies reported a perception of higher 
pressure to perform relative to their male peers. Specifically, about 99% of the 
surveyed women stated that they had to consistently over-perform to 
demonstrate their competence and to counter negative gender stereotypes in 
the workplace. Under such pressure, women would liaise to manipulate 
reported earnings, leading to unfavourable stock price movements.  
If the performance pressure is present, female top managers with longer 
tenure are more entrenched in the firms and should experience less of the 
pressure and be less engaged in this behaviour. To test for this arugument, I 
decompose Female top manager into Female top manager_New and Female 
top manager_Old by the tenure of the female top managers. Female top 
manager_New is equal to 1 if a female CEO/CFO is newly appointed to the 




the female CEO and the female CFO hold their positions for more than one 
year, and 0 otherwise. The two dummy variables are then multiplied 
by %Female directors.  
In Table 3.13, I find that both ROA and Earnings management are 
significantly positively related to Female top manager_New × %Female 
directors, but not significantly related to Female top manager_Old × %Female 
directors. The results suggest that only the newly appointed female top 
managers are likely to collaborate with female board directors to manipulate 
accounting returns, as they face greater pressure to perform when initially 
assuming their top managerial role. 
If gender interaction only induces earnings manipulation in the initial year 
of leadership, I would expect that the appointments of female top managers 
would not have a negative consequence on the firms’ stock prices in the long 
run, far beyond the three-day event window I studied in Section 3.5.6. I 
examine the long-run stock market reaction to CEO appointments by using the 
buy-and-hold (B&H) returns.18  
The average CEO tenure in my sample is three years. I thus examine the 
B&H returns up to three years post CEO appointments. The set of treatment 
firms comprises all firms that appoint a female CEO to replace a male  
                                            
 
18 B&H return𝑖𝑇 = ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡) − 1
𝑇





Table 3.13 Gender Interaction and the Pressure on Women to Perform 
This table examines whether the pressure on women to perform affects gender 
interaction. Female top manager is decomposed into Female top manager_New and 
Female top manager_Old. Female top manager_New is equal to 1 if the female 
CEO/CFO is newly appointed in a given year, and 0 otherwise. Female top 
manager_Old is equal to 1 if female top manager is equal to 1 but there are no 
appointments of female top managers in the given year, and 0 otherwise. Earnings 
management is the sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals over the 
previous three years, where discretionary accruals are calculated based on the 
modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995). Cluster-robust t-statistics are reported in 
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Variable definitions are provided in Table 3.1. 
  [1] [2] 
  ROA Earnings management 
Female top manager_New -0.011* -0.010 
 [-1.91] [-1.03] 
Female top manager_Old 0.001 -0.003 
 [0.19] [-0.59] 
%Female directors -0.014 -0.014 
 [-1.22] [-0.79] 
Female top manager_New × %Female directors 0.071** 0.135** 
 [2.28] [2.55] 
Female top manager_Old × %Female directors 0.029 0.018 
 [1.63] [0.75] 
Ln(Board size)  -0.002 -0.002 
 [-0.58] [-0.37] 
%Independent directors  0.002 -0.010 
 [0.20] [-0.67] 
Ln(Management size)  -0.005* -0.009** 
 [-1.68] [-2.39] 
Leverage -0.004 0.091*** 
 [-0.74] [11.74] 
Ln(1+Sales growth) 0.026*** -0.006 
 [8.96] [-1.63] 
Ln(Assets)  0.006*** -0.025*** 
 [5.12] [-15.53] 
Ln(Firm age) -0.001 0.000 
 [-0.41] [0.10] 
Cash holding 0.094*** -0.009 
 [9.49] [-0.67] 
R&D -0.030 -0.626*** 
 [-0.26] [-2.83] 
Capital expenditure 0.112*** 0.061** 
 [8.28] [2.36] 
Government ownership  0.010** 0.006 
 [2.21] [0.99] 
Institutional ownership  0.025*** 0.010 
 [5.04] [1.45] 
Managerial ownership  0.031*** -0.009 
 [2.61] [-0.47] 
Regional development 0.003*** -0.001 
 [5.75] [-0.65] 
Constant -0.105*** 0.605*** 
 [-4.41] [17.67] 
Industry fixed effect Y Y 
Year fixed effect Y Y 
R2 0.103 0.192 




CEO.19 The firms with a constant male CEO (i.e., no CEO change) are chosen 
as control firms. I require that the treatment firms and their matched control 
firms have stock return data for at least 500 trading days for three consecutive 
years after the CEO appointments. I exclude the CEO appointments centring 
which an M&A occurs within three years. After these procedures, I obtain 216 
CEO appointments with male-to-female gender transition.  
I match treatment firms and control firms based on the following criteria: 
(1) the matched pairs are in the same year; (2) the market capitalisation of the 
control firm is within +/− 30% of the market capitalisation of the treatment firm; 
(3) the absolute difference in %Female directors between the treatment firm 
and the control firm is less than 0.01; and (4) the control firm has the closest 
market-to-book ratio to the treatment firm. Finally, I find 173 matched pairs for 
male-to-female CEO appointments.  
Panel A of Table 3.14 shows that there are no significant post-matching 
differences in these variables between treatment and control firms. This result 
justifies my matching approach. Given that the ratio of %Female directors is 
nearly identical across the two groups, the group of treatment firms (male-to-
                                            
 
19 Alternatively, I could study CEO appointments with gender transition from female to male. 
In this case, I can match 71 pairs, in which firms with constant female CEOs are chosen as 
control firms. Out of the 71 treatment firms, 47 (66.20%) firms are already in the treatment 
sample where the firm appoints a female CEO to replace a male CEO. To reduce the possibility 
that the stock markets may have priced the effect of male-to-female transition, I take the firms 
with male-to-female transition out of the sample and then do the matching. I find that the 
original matching criteria will give rise to matched pairs with significant differences across the 
two groups. Thus, in this matching, I require that the market capitalisation of the control firm 
should be within +/− 20% of the market capitalisation of the treatment firm. Finally, I am left 





Table 3.14 Gender Interaction and Long-Run Post-Appointment B&H Returns 
This table presents long-run B&H returns over (0, 245 days), (0, 490 days), and (0, 735 days) after CEO appointments. Treatment firms 
are those in which a female CEO is appointed to replace a male CEO. Control firms are those without CEO appointments, and the CEOs 
in the control firms are male. Treatment and control firms are matched based on market capitalisation, market-to-book ratio, %Female 
directors, and year. The univariate tests are based on 173 matched pairs. Paired t-tests are used to generate the t-statistics for the 
difference in means, where ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Post-matching mean differences 
Variable Appointment firms Matched firms Difference t-statistic (p-value) 
Market capitalization (in CNY millions) 3,690 3,580 105 1.560 (0.121) 
%Female directors 0.180 0.180 0.000 0.397 (0.692) 
Market-to-book ratio 3.680 3.190 0.490 1.441 (0.151) 
      
      
            
Panel B: Mean B&H return  
  Appointment firms Matched firms Difference t-statistic (p-value) 
(0, 245 days) 0.133 0.238 -0.106** -2.339 (0.021) 
(0, 490 days) 0.328 0.397 -0.069 -0.819 (0.414) 




female CEO transition) are expected to show a stronger gender interaction 
after the female CEO is appointed, compared to the group of control firms 
(constant male CEO).  
I then compute B&H returns over (0, 245), (0, 490), and (0, 735) event 
windows (in trading days), where day 0 is the CEO appointment date.20 In 
Panel B of Table 3.14, I use paired t-tests to find out the statistical significance 
of the difference in B&H returns across the matched pairs. I show that, 
compared to control firms with constant male CEOs, treatment firms with 
female CEO appointments experience a drop in mean B&H return in the one-
year period post the appointment. However, the mean B&H return of the 
treatment firms is not significantly different from that of the control firms when 
the appointed CEOs hold their positions for two or three years. The results 
corroborate my argument that female top managers face strong performance 
pressure in their first year in office, as they become more entrenched in the 
subsequent years they have less need to sugar-coat firm earnings, resulting 
in insignificant market effects. 
If the stock market reacts to the gender interaction only in the first year 
after the CEO appointment, then it is unlikely that I would observe a statistical 
effect of the gender interaction on Tobin’s Q, another prevalent measure of the 
long-run market-based performance in the longitudinal data. Following Firth et 
al. (2008), I calculate Tobin’s Q of Chinese public firms as (market value of 
equity + book value of long-term debt + book value of inventories + book value 
                                            
 




of current liabilities – book value of current assets)/ (book value of total assets), 
where market value of equity is computed as (number of tradable shares × 
stock price + number of non-tradable shares × stock price × 30%) to account 
for the illiquidity discount of non-tradable shares. 21  The untabulated OLS 
regression results show that the interaction between female top managers and 




                                            
 
21 A typical Chinese public firm has three types of shares. Common shares are tradable on 
stock exchanges. Restricted institutional shares and state shares are not publicly tradable, 
and they can only be transferred privately or in auctions. As Chen and Xiong (2001) document, 
the price of non-tradable shares significantly deviates from that of tradable common shares, 
and the deviation varies with the quantity of non-tradable shares to be sold and also depends 





Given the minority status of women in top management and the growing 
pressure on women to perform, I argue that female top managers (female 
CEOs and CFOs) tend to collaborate with female board directors in decision-
making process, leading to measurable effects on firm outcomes. The effect 
of the gender interaction is, however, difficult to predict. On the one hand, the 
interaction between female top managers and female board directors could 
impair firm performance due to the detrimental effect of cooperation on board 
monitoring. One the other hand, the gender interaction could improve firm 
performance due to the efficient information exchange in decision-making.  
I test the two competing hypotheses, and show that the presence of 
female top managers has a larger increasing effect on ROA in a firm with a 
more gender-diverse board. However, investors respond negatively, which 
suggests that the higher ROA brought by the gender interaction may not reflect 
the improved operation efficiency. Further analysis shows that the opposite 
effects are related to earnings management. Female top managers with more 
support from female board directors are likely to manipulate earnings numbers 
to produce high accounting returns. This action then would be penalised by 
stock investors. Finally, I show that the significant gender interaction effects 
disappear when women hold their managerial roles for more than one year. A 
possible explanation is that as they become more entrenched in firms, the 




Collectively, the results provide some evidence that the greater pressure on 
women to perform engenders unfavourable gender interaction effects.  
An alternative explanation to my results is that the higher conservatism of 
women (Huang & Kisgen 2013), rather than the pressure to perform, explains 
the earnings manipulation in my data, as Bertomeu et al. (2017) show that 
higher conservatism increases the equilibrium earnings manipulation. In this 
context, women tolerate more manipulation in order to exploit the benefit of a 
more conservative measurement system. I will explore this possibility in a 
follow-up paper. 
The previous literature has largely investigated the separate effects of 
gender of top managers and gender diversity of corporate boards. This chapter 
complements the literature by showing that female top managers and female 
directors liaise to impact on firm outcomes. The significant interaction effects 
arise from female top managers’ enhanced managerial power due to their 
interaction with female executive directors. Powerful women tend to 
collaborate. This collaboration is detrimental to investors as the firm’s earnings 
manipulation intensifies.   
This chapter extends the emerging research that investigates the dynamic 
relationships among women within firms. My study does not suggest that firms 
should avoid female CEOs/CFOs working alongside with other women 
directors. Rather, I argue that if the disproportionate performance pressure of 





Chapter 4  
Do Local Gender Equality Attitudes Affect Women’s 
Representation on Corporate Boards? 
4.1. Introduction 
Cross-nationally, women are underrepresented on corporate boards (Adams 
& Kirchmaier 2015). Increasing board gender diversity is of great importance 
for policymakers. Norway, Germany, France, Belgium, Iceland and Italy have 
adopted mandatory gender quotas for boards; Austria, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK have introduced voluntary codes to 
improve women’s board representation (Wiersema & Mors 2016). If barriers to 
women’s advancement to directorship are rooted in local institutional 
environments, such as negative attitudes and stereotypes about women’s 
roles in society, then board restructuring policies that target firms may be 
ineffective and even cause low operational efficiency (e.g., Ahern & Dittmar 
2012). If increased gender diversity is desirable for firms, then it would be 
necessary to take actions at a higher level and promote gender equality in local 
institutions, not merely in target firms.  
Previous literature on this issue has largely focused on firm-level factors 
to examine what affects board gender diversity (Farrell & Hersch 2005; Hillman 
et al. 2007). A few studies exploit the cross-country varied institutional setting 
and investigate how country-specific socioeconomic development affects 
female board representation (Ferreira & Kirchmaier 2013; Adams & Kirchmaier 




regulatory gender quotas and governance codes, challenge the study on the 
informal institutions’ role in this issue.  
This chapter employs the unique setting of China. First, the one-child 
policy and extended nuclear family culture in China allows me to control for 
potential omitted variable biases associated with the supply of women director 
candidates. For example, it has been documented that career breaks – usually 
related to childcare – have a detrimental effect on women’s career progression 
(Bertrand et al. 2010). In China, most women have only one child and are aided 
by their extended families in rearing the child and, therefore, have less 
interrupted career progression.  
Second, the lower status of women that is present in almost every culture 
in the world is less likely to adversely affect the quality of upbringing of women 
in China. When financial resources are scarce, it is natural to expect that a 
majority of families would invest in the human capital of males rather than that 
of females. In China, however, a girl who is the only child of her family is likely 
to be cherished and educated by the family as much as a boy. Thus, 
insufficient supply of women director candidates is less likely to be an issue in 
China than in other countries.  
Third, the formal legal rules and regulations are generally identical across 
different provinces of China, but informal institutions such as cultures, values 
and traditions vary. In this setting, I study how the informal provincial-level 
gender equality values and beliefs, defined as local gender equality attitudes, 




I construct three categories of proxies to measure provincial-level gender 
equality beliefs. For the first category, I use enrolment data from Tsinghua 
University, the top-ranked STEM-oriented university in China, by tracing back 
students at this institution to the provinces where they grew up in. The gender 
composition of the newly enrolled students from each province is then used as 
the provincial-level gender equality proxy. Given the finding of  Guiso et al. 
(2008) that gender equality is positively associated with mathematics 
performance, I claim that provinces with greater beliefs about gender equality 
are those having a higher percentage of female students entering the top 
STEM-oriented university. Proxies in the second category are derived from the 
Chinese General Social Survey, which contains a range of questions that can 
be used to infer provincial attitudes and stereotypes about gender differences 
in innate abilities, employment and career development, and family roles. The 
third category is based on the presence of female political role models in the 
provincial government and the communist party. The rationale is that those 
provinces with women in influential political positions are those with positive 
attitudes about gender equality. 
I have several findings. First, board gender diversity is positively 
significantly related to the proportion of female students entering the top 
university. When looking into the students’ major of subject in the university, I 
find that the significant relation holds only when examining the gender ratio of 
students who major in STEM subjects. One possible explanation is that only 
the gender gap in STEM subject performance relates to local gender equality 




Second, I show that board gender diversity is higher in a province where 
there is a stronger belief that women and men have equal intrinsic abilities. 
Traditional gender stereotypes argue that women are inferior to men in 
leadership positions because women in general are less competent and 
talented (Schein 1973; Oakley 2000). Previous studies (e.g., Guiso et al. 2003; 
Fortin 2005; Guiso et al. 2008) have used the World Value Survey to infer 
attitudes towards gender diversity but the questions available are not as clean 
as those derived from the Chinese survey (as I will discuss in section 4.3.1). 
Thus, my study provides the first convincing evidence that stronger gender 
equality beliefs in local informal institutions increase female board 
representation. In addition, I document consistent results by using other 
questions concerning the gender differences in employment opportunities, 
career goals and housework loads.  
Third, ‘female political role models’ refer to those women who serve as 
the provincial governor (like the CEO of the province) or secretary of the 
provincial party standing committee (like the board chair of the province) in 
China. I find that corporate boards tend to be more gender-diverse when 
female role models are set at the top political level in the province. 
I conduct a number of robustness tests and find the above relations 
continue to hold. First, I use the province-level random effects generalised 
least squares (GLS) estimator, which controls for cross-province heterogeneity 
and allows for inclusion of time-invariant provincial-level independent variables. 
Second, although by using Chinese data I am able to control for omitted 




explicitly add a control for female labour supply and find the results unchanged. 
Third, if childcare service is available, women could be relieved from their 
motherhood-related duties and thus more likely to participate in the labour 
force (Kilburn & Datar 2002), which has potential effects on women directors’ 
supply. However, my empirical results do not support this contention. There is 
little evidence that non-household childcare provision is associated with board 
gender diversity. An implication is that women’s participation on corporate 
boards is not directly linked to the supply of women at grass-root levels. Even 
though there could be more women participating in the labour force, if the 
gender stereotypes exist and work against women, these women still cannot 
break the glass ceiling to the top corporate hierarchy. Finally, to deal with the 
multilevel structure of my data set, the baseline regression model is estimated 
at the aggregate province level. Alternatively, I show that the results are 
qualitatively unchanged when using firm-level regressions and including a 
variety of firm-level control variables. 
This study contributes to the literature in two main ways. First, I provide 
the first evidence that greater beliefs towards gender equality can promote 
corporate board gender diversity in contemporary China. From an 
econometrics perspective, my study using provincial-level gender equality 
measurements within a single country can mitigate the endogeneity concern 
that challenges the cross-country studies based on the World Values Survey, 
such as Adams and Kirchmaier (2015).22 
                                            
 




Second, in contrast to Adams and Kirchmaier (2015) who find corporate 
board gender diversity also associated with female labour supply, my study 
shows that the base level female labour supply across provinces of China has 
no statistical effect on board gender diversity. Furthermore, my results suggest 
that the provision of professional childcare service, which can afford women 
more time to develop their professional careers, appears to exert no statistical 
impact on women’s boardroom representation. The negative gender 
stereotypes regarding women’s role in society seem more influential in the 
Chinese setting.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the 
conceptual framework. Section 4.3 describes the data and the sample. Section 
4.4 interprets the empirical results. Section 4.5 concludes this chapter. 
  
                                            
 




4.2. Conceptual framework 
4.2.1. Division of gender roles in China 
The division of gender roles between women and men has existed in 
China for centuries. As Greenhalgh (1985: 267) states, ‘China’s traditional 
family system was without doubt one of the most brutally patriarchal in the 
world. The legal, economic, physical, and ideological mechanisms by which it 
subordinated women have been detailed in many places and need no 
repetition’.  
Ancient China is predominantly a labour intensive agricultural economy in 
great demand of male labour force in farming, construction and civil defence 
activities (Zhang 2016). Under the Confucian ideology pervasive in ancient 
China, having male descendants means the continuation of family blood. Sons 
are taken as life-time members of their natal family and caring for the well-
being of their parents even after they are married. Therefore, parents usually 
invest a lot in their sons’ education and upbringing relative to their daughters. 
Daughters will belong to their husband’s extended family once married. 
Parents thus have less intention to bring them up in a fruitful way. Daughters’ 
education becomes more oriented to training of merely feminine work such as 
housekeeping and childcare (Boserup 2007). As a result, women have been 
historically placed in a socially disadvantaged position relative to men. 
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, women’s 
socioeconomic status has greatly improved, primarily due to establishment of 




of Women ensures the equal rights of women and men in terms of education, 
health care and political participation. The Labour Law prohibits any kind of 
gender discrimination in employment and promotion practices. The Inheritance 
Law grants women the rights to inherit fortunes from their parents even after 
they are married, while in ancient China only sons have such rights.  
Gender equality and women’s development are important goals of the 
Chinese government to realise social harmony and justice. In China, children 
can receive nine-year free primary and secondary education in public schools. 
As Wu and Zhang (2010) document, the educational opportunities and college 
enrolments have significantly risen for women since the 1990s. Under the one-
child policy, most Chinese families are allowed to have only one child. If the 
only child is a girl, the families will be willing to invest as much as they can in 
rearing the girl. Tsui and Rich (2002) document similar academic performance 
and engagement levels for girls and boys from single child families.  
Despite the substantial improvement in women’s social status, gender 
disparity has not disappeared. As the 2013 Well-Being Development Report of 
China reveals, women remain underrepresented in scientific research 
institutions, government authorities and senior positions in corporations. 
4.2.2. Women’s underrepresentation on board: Can gender equality 
attitudes in local communities help women break the glass ceiling? 
In corporations, women are numerical minorities of the board of directors. 
As shown in Table 3.2 of chapter 3, only 11% of board members in Chinese 




representation on corporate boards in order to overcome the barriers to 
boardrooms. 
The investigation has been carried out at both the micro firm level and 
macro institutional level. Several firm characteristics have been found to be 
related to female director representation. For instance, Farrell and Hersch 
(2005) show that a woman is likely to be added to the board when a female 
director steps down – a finding consistent with tokenism. Hillman et al. (2007) 
find that women are more likely to participate on the board of firms that are 
larger in size, in industries with higher female labour force participation, highly 
diversified in corporate strategy, and closely linked to other firms with women 
board directors.  
Gender diversity on board is largely a socioeconomic issue. Standard 
economic models suggest that women are underrepresented in some 
occupations because of discrimination in the labour market. The taste-based 
discrimination literature (e.g., Eagly & Karau 2002; Becker 2010) argues that 
women are less likely than men to get promoted to leadership roles because 
of employers’ prejudice and discriminatory tastes. In contrast, the statistical 
discrimination literature (e.g., Bielby & Baron 1986; Lazear & Rosen 1990) 
assumes that employers make statistical inferences about the productivity of 
women and men for a specific job. Employers may consider that women on 
average are more likely to quit their jobs because of maternity, and thus 
presume that women’s productivity is lower than men’s productivity. Hence, 
they would discriminate against women in making appointment or promotion 




Employ a data set of 28 European countries, Ferreira and Kirchmaier 
(2013) find that country-fixed effects explain more of the cross-sectional 
variation of board gender diversity than do firm and industry characteristics. 
Their study suggests board gender diversity being greatly driven by cross-
country institutional factors. Furthermore, using a data set of 22 countries 
worldwide, Adams and Kirchmaier (2015) show that economic and cultural 
barriers (e.g., family-oriented policies regarding managing the work–family 
balance, discrimination in the labour market and traditional family values) as 
well as insufficient female labour supply inhibit women’s progression to the 
board level.  
A limitation of these cross-country studies is the difficulty in disentangling 
what is affected by formal institutions from that affected by informal institutions. 
As the formal institutional setting varies significantly across countries, it is 
especially challenging to include a complete control for its impact. The single-
country analysis for China, where the formal legal rules and regulations are 
nearly identical across different regions, helps reduce this endogeneity 
concern.  
In this study, I examine the effect of informal institutional environments, 
specifically local gender equality attitudes, on board gender diversity. China’s 
law and institutions, including investor protection, corporate governance and 
government quality, are less developed than those of the U.S. and other 
developed countries (Allen et al. 2005). Informal institutions, such as local 
values, norms and beliefs, would be more influential in the Chinese economy. 




across China’s provinces. The link between regional gender equality attitudes 
and board gender diversity, if it exists, should be evident. I expect that 
improved gender equality in local environments enhances board gender 
diversity in corporations. 
4.2.3. Measurement of gender equality attitudes 
The gender gap in mathematics performance reflect societal attitudes 
towards gender equality. Guiso et al. (2008) find that, on average, girls score 
lower in mathematics but higher in reading than boys, and that this gender 
disparity is not due to biological gender differences. The gender gap in 
mathematics scores can be shortened with improved gender equality, while 
the gender gap in reading scores is widened with it. Else-Quest et al. (2010) 
find that the cross-country gender gap in mathematics achievement can be 
reduced if the country adopts effective policies to enhance women’s welfare 
and social status. Women’s equal opportunity in schooling, participation in 
scientific research, and increased parliamentary representation can narrow the 
gender gap in mathematics.  
Gender stereotypes generally portray women as less capable or talented 
than men, less devoted to their career, and more responsible for household 
chores. Considerable literature has compared the performance of women and 
men on tests of cognitive abilities and general intelligence, and shown that the 
gender-related differences are rather small and disappearing over time 
(Maccoby & Jacklin 1978; Hyde 1981; Feingold 1988; Hyde 1990). In 




qualified leadership abilities as men managers (Dobbins & Platz 1986). 
Furthermore, women’s family roles can affect their commitment to the labour 
force and ultimate career success (Kirchmeyer 1998). Marriage and the 
anticipated shorter and more disrupted career life hinder women’s acquisition 
of necessary work experience to take part in upper-level positions (Marini 
1989). The gender differences in employment and career development 
opportunities signify gender inequality in the workplace and women’s work–life 
preferences (Bielby & Baron 1986; Ohlott et al. 1994; Hakim 2006). In addition, 
stereotypical gender roles usually assign housework to the women of the 
family. Women’s devotion to housework likely impedes their career 
advancement and pay increment (Becker 1985). The equitable housework 
division between women and men delineates gender equality in the household 
(e.g., Blair & Lichter 1991; Fuwa 2004; Hook 2010; Mencarini & Sironi 2010). 
Yu and Xie (2011) further show that as gender equality improves, women in 
China have more power in bargaining over housework division with their 
husbands. 
Women’s political representation in governments can promote gender 
equality in local communities. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) find that the 
increased representation of women in Indian village councils affects policy 
decisions on local infrastructure construction in a way that caters to women’s 
needs. Beaman et al. (2009) show that the prior exposure to female political 
leaders lessens negative stereotypes against female leaders and promotes 
perceptions of female leadership’s effectiveness. These female political 




4.3. Sample construction 
4.3.1. Data 
There is a severe underrepresentation of women on corporate boards of 
STEM sectors (Adams & Kirchmaier 2016). Tsinghua University is the top-
ranked university in China, internationally renowned for its education and 
scientific research in disciplines of science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics (STEM). The students recruited are elite students in their home 
provinces. They choose Tsinghua University as their priority mainly because 
they are interested and specialised in STEM subjects – mathematics is the 
fundamental. The national university entrance examination results show that 
women are less likely than men to get enrolled into Tsinghua University. The 
gender disparity in enrolment varies across provinces. Given the strong link 
between mathematics performance and gender equality, the gender 
composition of the new students recruited from different provinces, defined 
as %Female freshmen in Tsinghua University, reflects, to some extent, the 
provincial-level gender equality attitudes. I extract the gender details of the 
new students of Tsinghua University from public web sources. The data is 
available for the years 2006–2009, 2012 and 2013. The data also records the 
students’ major of discipline in Tsinghua University.  
To assess provincial values and beliefs about gender roles in society, I 
collect data from the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS). Gender equality 
relates to six questions in this survey:  




Q2: In the economic downturn, women employees should be dismissed 
first; 
Q3: Men should be career-oriented, and women should be family-oriented; 
Q4: Men should undertake more housework than what they have done 
now; 
Q5: Husband and wife should share housework equally; 
Q6: For women, marrying a good man is more important than pursuing 
their own career.  
I define these survey questions as Gender role belief questions. Q1 
relates to societal beliefs about gender difference in innate abilities. The 
‘abilities’ could simply mean physical strength. In general, men are physically 
stronger than women. Holding this belief may not reflect gender prejudice. Q2 
is conceptually similar to the World Values Survey (WVS) question: ‘When jobs 
are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.’ A critique is that 
this question may not measure gender equality. In economic downturns, jobs 
are scarce and maximising household earnings is likely to be the top priority of 
the family. If only one job can be kept, the wife is more likely to sacrifice her 
own career and stay at home for housekeeping because the husband typically 
earns more. Therefore, agreeing men have a priority over jobs may not 
precisely reflect one’s gender role belief. Furthermore, Q3 and Q6 are related 
to gender differences in career–family goals. Q4 and Q5 describe gender 
division of household work. 




How do you place your view on the statement?  
6: very strongly agree;  
5: strongly agree;  
4: slightly agree;  
3: indifferent;  
2: slightly disagree;  
1: strongly disagree;  
0: very strongly disagree.  
It is important to note that whereas a higher score in questions 1, 2, 3 and 
6 represents more gender inequality, a higher score in questions 4 and 5 
represents more gender equality. I concentrate on clear agreements or 
disagreements to each question. I calculate the fraction of respondents scoring 
lower than 2 in questions 1, 2, 3 and 6, and the fraction of respondents scoring 
higher than 4 in questions 4 and 5.23 As such, a higher fraction indicates higher 
gender equality in local attitudes about gender roles. The survey data is 
available for 28 provinces and municipalities in the years 2006, 2008, 2010, 
2012 and 2013.24  
For women’s political empowerment, defined as Female political role 
model, I focus on two political roles. The first is the provincial governor – that 
                                            
 
23  Average scores of the responses are highly influenced by the large proportion of 
respondents who are indifferent to the question being asked and they do not add to my 
understanding of gender attitudes. 
24 Because the survey questionnaires do not record interviewees’ gender, I cannot separate 




is, the top officer of the provincial government. The other is the secretary of 
the provincial party standing committee – that is, the leader of the provincial 
subsidiary of the Chinese communist party. In a typical province, the party 
secretary has a slightly higher political ranking than the provincial governor. I 
collect the provincial governors and secretaries’ gender information from public 
web sources. All the gender equality attitude proxies are defined in Table 4.1. 
I use the firm-level board gender diversity data collected in chapter 3 for 
the period 2000–2014 to conduct this study. A limitation of my data is that the 
university enrolment and CGSS survey data is unavailable for a few sample 
years. To decide on the best way to fill in the missing data, I explore whether 
cross-provincial institutional variation or time-series variation is more powerful 
in predicting provincial-level board gender diversity.  
A number of factors have potential impact on board gender diversity. As 
explanatory factors, I include provincial-level yearly GDP and GDP growth rate 
to account for the impact of economic development, because Mammen and 
Paxson (2000) show that women’s work status and well-being are associated 
with economic development. Population birth rate and population density (per 
square kilometre) are included as controls for the general population. The 
fraction of women in the population (%women) captures the sex ratio in the 








%Female freshmen in Tsinghua University: 
School of Medical 
Science 
The proportion of female students enrolled in the school 
of medical science of Tsinghua University, as a fraction of 
all students recruited by the university from the province 
Schools of Humanities 
and Social Science 
The proportion of female students enrolled in schools of 
humanities and social science of Tsinghua University, as 
a fraction of all students recruited by the university from 
the province 
Schools of Physical 
Science, Technology 
and Engineering 
The proportion of female students enrolled in the schools 
of physical science, technology and engineering of 
Tsinghua University, as a fraction of all students recruited 
by the university from the province 
Total The proportion of female students as a fraction of all 
students recruited by Tsinghua University from the 
province 
  
Gender role attitude:  
Q1 The proportion of survey respondents who (very) strongly 
disagree with the argument 'men have inherently higher 
abilities than women' 
Q2 The proportion of survey respondents who (very) strongly 
disagree with the argument 'in the economic downturn, 
women employees should be dismissed first' 
Q3 The proportion of survey respondents who (very) strongly 
disagree with the argument 'men should be career-
oriented, and women should be family-oriented' 
Q4 The proportion of survey respondents who (very) strongly 
agree with the argument 'men should undertake more 
housework than what they have done now' 
Q5 The proportion of survey respondents who (very) strongly 
agree with the argument 'husband and wife should share 
housework equally' 
Q6 The proportion of survey respondents who (very) strongly 
disagree with the argument 'for women, marrying a good 
man is more important than pursuing their own career' 
  
Female political role 
model: 
 
Presence of female 
provincial governor 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the governor of the 




Presence of female 
party secretary 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the secretary of the 
provincial party standing committee is female, and 0 
otherwise 
Total 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if either the governor or the 
party secretary is female, and 0 otherwise 
  
Provincial-level control variables: 
GDP GDP in billion RMB 
GDP growth GDP growth rate 
Birth rate The number of births per 1,000 population 
%women The proportion of women as a fraction of the total 
population 
%educated women The proportion of women with above college education as 
a fraction of the female population 
%married women The proportion of married women as a fraction of the 
female population  





potential determinants of women’s labour market outcomes (Fortin 2005), I 
control for the proportion of women with above college education as a fraction 
of the female population (%educated women) and the proportion of married 
women as a fraction of the female population (%married women). The data 
comes from the China Statistical Yearbook.  
Table 4.2 reports the mean values of these provincial-level variables in 
the province-year panel. The average GDP growth rate is 15.10%, which 
suggests that China’s provincial economy has been growing very fast. The 
average sex ratio is 0.492, indicating that the gender composition of the total 
population is nearly balanced. As China is a developing country, the education 
level of women is still very low. Only 7.1% of women population have received 
above-college education. In addition, 81.16% of women population are married 
women.  
In Table 4.3, I test how these provincial factors influence board gender 
diversity. The dependent variable is the average firm-level board gender 
diversity for each province-year, where board gender diversity is defined as 
the proportion of female directors on the board. All the independent variables 
are lagged by one year relative to the dependent variable in order to reduce 
simultaneity. The OLS regression results show that provincial-level board 
gender diversity increases with GDP, which corroborates the finding of Adams 
and Kirchmaier (2015) that economic development increases women’s 




Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics of Provincial-Level Control Variables 
This table reports the mean values of the provincial-level control variables across provinces. 
The provincial-level variables are GDP, GDP growth, birth rate, %women, %educated 













Shanghai 1.161 12.65% 7.242 0.496 0.178 0.807 0.030 
Yunnan 0.508 13.54% 14.324 0.484 0.036 0.835 0.001 
Inner Mongolia 0.694 19.64% 9.621 0.489 0.075 0.839 0.000 
Beijing 0.934 16.81% 7.288 0.489 0.267 0.763 0.010 
Jilin 0.566 15.32% 7.206 0.493 0.070 0.820 0.001 
Sichuan 1.135 14.39% 9.622 0.494 0.047 0.857 0.002 
Tianjin 0.591 17.32% 7.905 0.503 0.153 0.804 0.010 
Ningxia 0.105 17.80% 14.903 0.491 0.066 0.818 0.001 
Anhui 0.822 13.87% 12.395 0.493 0.039 0.845 0.004 
Shandong 2.556 14.71% 11.575 0.499 0.052 0.847 0.006 
Shanxi 0.593 15.68% 11.553 0.489 0.065 0.825 0.002 
Guangdong 3.029 14.88% 12.076 0.488 0.055 0.753 0.005 
Guangxi 0.621 14.65% 14.005 0.480 0.042 0.809 0.002 
Xinjiang 0.369 14.61% 16.024 0.491 0.099 0.786 0.000 
Jiangsu 2.666 15.26% 9.365 0.508 0.068 0.854 0.007 
Jiangxi 0.617 14.85% 13.919 0.490 0.045 0.848 0.003 
Hebei 1.366 13.62% 12.555 0.493 0.048 0.830 0.004 
Henan 1.493 14.42% 11.836 0.495 0.043 0.824 0.006 
Zhejiang 1.816 14.55% 10.187 0.494 0.089 0.832 0.005 
Hainan 0.138 14.22% 14.753 0.477 0.048 0.775 0.002 
Hubei 1.047 13.83% 9.393 0.492 0.065 0.836 0.003 
Hunan 1.041 14.93% 12.470 0.488 0.049 0.840 0.003 
Gansu 0.280 14.27% 12.714 0.490 0.043 0.821 0.001 
Fujian 0.980 13.57% 11.803 0.496 0.059 0.814 0.003 
Tibet 0.035 15.77% 16.709 0.508 0.017 0.684 0.000 
Guizhou 0.316 16.39% 14.622 0.484 0.040 0.823 0.002 
Liaoning 1.214 13.99% 6.603 0.498 0.103 0.824 0.003 
Chongqing 0.522 15.92% 9.852 0.495 0.049 0.859 0.004 
Shaanxi 0.643 17.98% 10.215 0.491 0.068 0.830 0.002 
Qinghai 0.087 16.47% 15.621 0.491 0.063 0.809 0.000 
Heilongjiang 0.725 11.72% 7.571 0.493 0.064 0.839 0.001 





Table 4.3 Board Gender Diversity and Fixed Effects Estimator 
This table presents OLS regressions of provincial-level board gender diversity on a 
set of provincial-level independent variables. The sample is a province-year panel. All 
independent variables are lagged by one year relative to the dependent variable. 
Cluster-robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in 
Table 4.1. 
Dependent variable = Board gender diversity 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
GDP 0.005*** 0.001 0.013*** 0.010*** 
 [3.19] [0.86] [4.01] [2.88] 
GDP growth 0.008 0.099 0.018 0.081 
 [0.26] [1.36] [0.76] [1.66] 
Birth rate -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.001 
 [-0.76] [-0.97] [-0.04] [0.70] 
%women 0.380 0.633** -0.491* -0.205 
 [1.64] [2.67] [-1.90] [-0.87] 
%educated women 0.153 0.069 0.090 -0.110 
 [1.31] [0.65] [1.04] [-1.12] 
%married women -0.049 -0.050 0.006 -0.060 
 [-0.65] [-0.94] [0.06] [-0.53] 
Population density -1.934** -1.365* -2.402* -1.399 
 [-2.41] [-1.93] [-1.83] [-1.43] 
Constant -0.035 -0.163 0.377** 0.275* 
 [-0.23] [-1.12] [2.29] [1.87] 
Year fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
Province fixed effect No No Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.189 0.257 0.671 0.688 





Models 1–4 of Table 4.3 differ in the choice of fixed effects. Model 1 
includes neither year- nor province-fixed effects. The adjusted R2 is 18.9%, 
which means that the independent variables altogether explain 18.9% of 
variation in provincial-level board gender diversity. In model 2, I include year-
fixed effects; the adjusted R2 increases to 25.7%. In model 3, alternatively I 
include province-fixed effects; the adjusted R2 increases to 67.1%. When both 
year- and province-fixed effects are incorporated into model 4, the adjusted R2 
rises to 68.8%. This analysis reveals that the cross-province differences 
explain a majority of the variation of board gender diversity, while the time-
series changes within each province explain a rather limited portion. Therefore, 
to fully exploit the cross-provincial variation, I take the mean values 
of %Female freshmen in Tsinghua University and Gender role attitude 
variables across the available data years for each province to construct the 
provincial-level gender equality attitude proxies. 
4.3.2. Descriptive statistics 
In Table 4.4, I report the mean scores of the gender equality attitude 
proxies across 32 provinces and municipalities. For the first proxy, %Female 
freshmen in Tsinghua University, I observe in Panel A that on average only 
31.3% of new students are female, which suggests that women are less likely 
than men to enter the top STEM-oriented university. It is noteworthy that the 
gender composition ratio differs substantially across disciplines. In the school 
of medical science, 48.3% of new students are women – nearly gender-




Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics of Gender Equality Attitude Proxies 
This table describes the distributions of local gender equality attitude proxies and board gender 
diversity. Panels A, B and C report the mean values of the gender equality attitude proxies 
across provinces. Panel D reposts the summary statistics of board gender diversity across 
provinces. Panel E presents the correlations between the gender equality attitude proxies and 
board gender diversity. * indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Variables are defined 
in Table 4.1. 








Schools of Physical 
Science, Technology and 
Engineering 
Total 
Shanghai 0.528 0.727 0.203 0.384 
Yunnan 0.435 0.671 0.212 0.291 
Inner Mongolia 0.556 0.548 0.222 0.307 
Beijing 0.565 0.677 0.268 0.422 
Jilin 0.394 0.689 0.224 0.327 
Sichuan 0.569 0.671 0.213 0.337 
Tianjin 0.551 0.594 0.230 0.342 
Ningxia 0.764 0.576 0.206 0.303 
Anhui 0.530 0.525 0.159 0.250 
Shandong 0.481 0.528 0.182 0.332 
Shanxi 0.542 0.589 0.199 0.304 
Guangdong 0.559 0.610 0.134 0.299 
Guangxi 0.319 0.606 0.237 0.306 
Xinjiang 0.639 0.602 0.294 0.393 
Jiangsu 0.588 0.686 0.220 0.377 
Jiangxi 0.144 0.467 0.102 0.175 
Hebei 0.566 0.640 0.166 0.339 
Henan 0.572 0.544 0.185 0.276 
Zhejiang 0.434 0.678 0.186 0.348 
Hainan 0.300 0.631 0.216 0.329 
Shenzhen 0.559 0.610 0.134 0.299 
Hubei 0.463 0.598 0.175 0.288 
Hunan 0.358 0.601 0.144 0.304 
Gansu 0.581 0.670 0.183 0.268 
Fujian 0.542 0.551 0.151 0.259 
Tibet 0.000 0.864 0.297 0.380 
Guizhou 0.319 0.449 0.189 0.223 
Liaoning 0.478 0.593 0.178 0.325 
Chongqing 0.558 0.593 0.163 0.320 
Shaanxi 0.456 0.594 0.212 0.303 
Qinghai 0.633 0.694 0.204 0.314 
Heilongjiang 0.475 0.646 0.165 0.297 





(Table 4.4 continued) 
Panel B Gender role attitude 
Province Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
Shanghai 0.233 0.530 0.147 0.193 0.433 0.189 
Yunnan 0.116 0.289 0.072 0.219 0.355 0.125 
Inner Mongolia 0.196 0.303 0.100 0.414 0.652 0.144 
Beijing 0.160 0.460 0.099 0.178 0.291 0.089 
Jilin 0.118 0.331 0.069 0.500 0.296 0.082 
Sichuan 0.112 0.288 0.080 0.237 0.274 0.110 
Tianjin 0.159 0.424 0.073 0.194 0.326 0.123 
Ningxia 0.189 0.556 0.093 - 0.504 0.098 
Anhui 0.071 0.274 0.060 0.141 0.186 0.061 
Shandong 0.115 0.331 0.063 0.226 0.326 0.084 
Shanxi 0.089 0.281 0.060 0.267 0.193 0.082 
Guangdong 0.106 0.354 0.059 0.135 0.265 0.071 
Guangxi 0.084 0.300 0.068 0.247 0.264 0.082 
Xinjiang 0.286 0.442 0.204 0.211 0.670 0.234 
Jiangsu 0.098 0.333 0.057 0.316 0.241 0.077 
Jiangxi 0.068 0.245 0.136 0.085 0.252 0.061 
Hebei 0.103 0.223 0.051 0.115 0.229 0.058 
Henan 0.121 0.251 0.040 0.153 0.286 0.077 
Zhejiang 0.141 0.388 0.104 0.277 0.368 0.098 
Hainan 0.180 0.375 0.140 0.235 0.500 0.140 
Hubei 0.081 0.212 0.028 0.180 0.205 0.056 
Hunan 0.100 0.293 0.053 0.060 0.252 0.067 
Gansu 0.152 0.517 0.094 0.175 0.552 0.132 
Fujian 0.100 0.266 0.056 0.148 0.318 0.075 
Tibet 0.027 0.167 0.026 - 0.158 0.081 
Guizhou 0.193 0.430 0.087 0.163 0.367 0.223 
Liaoning 0.089 0.258 0.085 0.290 0.164 0.039 
Chongqing 0.113 0.243 0.035 0.176 0.272 0.080 
Shaanxi 0.135 0.271 0.064 0.203 0.314 0.097 
Qinghai 0.436 0.630 0.208 - 0.636 0.152 
Heilongjiang 0.103 0.227 0.066 0.119 0.265 0.081 





(Table 4.4 continued) 
Panel C Female political role model 
Province 
Presence of female provincial 
governor 
Presence of female party 
secretary 
Total 
Shanghai 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Yunnan 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inner Mongolia 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Beijing 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Jilin 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sichuan 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Tianjin 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ningxia 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Anhui 0.067 0.000 0.067 
Shandong 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Shanxi 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Guangdong 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Guangxi 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Xinjiang 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Jiangsu 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Jiangxi 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hebei 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Henan 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Zhejiang 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hainan 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Shenzhen 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hubei 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hunan 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Gansu 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fujian 0.000 0.200 0.200 
Tibet 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Guizhou 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Liaoning 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Chongqing 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Shaanxi 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Qinghai 0.333 0.000 0.333 
Heilongjiang 0.000 0.000 0.000 





(Table 4.4 continued) 
Panel D Board Gender Diversity 
Province Mean SD P1 P25 Median P75 P99 
Shanghai 0.101 0.106 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.167 0.444 
Yunnan 0.086 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.111 0.333 
Inner Mongolia 0.138 0.141 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.222 0.500 
Beijing 0.102 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.095 0.154 0.429 
Jilin 0.140 0.139 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.222 0.545 
Sichuan 0.104 0.115 0.000 0.000 0.095 0.143 0.455 
Tianjin 0.128 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.214 0.400 
Ningxia 0.145 0.157 0.000 0.000 0.108 0.222 0.556 
Anhui 0.093 0.101 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.143 0.385 
Shandong 0.111 0.115 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.176 0.500 
Shanxi 0.072 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.074 0.111 0.286 
Guangdong 0.109 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.167 0.364 
Guangxi 0.113 0.118 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.167 0.500 
Xinjiang 0.128 0.099 0.000 0.067 0.111 0.200 0.400 
Jiangsu 0.124 0.113 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.200 0.444 
Jiangxi 0.090 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.143 0.286 
Hebei 0.096 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.133 0.333 
Henan 0.093 0.121 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.125 0.500 
Zhejiang 0.122 0.113 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.200 0.444 
Hainan 0.083 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.143 0.333 
Shenzhen 0.125 0.110 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.200 0.429 
Hubei 0.095 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.143 0.444 
Hunan 0.097 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.143 0.364 
Gansu 0.108 0.097 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.167 0.429 
Fujian 0.125 0.110 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.200 0.444 
Tibet 0.114 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.222 0.333 
Guizhou 0.066 0.086 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.333 
Liaoning 0.141 0.121 0.000 0.056 0.111 0.222 0.444 
Chongqing 0.118 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.200 0.381 
Shaanxi 0.115 0.127 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.167 0.556 
Qinghai 0.115 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.154 0.500 
Heilongjiang 0.112 0.124 0.000 0.000 0.106 0.182 0.556 




(Table 4.4 continued) 
Panel E     [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] 
Board gender 
diversity 
[1] %women on board 





[2] School of Medical 
Science 
0.241* 1             
[3] Schools of Humanities 
and Social Science 
0.153* -0.140* 1            
[4] Schools of Physical 
Science, Technology and 
Engineering 
0.180* -0.045 0.519* 1           
 
[5] Total 
0.240* 0.202* 0.682* 0.698* 1          
Gender role 
attitude 
[6] Q1 0.132* 0.439* 0.055 0.272* 0.208* 1         
[7] Q2 0.128* 0.462* 0.097 0.231* 0.212* 0.811* 1        
[8] Q3 0.073 0.176* 0.020 0.221* 0.138* 0.824* 0.698* 1       
[9] Q4 0.388* 0.090 0.299* 0.509* 0.333* 0.166* 0.098 0.089 1      
[10] Q5 0.210* 0.378* -0.015 0.294* 0.106 0.829* 0.710* 0.754* 0.244* 1     
[11] Q6 




[12] Presence of female 
provincial governor 
0.068 0.103 0.071 0.003 -0.022 0.361* 0.241* 0.264* -0.037 0.185* 0.085 1   
[13] Presence of female party 
secretary 
0.113 0.032 -0.067 -0.083 -0.088 -0.041 -0.053 -0.051 -0.057 -0.011 -0.048 -0.009 1  




– there are significantly more women than men. In the schools of physical 
science, technology and engineering, only 19.5% are women – women are 
severely underrepresented in STEM disciplines.  
For each discipline, the cross-province difference is also non-negligible.25 
In the medical school, only 14.4% of students enrolled from Jiangxi province 
are women, while 76.4% of students coming from Ningxia province are women. 
In the schools of humanities and social science, only 44.9% of students from 
Guizhou province are women, while 72.7% of students from Shanghai are 
women. In the schools of physical science, technology and engineering, 
women represent 10.2% of all the students coming from Jiangxi province but 
26.8% of the students from Beijing. 
In Panel B of Table 4.4, I report the provincial scores of gender role 
attitudes based on each CGSS survey question. On average, 13.8% of 
respondents (very) strongly disagree that women are inherently less capable 
than men; 33.9% of respondents (very) strongly disagree that women 
employees should be laid off first in economic recession; only 8.3% of 
respondents (very) strongly disagree that men should be more career-oriented 
while women should be more family-oriented; 20.9% of respondents (very) 
strongly agree that men should do more housework than before; 33.6% of 
respondents (very) strongly agree that housework should be divided equally 
between women and men; 10.2% of respondents (very) strongly disagree that 
                                            
 
25 Tibet is the least developed region in China. Every year Tsinghua University recruits no more 
than ten students from Tibet. Due to the limited enrolment number, the student gender 
composition from Tibet could be an outlier. In the subsequent analysis, the regression results 




marrying a good man is more important than pursuing their own career. This 
shows that the gender roles in China are far from being equal.  
The gender role attitude also varies across provinces. For example, if I 
assess the attitude based on Q1, Tibet is the least gender-equal province, 
where only 2.7% of respondents (very) strongly disagree that women are 
inherently less capable than men; Qinghai is the most gender-equal province, 
where 43.6% of respondents (very) strongly refute that statement. The more 
noticeable provincial-level variation is seen in Q2. Only 16.7% of respondents 
in Tibet (very) strongly disagree that women should be dismissed first in 
economic downturns, while in Qinghai 63.7% of respondents (very) strongly 
refute the statement. For the other survey questions, the cross-province 
variation is also measurable. 
The above results reveal that there is sufficient cross-province variation in 
the variables of %Female freshmen in Tsinghua University and Gender role 
attitude that can be employed for my cross-sectional analysis.  
Regarding the female political role model, in Panel C of Table 4.4 I show 
that Chinese governments are predominantly led by men. Only two provinces, 
Anhui and Qinghai, have ever had female provincial governors in local 
governments. Only Fujian province has ever had a female secretary in the 
provincial party standing committee. This finding suggests that women are 
severely underpowered in provincial governments and communist party. From 




pose a challenge to finding a statistically significant result even if there existed 
a significant relation between role models and board gender diversity. 
Using the board sample from chapter 3, I tabulate the distribution of board 
gender diversity across 32 provinces and municipalities of China in Panel D of 
Table 4.4. It is worth noting that the cross-sectional difference on board gender 
diversity is not negligible. Women are least represented on corporate boards 
in Guizhou province, where only 6.6% of directors are women; and are most 
represented in Ningxia province, where 14.5% of directors are women.  
In Panel E of Table 4.4, I report the correlations between the gender 
equality attitude proxies and provincial-level board gender diversity. Board 
gender diversity is positively correlated with the three categories of gender 
equality proxies in terms of women’s educational achievement, gender roles 





4.4.1. Gender disparity in educational achievement and board gender 
diversity 
In Table 4.5, I regress provincial-level board gender diversity on %Female 
freshmen in Tsinghua University and provincial-level control variables. When I 
take the new students as a whole and disregard the academic discipline they 
are enrolled into, the result in model 4 shows that corporate boards are more 
gender-diverse in a province where a higher proportion of the students 
accepted by the university are women. More women being recruited from a 
province could potentially unveil a more gender-equal institutional environment 
that helps girls achieve academic success. However, there is the possibility 
that these high-achieving women are related to the pool of future female board 
directors, and therefore our proxy for gender attitudes is tangled with a supply 
argument. 
To clarify this issue, I classify the academic divisions into three categories: 
(1) medical science, (2) humanities and social science, and (3) physical 
science, technology and engineering. In model 2, I find that %Female 
freshmen enrolled into the faculties of humanities and social science has no 
statistically significant effect on board gender diversity, while the gender 
diversity is significantly positively associated with %Female freshmen enrolled 
into the schools of physical science, technology and engineering in model 3 





Table 4.5 Gender Disparity in Educational Achievement and Board 
Gender Diversity 
This table presents OLS regressions of provincial-level board gender diversity on the 
gender disparity in educational achievement. All time-varying control variables are 
lagged by one year relative to the dependent variable. Cluster-robust t-statistics are 
reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Table 4.1. 
Dependent variable = Board gender diversity 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
     
%Female freshmen in Tsinghua University: 
School of Medical Science 0.041*    
 [1.73]    
Schools of Humanities and Social Science  0.061   
  [1.47]   
Schools of Physical Science, Technology and 
Engineering 
  0.142**  
   [2.39]  
Total    0.142** 
    [2.33] 
     
Control variables:     
GDP 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.001 
 [0.17] [1.22] [1.52] [0.39] 
GDP growth 0.094 0.117 0.088 0.099 
 [1.38] [1.64] [1.28] [1.41] 
Birth rate -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 [-1.29] [-0.80] [-1.16] [-0.98] 
%women 0.613** 0.515* 0.536* 0.497* 
 [2.74] [1.96] [2.02] [1.79] 
%educated women 0.010 0.084 0.024 0.014 
 [0.11] [0.78] [0.24] [0.14] 
%married women -0.118* 0.013 0.001 0.000 
 [-1.83] [0.20] [0.02] [0.01] 
Population density -1.210* -1.483** -1.192* -1.383** 
 [-1.84] [-2.25] [-1.78] [-2.13] 
Constant -0.111 -0.201 -0.180 -0.180 
 [-0.91] [-1.34] [-1.21] [-1.14] 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.293 0.277 0.286 0.297 





If the proportion of female students is related to a plain supply argument, 
I should find a consistent relation across all academic divisions. As women are 
generally overrepresented in schools of humanities and social science (see 
Panel A of Table 4.4), the relation could be more statistically evident if the 
proxy captures the supply of women. Rather, the significant effect only appears 
in STEM-intensive disciplines. Given that local gender equality attitudes are 
particularly crucial to encouraging women to specialise in STEM subjects (e.g., 
Guiso et al. 2008), my results indicate that some firms have higher board 
gender diversity because in their province women are treated more equally. 
This means that board gender diversity is associated with provincial-level 
gender equality environments. 
4.4.2. Gender role values and board gender diversity 
In Table 4.6, I examine how provincial attitudes about gender roles affect 
board gender diversity. I show that high gender equality as reflected by a 
higher score derived from each survey question significantly increases 
women’s representation on board.26 The only exception is Q6. Its coefficient 
is statistically insignificant but is positive as expected. The results suggest that, 
if there is a stronger belief that women and men have equal intrinsic abilities 
(Q1), employment opportunities and career goals (Q2, Q3 and Q6) and 
                                            
 
26 In the above analysis, the provincial gender equality attitude is delineated through six 
questions on gender roles. Some of these questions are strongly correlated as shown in Panel 
E of Table 4.4 and it is difficult to decide on which question(s) to focus on without being arbitrary. 
In Appendix 1, I apply principal component factor analysis and extract the common factors 




Table 4.6 Gender Role Attitude and Board Gender Diversity 
This table presents OLS regressions of provincial-level board gender diversity on the 
gender equality attitude variables derived from CGSS survey questions regarding 
gender roles in society. All time-varying control variables are lagged by one year 
relative to the dependent variable. Cluster-robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Variables are defined in Table 4.1. 
Dependent variable = Board gender diversity 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
       
Gender role attitude:       
Q1 0.117***      
 [2.91]      
Q2  0.078**     
  [2.55]     
Q3   0.168*    
   [2.04]    
Q4    0.079**   
    [2.48]   
Q5     0.086***  
     [4.22]  
Q6      0.073 
      [0.68] 
       
Control variables:       
GDP 0.003* 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004** 0.002 
 [1.79] [1.49] [1.41] [1.16] [2.71] [1.23] 
GDP growth 0.079 0.077 0.106 0.043 0.064 0.087 
 [1.24] [1.13] [1.55] [0.63] [1.22] [1.29] 
Birth rate -0.003** -0.003** -0.003 -0.003 -0.003** -0.002 
 [-2.12] [-2.34] [-1.60] [-1.65] [-2.44] [-1.27] 
%women 0.628** 0.614** 0.655** 0.464 0.645** 0.651*** 
 [2.70] [2.63] [2.73] [1.42] [2.62] [2.82] 
%educated women -0.004 -0.014 0.000 0.041 0.013 0.052 
 [-0.05] [-0.15] [0.00] [0.44] [0.20] [0.52] 
%married women -0.091 -0.084 -0.096 -0.048 -0.056 -0.062 
 [-1.53] [-1.48] [-1.39] [-0.87] [-1.01] [-1.12] 
Population density -1.428*** -1.578*** -1.465*** -1.154** -1.392*** -1.497** 
 [-3.06] [-2.76] [-2.88] [-2.15] [-3.34] [-2.46] 
Constant -0.118 -0.125 -0.129 -0.080 -0.163 -0.160 
 [-0.89] [-0.96] [-0.88] [-0.54] [-1.13] [-1.12] 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.320 0.317 0.292 0.438 0.369 0.267 




housework loads (Q4 and Q5), this reflects higher gender equality attitudes in 
local informal institutions and, therefore, facilitates women’s progression to the 
board level. 
4.4.3. Female political role model and board gender diversity 
In Table 4.7, I study the relation between board gender diversity and the 
presence of female role models in political establishments. If the provincial 
government or communist party standing committee is governed by a female 
political leader, then positive attitudes about gender equality and women’s 
effectiveness in leadership positions should be expected in the local 
communities, which could lead to higher board gender diversity. The results in 
model 1 and 2 show that the presence of female provincial governor and 
female party secretary is positively and significantly associated with board 
gender diversity. Since women have ever served as provincial governor or 
secretary in only three provinces (see Table 4.4 Panel C), the variation in these 
two women political empowerment proxies is not large and its statistical 
significance could be understated. In model 3, I create a dummy indicator Total, 
which is equal to1 if either governor or secretary is female, and 0 if both are 
male. The relation still holds. 
4.4.4. Endogeneity 
In this study, reverse causality – board gender diversity affecting 
provincial-level gender equality attitudes – is unlikely because board gender 




Table 4.7 Female Political Role Model and Board Gender Diversity 
This table presents OLS regressions of provincial-level board gender diversity on the 
presence of female political role models in political establishments. All time-varying 
control variables are lagged by one year relative to the dependent variable. Cluster-
robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Table 4.1. 
Dependent variable = Board gender diversity 
  [1] [2] [3] 
    
Female political role model:    
Presence of female provincial governor 0.022*   
 [1.70]   
Presence of female party secretary  0.020**  
  [2.47]  
Total   0.022** 
   [2.07] 
    
Control variables:    
GDP 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 [0.95] [0.90] [0.94] 
GDP growth 0.097 0.101 0.096 
 [1.28] [1.40] [1.27] 
Birth rate -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 [-1.21] [-1.10] [-1.23] 
%women 0.367 0.355 0.339 
 [1.64] [1.54] [1.53] 
%educated women 0.068 0.071 0.063 
 [0.60] [0.62] [0.56] 
%married women -0.071 -0.064 -0.072 
 [-1.16] [-1.01] [-1.16] 
Population density -1.366* -1.362* -1.339* 
 [-1.91] [-1.87] [-1.88] 
Constant -0.010 -0.013 0.005 
 [-0.08] [-0.10] [0.04] 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.246 0.238 0.249 





wide informal attitudes and values seems implausible. Nonetheless, omitted 
variable concerns may still plague my results.  
Two of my gender equality attitude proxies, %Female freshmen in 
Tsinghua University and Gender role attitude, are cross-sectional variables 
without time variation. To alleviate omitted variable concern, if I include 
province-fixed effects in the regressions, the fixed effects will absorb the time-
invariant attitude proxies. As an attempt to overcome this endogeneity 
challenge, I use the random effects GLS estimator. This estimator works 
because it allows me to control for unexplained heterogeneity in board gender 
diversity across provinces, and more importantly, it generates meaningful 
coefficient estimates for province-level time-invariant explanatory factors.  
In Table 4.8, the random effects GLS regression results show that board 
gender diversity increases with %Female freshmen in Tsinghua University in 
schools of physical science, technology and engineering, Gender role equality 
as assessed by the CGSS survey questions, and the proxies for Female 
political role model. Overall, the results are consistent with my baseline OLS 
regression results. Corporate boards are more gender-diverse when provincial 
attitudes about women’s roles in society are more positive and supportive.  
4.4.5. Is female labour supply a missing explanatory factor for board 
gender diversity? 
Adams and Kirchmaier (2015) propose that increased female labour force 
participation and full-time employment by women enable the generation of a 




Table 4.8 Random Effects GLS Estimation 
This table presents province-level random effects GLS regressions of board gender 
diversity on the proxies for local gender equality attitudes. All time-varying control 
variables are lagged by one year relative to the dependent variable. Cluster-robust t-
statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Table 4.1. 
Dependent variable = Board gender diversity 
%Female freshmen in Tsinghua University:   
School of Medical Science 0.037 
 [1.13] 
Schools of Humanities and Social Science 0.002 
 [0.19] 

















Female political role model:   
Presence of female provincial governor 0.015* 
 [1.88] 
Presence of female party secretary 0.024*** 
 [4.79] 
Total 0.018*** 




supply of female labour could be a missing factor explaining the heterogeneity 
of board gender diversity. To rule out this possibility, I explicitly add a control 
for female labour supply. %working women is women’s labour force 
participation ratio, calculated as the proportion of working women as a fraction 
of the female population. The data is collected from the 2010 Population 
Census of China.  
In Table 4.9 I show that the results for %Female freshmen in Tsinghua 
University, Gender role attitude and Female political role model are 
qualitatively unchanged when the control variable of %working women is 
incorporated into the regressions. In addition, %working women is not 
significantly related to board gender diversity, which implies that the supply of 
average women at lower levels in society has no direct effect on board gender 
diversity. 
4.4.6. Childcare provision and board gender diversity 
Most women, at some point in their careers, need to take time off for child 
rearing. Budig and England (2001) document that motherhood is associated 
with the gender gap in pay. Bertrand et al. (2010) further show that the 
relatively low income of women is due to women’s motherhood-related career 
interruptions and the resultant short weekly working hours. Kilburn and Datar 
(2002) find that the sufficient provision of childcare service is conducive to 
women’s participation in the labour force. It is thus possible that adequate non-




Table 4.9 Control for Female Labour Supply 
This table presents OLS regressions of provincial-level board gender diversity on the 
proxies for local gender equality attitudes by controlling for provincial-level female 
labour supply (%working women). All time-varying control variables are lagged by one 
year relative to the dependent variable. Cluster-robust t-statistics are reported in 
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Variables are defined in Table 4.1. 
Panel A: Dependent variable = Board gender diversity 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
     
%Female freshmen in Tsinghua University: 
School of Medical Science 0.043*    
 [1.86]    
Schools of Humanities and Social Science  0.068   
  [1.40]   
Schools of Physical Science, Technology and 
Engineering 
  0.147**  
   [2.14]  
Total    0.148** 
    [2.14] 
     
Control variables:     
GDP -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 
 [-0.22] [0.86] [1.00] [0.41] 
GDP growth 0.095 0.119 0.087 0.099 
 [1.38] [1.64] [1.28] [1.41] 
Birth rate -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 [-1.33] [-0.66] [-1.08] [-0.87] 
%women 0.608*** 0.504* 0.534* 0.493* 
 [2.78] [1.87] [1.99] [1.75] 
%educated women 0.021 0.076 0.018 0.004 
 [0.21] [0.68] [0.15] [0.04] 
%married women -0.124* 0.022 0.004 0.004 
 [-1.90] [0.28] [0.07] [0.07] 
Population density -1.209* -1.492** -1.184* -1.380** 
 [-1.85] [-2.27] [-1.76] [-2.13] 
%working women 0.047 -0.034 -0.019 -0.026 
 [0.40] [-0.23] [-0.14] [-0.19] 
Constant -0.127 -0.192 -0.174 -0.171 
 [-0.99] [-1.23] [-1.07] [-1.01] 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.294 0.276 0.285 0.296 




(Table 4.9 continued) 
Panel B: Dependent variable = Board gender diversity 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
       
Gender role attitude:       
Q1 0.117***      
 [2.94]      
Q2  0.078**     
  [2.55]     
Q3   0.168**    
   [2.05]    
Q4    0.077*   
    [1.90]   
Q5     0.086***  
     [4.20]  
Q6      0.073 
      [0.67] 
       
Control variables:       
GDP 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004* 0.002 
 [1.09] [0.80] [0.93] [0.60] [1.87] [0.70] 
GDP growth 0.080 0.077 0.107 0.044 0.064 0.088 
 [1.25] [1.13] [1.55] [0.64] [1.23] [1.30] 
Birth rate -0.003* -0.003** -0.003 -0.003 -0.003** -0.002 
 [-2.03] [-2.27] [-1.55] [-1.56] [-2.32] [-1.25] 
%women 0.626** 0.612** 0.653** 0.471 0.645** 0.649*** 
 [2.71] [2.65] [2.74] [1.40] [2.61] [2.83] 
%educated women 0.002 -0.006 0.006 0.045 0.012 0.057 
 [0.02] [-0.06] [0.06] [0.45] [0.18] [0.52] 
%married women -0.092 -0.085 -0.097 -0.053 -0.056 -0.063 
 [-1.53] [-1.50] [-1.38] [-0.82] [-0.97] [-1.12] 
Population density -1.430*** -1.582*** -1.467*** -1.155** -1.392*** -1.497** 
 [-3.07] [-2.78] [-2.88] [-2.14] [-3.33] [-2.46] 
%working women 0.021 0.028 0.018 0.022 -0.003 0.017 
 [0.20] [0.25] [0.17] [0.17] [-0.03] [0.14] 
Constant -0.126 -0.135 -0.136 -0.088 -0.162 -0.167 
 [-0.93] [-1.00] [-0.92] [-0.55] [-1.14] [-1.11] 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.318 0.316 0.291 0.437 0.367 0.265 





(Table 4.9 continued) 
Panel C:  Dependent variable = Board gender diversity 
  [1] [2] [3] 
 
   
Female political role model:    
Presence of female provincial governor 0.022   
 [1.70]   
Presence of female party secretary  0.020**  
  [2.46]  
Total   0.022** 
 
  [2.06] 
 
   
Control variables:    
GDP 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.47] [0.43] [0.46] 
GDP growth 0.097 0.102 0.097 
 [1.28] [1.40] [1.27] 
Birth rate -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 [-1.19] [-1.08] [-1.21] 
%women 0.365 0.352 0.337 
 [1.65] [1.55] [1.54] 
%educated women 0.075 0.077 0.070 
 [0.62] [0.64] [0.58] 
%married women -0.073 -0.065 -0.074 
 [-1.17] [-1.02] [-1.17] 
Population density -1.369* -1.364* -1.342* 
 [-1.91] [-1.87] [-1.89] 
%working women 0.025 0.024 0.026 
 [0.21] [0.20] [0.22] 
Constant -0.020 -0.022 -0.004 
 [-0.14] [-0.15] [-0.03] 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.244 0.236 0.248 





women’s commitment to careers and consequently increase their chances of 
rising to the boardroom.  
To measure childcare provision, I use questionnaire data from the China 
Health and Nutrition Survey and compute three variables: the average days of 
child being cared outside home per week, the fraction of survey respondents 
having their child cared for in non-household, and the fraction of survey 
respondents having their child cared for in professional childcare facilities.27 
The surveys were carried out in 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, 
2011 in 12 provinces of China.28 The constructed variables are provincial 
averages across available survey years. 
In Table 4.10, I report the results of OLS regressions of provincial-level 
board gender diversity on childcare provision. Across models 1–3, the different 
proxies for childcare provision has no statistical effect on board gender 
diversity. This finding suggests that, even though provision of childcare may 
increase women’s participation in the labour force, the supply of average 
women has no direct link to the gender composition at the top corporate ladder 
– the board of directors.
                                            
 
27 Non-household refers to grandparents’ home, other relatives’ home, neighbours’ home, 
childcare centre, primary school’s pre-school, nursery school and other professional facilities. 
Professional childcare facilities refer to childcare centre, primary school’s pre-school, nursery 
school and other professional facilities. 
28 The survey data is only available for 12 provinces out of 32 provinces in my sample. 
Including childcare provision as controls in replace of female labour supply in Table 4.11 will 




Table 4.10 Childcare Provision and Board Gender Diversity 
This table presents OLS regressions of provincial-level board gender diversity on 
childcare provision. All time-varying control variables are lagged by one year relative 
to the dependent variable. Cluster-robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Dependent variable = Board gender diversity  
[1] [2] [3]  
   
Childcare provision:    
# Days of child being cared outside home per week 0.023    
[0.19]   
% Survey respondents having their child cared for 
in non-household 
 0.166  
 
 [0.98]  
% Survey respondents having their child cared for 
in professional childcare facilities 
  0.005 
 
  [0.39]  
   
Control variables:    
GDP 0.001 0.006 0.004  
[0.38] [1.77] [1.57] 
GDP growth 0.099 0.059 0.038  
[1.36] [0.92] [0.61] 
Birth rate -0.002 -0.004 -0.006***  
[-0.95] [-1.58] [-3.54] 
%women 0.631** 0.035 0.039  
[2.67] [0.18] [0.17] 
%educated women 0.075 -0.194 -0.109  
[0.66] [-1.72] [-1.43] 
%married women -0.052 -0.143 -0.063  
[-0.94] [-0.74] [-0.37] 
Population density -1.368* -0.593* -0.336  
[-1.94] [-1.82] [-0.70] 
Constant -0.171 0.213 0.174  
[-1.13] [0.94] [0.87] 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.256 0.556 0.523 




4.4.7. Local gender equality, childcare provision and firm-level board 
gender diversity 
As the variable of focus in my study is provincial-level gender equality 
beliefs measures, the baseline regressions are estimated at the aggregate 
province level. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that board gender diversity is a 
firm-level characteristic. As a robustness test, I rerun the regressions at the 
firm level.  
In Table 4.11, the dependent variable is firm-level board gender diversity. 
As independent variables, I include the province-level control variables and an 
array of firm-level control variables, including Ln(Board size), %Independent 
directors, Leverage, Ln(1+Sales growth), ROA, Ln(Assets), Ln(Firm age), and 
Government ownership, Institutional ownership and Managerial ownership – 
the same as what I have included in chapter 3. See Table 3.1 for detailed 
variable definitions. Furthermore, Adams and Ferreira (2009) show that firms 
in which male directors are more closely connected to female directors in other 
firms are more likely to add women to their boards. I thus control for Male 
directors’ connectedness to female directors, calculated as the proportion of 
male directors with external board connections to female directors. I also 
control for Director connectedness, defined as the total number of external 
board seats held by all directors in the firm, as a proxy for the overall 
connectedness of the board. In addition, industry- (2-digit Global Industry 
Classification Standard codes) and year-fixed effects are included to account 




Table 4.11 Local Gender Equality Attitudes and Firm-Level Board 
Gender Diversity 
This table presents firm-level OLS regressions of board gender diversity on the 
proxies for local gender equality attitudes and childcare provision. The sample is a 
firm-year panel data set. All time-varying control variables are lagged by one year 
relative to the dependent variable. Cluster-robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
Panel A:                                     Dependent variable = Board gender diversity 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
     
%Female freshmen in Tsinghua University: 
School of Medical Science 0.002    
 [0.36]    
Schools of Humanities and Social Science  -0.011   
  [-1.01]   
Schools of Physical Science, Technology and 
Engineering 
  0.045*  
   [1.83]  
Total    0.007 
    [0.30] 
     
Control variables:     
Ln(Board size)  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.12] [0.13] [0.14] [0.12] 
%Independent directors  0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 [0.12] [0.12] [0.13] [0.12] 
Leverage 0.750 0.748 0.719 0.761 
 [0.10] [0.10] [0.09] [0.10] 
Ln(1+Sales growth) -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* 
 [-1.77] [-1.74] [-1.78] [-1.78] 
ROA 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.014 
 [0.84] [0.85] [0.88] [0.84] 
Ln(Assets)  -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 [-5.64] [-5.67] [-5.63] [-5.64] 
Ln(Firm age) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 [-1.20] [-1.19] [-1.23] [-1.21] 
Government ownership  -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.032*** 
 [-4.44] [-4.46] [-4.42] [-4.43] 
Institutional ownership  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [-0.06] [-0.05] [-0.05] [-0.05] 
Managerial ownership  0.047 0.046 0.047 0.047 
 [1.55] [1.53] [1.57] [1.55] 
%Male directors with external connections to female 
directors 
0.036* 0.036* 0.036* 0.036* 
 [1.74] [1.75] [1.77] [1.75] 
Director connectedness -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 [-4.28] [-4.28] [-4.29] [-4.29] 
GDP 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.40] [0.40] [0.50] [0.40] 
GDP growth 0.025 0.027 0.029 0.027 
 [0.52] [0.55] [0.59] [0.55] 
Birth rate -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 [-2.28] [-2.38] [-2.32] [-2.26] 
%women 0.420** 0.456*** 0.402** 0.418** 
 [2.45] [2.66] [2.35] [2.46] 
%educated women -0.008 -0.007 -0.024 -0.011 




%married women -0.056 -0.059 -0.057 -0.056 
 [-0.94] [-0.99] [-0.97] [-0.94] 
Population density -0.488 -0.461 -0.395 -0.483 
 [-1.64] [-1.55] [-1.31] [-1.63] 
Constant 0.149 0.144 0.150 0.149 
 [1.51] [1.45] [1.52] [1.51] 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 
N 14325 14325 14325 14325 
 
 
Panel B:                                     Dependent variable = Board gender diversity 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 
      
Gender role attitude:       
Q1 0.151***      
 [3.35] 
     
Q2  0.072**     
 
 [2.24]     
Q3   0.229***    
 
  [3.15]    
Q4    0.067*   
 
   [1.68]   
Q5     0.081***  
 
    [3.32]  
Q6      0.131** 
 
     [2.05] 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.067 0.065 0.066 0.066 0.068 0.065 
N 14325 14325 14325 14021 14325 14325 
 
 
Panel C:                                     Dependent variable = Board gender diversity 
 [1] [2] [3] 
    
Female political role model:    
Presence of female provincial governor 0.004   
 [0.51]   
Presence of female party secretary  0.020*  
  [1.81]  
Total   0.012* 
   [1.80] 
    
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Province-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.076 0.076 0.076 
N 14325 14325 14325 
 
(Table 4.11 continued) 
Panel D:                                     Dependent variable = Board gender diversity 





   
Childcare provision:    
# Days of child being cared outside home per week 0.009   
 [0.82]   
% Survey respondents having their child cared for in non-household  -0.019  
  [-0.21]  
% Survey respondents having their child cared for in professional 
childcare facilities 
  0.035 
 
  [0.27] 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Province-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.078 0.078 0.078 




Table 4.11 reports OLS regressions of firm-level board gender diversity 
on provincial-level gender equality proxies. The data set has a multilevel 
structure, where firms are nested within provinces. Using OLS regressions to 
estimate the model has two limitations. One is the disproportionate 
representation of provinces in the firm-level sample. Large provinces that more 
represent the sample could drive the regression results. The other limitation is 
regarding clustering. If the residuals are correlated across provinces, then 
using firm-level clustering will cause biases on standard errors. Nonetheless, 
the main findings are qualitatively unchanged in the firm-level regressions, 
although the statistical significance is much lower, which is mainly because the 
variation of gender equality belief proxies is rather limited in the large firm-year 
sample. Panel D reports the relation between firm-level board gender diversity 
and provincial-level childcare provision. The relation remains statistically 
insignificant. Furthermore, I find that China’s corporate boards tend to be less 
gender-diverse in larger firms and in government-controlled firms. In the 
untabulated regression results, I further include industry × year dummies. 







The underrepresentation of women on corporate boards has long been 
the focus of financial research (e.g., Adams & Kirchmaier 2015). I employ the 
unique setting of China, where the one-child policy minimises the omitted 
variable biases associated with the supply of women director candidates and 
the socioeconomic development varies significantly across different provinces 
of China. I test whether the measurable cross-province variation in gender 
equality attitudes leads to different levels of board gender diversity.  
The provincial-level gender equality attitudes are measured by (1) the 
gender composition of the student enrolment from different provinces into 
Tsinghua University, the top-ranked STEM-oriented university in China; (2) the 
attitudes and beliefs about the gender differences in intrinsic abilities, 
employment opportunities and career development, and housework division 
from the Chinese General Social Survey; and (3) the existence of female 
political role models in the provincial government and communist party. I find 
robust evidence that in a province with positive attitudes towards gender 
equality, the corporate boards tend to be gender-diverse. Meanwhile, there is 
little evidence that female labour supply or non-household childcare provision 
would improve board gender diversity. Collectively, these findings suggest that 
board gender diversity is primarily associated with gender equality attitudes. 
An important policymaking implication is that the gender equality policies 
targeting institutional-level gender attitudes would be beneficial to women’s 




Chapter 5  
Conclusion 
Practices and policies for improving corporate governance of Chinese firms 
are imperative in light of the weak legal system and poor investor protection in 
China (Allen et al. 2005; Jiang & Kim 2015). Building on contemporary studies 
on corporate governance of Chinese firms (e.g., Fan et al. 2007; Liu & Lu 2007; 
Giannetti et al. 2015), this thesis is dedicated to the specific research field on 
how managerial characteristics affect firm outcomes.  
Extant literature has shown that managers’ personal characteristics affect 
their managerial style in voluntary corporate financial disclosure (Bamber et al. 
2010) and that gender impacts managerial behaviour (Huang & Kisgen 2013). 
Extending these articles that are focused on U.S. firms, this thesis carried out 
three further studies using the unique Chinese setting. The first study 
investigates the role of board secretaries in voluntary disclosure of 
management earnings forecasts. Board secretaries are a unique top 
managerial post for information disclosure in Chinese firms. I study how board 
secretaries’ personal characteristics, including professional expertise, political 
connection, role duality and equity holdings, influence management forecast 
disclosure. The second study uses the relatively high representation of women 
on the board of directors of Chinese firms, and studies whether women would 
interact with each other and make an impact on corporate governance and 
performance. Using the imbalanced socioeconomic development across 




the third study investigates whether the barriers for women to corporate board 
rooms are rooted in societal ideology about women. 
5.1. Summary of findings 
In the first study, I find that management earnings forecast quality is 
positively associated with board secretaries’ legal expertise, accounting 
expertise, foreign experience, dual senior titles and equity ownership, and is 
negatively associated with their membership in the Chinese communist party. 
Furthermore, board secretaries with accounting expertise, dual senior roles 
and equity ownership tend to issue bad news forecasts. Board secretaries who 
deliver more accurate earnings forecasts tend to earn more and have a lower 
likelihood of being replaced. Finally, I document a pervasive impact of board 
secretaries on other corporate issues, including corporate governance, 
business ethics, investment strategy and firm performance.  
In the second study, I examine the gender interaction effect between 
female top managers and female board directors. I argue that due to the 
growing pressure on women to perform, female top managers tend to 
cooperate with female board directors in the decision-making process, leading 
to measurable effects on firm outcomes. I show that the presence of female 
top managers has a larger increasing effect on ROA when there are more 
women on the firm’s board of directors. However, this gender interaction 
results in a negative stock price reaction. The further analysis reveals that the 
opposite effects on accounting and market-based performance measures are 




performance, female top managers in collaboration with female board directors 
are likely to manipulate earnings, which produces high accounting returns.  
In the third study, I study the sources of gender diversity of corporate 
boards. I test whether the measurable cross-province variation in gender 
equality beliefs is associated with board gender diversity. I use novel data sets 
to measure provincial-level societal values towards gender equality. First, I use 
the gender composition of the student enrolment from different provinces into 
Tsinghua University, the top-ranked STEM-oriented university in China. 
Second, I use the Chinese General Social Survey and construct measures of 
average societal beliefs about gender differences in intrinsic abilities, career 
development and household workload. Third, I assume that the presence of 
female political role models in provincial governments indicates higher gender 
equality. Overall, I find robust evidence that in a province with more positive 
values and beliefs about women’s roles in society, the corporate boards are 
more gender-diverse.  
5.2. Contributions 
This thesis contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, the first 
study on the role of board secretaries opens a new research avenue for the 
top management team (TMT) studies. This study also adds to the management 
forecast literature by documenting a new managerial determinant of the 
forecast quality. I provide original evidence that the forecast quality is affected 
by board secretaries’ characteristics. This study also complements the 




2009; Chen et al. 2016; Lee 2017), as accurate and timely management 
forecast disclosure can protect investors and is a business ethics issue. 
The second study on gender interaction bridges two strands of literature 
on the presence of female leadership in the TMT and the gender diversity of 
the board of directors. Further, this study extends the work of Amore et al. 
(2014) by showing that the gender interaction between female top managers 
and female board directors leads to a short-lived increment in ROA, which is a 
result of earnings management. This study also complements the general 
literature on diversity, such as racial diversity (Richard 2000; Richard et al. 
2004), cognitive diversity (Kilduff et al. 2000) and TMT heterogeneity (Pegels 
et al. 2000; Carpenter 2002).   
The third study on the sources of board gender diversity provides the first 
evidence that improved provincial-level gender equality environments promote 
board gender diversity in contemporary China. It further shows that the base 
level female labour supply and the provision of childcare service have no 
statistical effects on board gender diversity. These supply factors appear not 
to inhibit women from rising to corporate boards. The gender inequality 
ideology about women’s roles in society seem more influential.  
This thesis has important implications for regulators, investors and 
policymakers. First, given the influential role of board secretaries in 
management forecast disclosure, regulators in China should closely monitor 
the practices of board secretaries in voluntary corporate information disclosure 




should carefully consider the side effect of high female representation in 
corporations. When women represent a significant faction of the top 
management team as well as the board of directors, the gender interaction 
between the two would take place, leading to inflated accounting returns, 
which is due to earnings management. Third, policymakers in China who target 
the gender composition of corporate boards to improve board monitoring and 
corporate governance should take actions to overcome the socioeconomic 
barriers in women’s career development especially in local communities where 
women’s societal role is undervalued.  
5.3. Limitations of research 
This thesis has several limitations worth further investigation. First, as I 
have discussed in the first study, board secretaries are the persons disclosing 
management earnings forecasts to the public. However, the forecasted 
earnings numbers are actually produced by the CFOs. Although my empirical 
results suggest an influential role of board secretaries in forecast quality, the 
specific mechanism through which board secretaries impact the financial 
forecasting process remains obscure.  
Second, the first study examines a variety of characteristics of the board 
secretaries, and these managerial characteristics could be endogenously 
chosen by the firms to suit their operating strategies. Because I do not have 
enough instrumental variables to carry out the rigorous 2SLS tests, I am unable 




Third, the second study documents opposite effect of gender interaction 
on accounting returns and stock prices. I have proposed an earnings 
management-based explanation to reconcile the conflicting results. However, 
it can be seen in Table 3.12 that the impact of gender interaction on earnings 
management is significant at the 10% significance level. Some omitted factors 
could be driving the opposite results.  
Fourth, the third study uses survey data to create provincial-level gender 
equality proxies. Since there are large missing observations in the time-series 
of the survey data, I only exploit the cross-sectional variation of the data to 
construct these proxies. This makes the endogeneity tests rather difficult, as 
fixed effects and dynamic panel GMM estimators cannot be used if the 
variables have no time-series variation.   
Fifth, in the third study, I argue that due to the one-child policy, Chinese 
women are likely to have equal access to education and resources of their 
family as men and are less interrupted in their career progression, so that the 
inadequate supply of qualified female director candidates is unlikely to be an 
issue in the Chinese setting. As an attempt to further control for the supply of 
women and disentangle the supply issue from the gender equality issue, I 
include female labour force participation and childcare provision as control 
variables. It is still worthwhile to find more rigorous measures to capture the 
supply effect.  
Finally, as this thesis studies many unique features of Chinese companies, 




context. First, the post of board secretaries in information disclosure is unique 
to Chinese companies, while in other countries it is more likely that CEOs and 
CFOs release corporate financial information, and company secretaries in 
these countries are more like coordinators of corporate matters. Even though 
my findings for Chinese board secretaries would not have direct implications 
for improving voluntary information disclosure in other countries, my evidence 
suggests that in other countries managerial characteristics could also affect 
the managers’ practice in information disclosure. It is worthwhile to further 
study which managerial characteristic is preferable in the non-Chinese context. 
Second, some advanced economies such as Norway have mandated gender 
quotas at the board level, and the societal-level gender equality is substantially 
high. Further increasing gender equality in these countries may not have 
desirable effects. In view of the unappealing gender interaction effect I 
documented in the second study, when women make up a notable faction of 
the top management team as well as the board of directors, an undesirable 
gender interaction effect would take place. In the Chinese context, I argue that 
this is due to the strong pressure for women to perform. However, in developed 
countries (e.g., Norway), whether such an expectation for women to 
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Appendix 1 Factor Analysis of Gender Role Values 
I apply principal component factor analysis to the six gender role 
questions in Table A1. According to Kaiser’s (1960) criterion, only factors with 
eigenvalues greater than 1 are meaningful and worth keeping. I retain the first 
two factors, which together explain 83.9% of the total variance of the six 
independent attitude question scores. The factor loadings for Q1, Q2, Q3, Q5 
and Q6 on Factor 1 are positive and higher than 0.80, and the factor loading 
of Q4 on Factor 2 is equal to 0.981. The factor loadings are actually the 
correlation coefficients between each question score and the underlying factor. 
The uniqueness of Q2 and Q3 is around 0.27, which means that about 27% of 
the variance in Q2 and Q3 scores is not shared with the variance of other 
questions in the factor model. Collectively, it appears that Factor 1 is mainly 
defined by Q1, Q2, Q3, Q5 and Q6, while Factor 2 is defined by Q4.  
In Table A2, I test whether the gender role factors can explain board 
gender diversity. In models 1 and 2, where Factor 1 and Factor 2 are included 
as separate factors, each of them is significantly and positively associated with 
board gender diversity. In model 3, where both factors are included 
simultaneously, I find that only Factor 1 has a significant and positive effect, 
while the coefficient on Factor 2 is positive but insignificant. Jointly, the results 
suggest that when the societal gender roles are more equal, women’s 




Table A1 Factor Analysis of Gender Role Beliefs 
This table presents the principal component factor analysis of the gender equality 
attitude variables derived from CGSS survey questions regarding gender roles in 
society. Panel A reports the factor eigenvalue, Panel B reports the factor loadings on 
the first two factors, and Panel C reports the scoring coefficients to generate the 
scores of the first two factors. 
Panel A: Factor analysis   
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1 3.992 2.950 0.665 0.665 
Factor 2 1.042 0.663 0.174 0.839 
Factor 3 0.379 0.036 0.063 0.902 
Factor 4 0.343 0.174 0.057 0.960 
Factor 5 0.170 0.096 0.028 0.988 
Factor 6 0.073 . 0.012 1.000 
 
Panel B: Factor loadings  
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
Q1 0.956 -0.029 0.085 
Q2 0.854 -0.028 0.270 
Q3 0.814 -0.252 0.273 
Q4 0.116 0.981 0.024 
Q5 0.905 0.113 0.168 
Q6 0.923 0.044 0.146 
 
Panel C: Scoring coefficients 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 
Q1 0.240 -0.027 
Q2 0.214 -0.027 
Q3 0.204 -0.242 
Q4 0.029 0.941 
Q5 0.227 0.108 





Table A2 Gender Role Factors and Board Gender Diversity 
This table presents OLS regressions of provincial-level board gender diversity on the 
first two factors derived from the principal factor analysis of CGSS survey questions. 
All time-varying control variables are lagged by one year relative to the dependent 
variable. Cluster-robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are 
defined in Table 4.1. 
Dependent variable = Board gender diversity 
  [1] [2] [3] 
    
Gender role attitude:    
Factor 1 0.008**  0.007* 
 [2.23]  [1.74] 
Factor 2  0.005** 0.003 
  [2.13] [0.97] 
    
Control variables:    
GDP 0.004** 0.002 0.004** 
 [2.58] [1.13] [2.24] 
GDP growth 0.045 0.043 0.034 
 [0.73] [0.63] [0.57] 
Birth rate -0.005*** -0.003 -0.004*** 
 [-4.31] [-1.64] [-3.50] 
%women 0.420 0.468 0.427 
 [1.48] [1.42] [1.54] 
%educated women -0.021 0.048 -0.003 
 [-0.27] [0.49] [-0.05] 
%married women -0.046 -0.044 -0.040 
 [-0.77] [-0.80] [-0.74] 
Population density -1.526*** -1.144* -1.438*** 
 [-3.74] [-1.97] [-3.25] 
Constant -0.017 -0.071 -0.032 
 [-0.13] [-0.48] [-0.26] 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.473 0.428 0.479 
N 308 308 308 
 
